

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

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Special Issue

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Rates: \$26/yr.; \$44/2 yrs.; \$59/3 yrs. Please add \$10 outside the United States and Canada.

The National Interest (ISSN 0884-9382) is published quarterly in Spring, Summer, Fall and Winter by The National Interest, Inc., a non-profit partnership of Hollinger International, Inc. and The Nixon Center that has received long-term support from the John M. Olin Foundation and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *P.A.I.S.*, *Historical Abstracts*, *International Political Science Abstracts*, *U.S. Political Science Documents*, *Political Science Abstracts*, and *America: History and Life*; and available on microfilm from University Microfilms International. Periodicals postage is paid at Washington, DC, and at additional mailing offices. © 2001 by The National Interest, Inc. *The National Interest* is printed by Kirby Lithographic Co., Inc. It is distributed in the U.S. and Canada by Ingram Periodicals (1240 Heil Quaker Blvd., La Vergne, TN 37086-7000, 615-793-5522) and Bernhard DeBoer (113 East Centre Street, Nutley, NJ 07110, 973-667-9300) and in the U.K. by Comag Special Services (Tavistock Road, West Drayton, Middlesex UB7 7QX, 44-1895-444055). BPA International Membership Applied for December 1999.

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The world did not change on September 11, but the assumptions of many did. The future is bound to be a more realistic place.

A Special Issue

In the decade and a half since *The National Interest* was launched, we have never deviated from our quarterly publication schedule—until now. That is because, until now, there has been no good reason to do so. Even the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, sudden by historical measure and momentous in implication as those events were, did not suggest a need to alter well-established practice. The attacks of September 11, 2001 and their aftermath, however, have evoked a different feeling, not just in our offices here—located about four blocks from the White House—but in the nation at large and, indeed, around much of the world.

The reason lies, I think, in the unprecedented nature of the attack itself. Not since the War of 1812 has the capital of the United States been attacked, and not since the Revolutionary War has America's largest city, New York, experienced anything remotely resembling combat. Never before in all of American history have so many civilians been murdered on a single day. Never before has mass-casualty terrorism struck such a heavy blow on any country, let alone on the pre-eminent world power of an era. Paul Giraudoux once wrote, "The privilege of the great is to watch catastrophe from a distance." In a sense, that is what America as a great power has been doing for more than a century. Not any more, and in its own somber way, that qualifies as special.

Some say that the events of September 11 have dispelled a great deal of confusion and irresolution in post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy by giving the country and its leadership a focus of an intensity comparable to that of Soviet Communism and European Fascism before it. Others observe that the nature of the threat, and the absence of any directly relevant strategic precedent to handle it, leaves us more uncertain and troubled about the future than ever. Perhaps neither of these points is really true, or perhaps both are. In any event, since none of us knows yet what will be, we felt it wise to create a special issue dedicated to the rapidly unfolding events and to the discussions touched off by the September 11 attacks, and to bring it before our readers as quickly as possible.

This special publication, which we have called the Thanksgiving 2001 issue, consists of nine essays and an extended conversation about the problems and choices before us. We make no claim to cover every aspect of those present circumstances that occupy our thoughts, only to touch on some of the most immediate questions and to offer a few particularly time-sensitive analyses about the initial theater of war in and near Afghanistan. There is no book review or letters section between these covers; each will return with the Winter 2001/02 issue, which will appear according to schedule. (Nor, of course, will subscribers be billed anything extra for this violation of our quarterly routine.)

Finally, we have decided to name this issue after the American holiday of Thanksgiving for a reason. The experience of the mass murder of innocents is nothing to be thankful for, of course, nor is the need for the arduous and dangerous struggle that doubtless lies ahead. But it is a constant of human nature that a painful loss sharpens the appreciation of what is most dear to us. We have experienced such a loss, and one consequence of our renewed thankfulness for what America is and offers to the world is a stronger sense of national unity and purpose than many of us have ever witnessed in our lifetimes. This sense of unity and purpose is symbolized, of course, by the near-universal display of the American flag in houses, schools and offices all over this country. Long, long may it wave.

—Adam Garfinkle

A Test by Terrorism_____

—James Schlesinger_____

THE EVENTS of September 11, undoubtedly the best planned and best executed terrorist act in memory, have transformed the domestic and international landscape. The media have regularly asserted that *everything has changed*—a judgment that apparently does not apply to the hyperbole of the press. Some things have changed; others have been re-inforced; and still others have been made visible that previously were unrecognized. What has changed domestically is a new and different focus and a rebirth of national unity, which could prove transitory. The public's illusion, despite most of a decade's intelligence warnings and commission reports, of American immunity to terrorism has been shattered. London, Paris, Rome and Tokyo may have been susceptible to terrorist acts, but in the public mind somehow this nation remained invulnerable. We now even recall prior acts of foreign terrorism on our soil that were quickly forgotten. We now recognize—and perhaps exaggerate—our own vulnerability to terrorism.

Internationally the impact has been equally dramatic. Public opinion in allied

countries has again become strongly supportive of the United States. Gone are the cascading complaints about global warming, American unilateralism, ballistic missile defense and the rest. Suddenly the French recall 1944—and the Russians reminisce about the wartime alliance of 1941–45. “*Ich bin ein New Yorker*” is uttered as a chorus in Germany.

Public reaction in much of the Middle East has been quite different, however. While public demonstrations of delight were few, many felt that America had “*got-ten what it deserved*.” For far too many, Osama bin Laden has become something of a folk hero—an Arab Robin Hood successfully defying the American Sheriff of Nottingham. Demonstrations against the American bombing of Afghanistan have been widespread. While something less than Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations, this disparity and reaction is instructive. It underscores both the internal fragility of particular nations in the Islamic world, and the overall fragility of the coalition that we are assembling in the wake of the September 11 attack.

Fundamentals

BEFORE TURNING to the many consequences of that act, we should reflect on some of the fundamentals of terrorism. Terrorism is truly a weapon of the weak. It is an act

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of defiance against a dominant power or a dominant establishment, based upon the tacit acknowledgment that direct confrontation is beyond the power of the terrorist. In this case, the need to turn to terrorism is in a sense a tribute to the basic strength of the United States; the motive for doing so is American pre-eminence.

The need to strike out against a stronger power has fostered the search for what is known as asymmetric warfare—the means to inflict significant damage on a stronger foe by attacking points of maximum vulnerability. And the possibility of asymmetric warfare, curiously enough, is a reflection of the trickle down of technology, developed in large degree by the United States, but increasingly available to those who would assault it. Terrorists today have available to them the fruits of Western technology; not only wide-bodied jet aircraft and flying lessons, but also the Global Positioning System, satellite photography, encryption, the Internet and jamming capabilities—all technologies that permit more sophisticated attacks than anything available in the past. The irony is that contemporary terrorists are making use of all those elements that are the product of the progressive civilization that the more dedicated or fanatical Islamists find so objectionable.

Countless studies have pointed to the necessity of asymmetric warfare for those who would damage the United States, especially since the failures of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the Gulf War. Steady and persistent intelligence warnings have pointed to the dedication and malign intentions of bin Laden and his ilk—even if intelligence clearly failed to provide specific warnings regarding either the timing or the technique of the September 11 actions.

Catastrophic as those events were, they have had the beneficial effect of providing a useful wake-up call. The revelation of our vulnerability has made us

keenly aware of the necessity of reducing that vulnerability. For some forty years, this nation has nurtured an ideology of ever greater openness—and suddenly we have been confronted with some of the consequences. Under this ideology we have become terribly lax. The September 11 terrorists were able all too easily to enter the country and to operate with surprising freedom. Tourist and student visas are given almost automatically—and their conditions are not enforced when they expire. Visa requirements can be waived. The Immigration and Naturalization Service devotes most of its energies to sweeps against illegal workers from Mexico and elsewhere—and devotes few resources to those who may wish to inflict damage on us. Our borders are porous and individuals with hostile intent can enter illegally, most notably from Canada. The nation, as Senator Dianne Feinstein has observed, is like a sieve.

Once here, these individuals confront security measures that are less than robust—certainly far less robust than in other industrial nations. That four sets of terrorists could move so readily through airport security, and apparently stow box cutters on some aircraft, tells us how flimsy airport security measures have been. Moreover, that access to the aircraft cabin was so easily obtained shows that both procedures and physical protection were wholly inadequate. After the theft, we are now taking steps to lock the barn door. These measures will be sufficiently effective, no doubt, that the next terrorist acts will employ something other than passenger aircraft. Still, in my judgment, the President needs to establish a national commission, like that after the *Challenger* disaster, to study the entire range of issues in order to learn what went wrong. This is fundamental.

A wake-up call has also sounded in another area. For years, analysts have

been pointing to the possibility of biological warfare directed against the United States. Now, with the sending of anthrax spores through the mail, it is no longer a possibility, but a reality. On balance, this too has its beneficial aspect. *No one need die of anthrax attacks.* The public has been alerted. The disease is readily treatable when detected early enough. Public health officials are being provided the resources they need to store antibiotics, vaccines, and to make other preparations.

The American Response—So Far

THE BUSH Administration has reacted impressively. It has rallied the American public (as well as an international coalition). It has taken necessary measures. It has been steadfast. At times, some official statements went further in creating alarm than was necessary, but the administration has now struck the right balance between warning and reassuring the public.

In one area, however, we are obliged to do more. We have urged others to follow the money trail and to cut off the financial resources flowing to terrorists. But we must practice what we preach. The United States is not the only or even the first nation to be subject to terrorism. Britain, for example, has been subjected to repeated acts of terrorism by the IRA and its successors. Where does the money come from? From the United States—collection points, nominally for charity, can be found in all too many of the bars in Boston, New York and elsewhere. We owe it to the Brits—to say nothing about the consistency and credibility of our campaign against terrorism—to clamp down on those money flows.

The measures that we take domestically, though essential, are by far the easier part of the problem. The international

position of the United States has been challenged—and the ultimate question is how does the United States respond to that challenge? As mentioned above, in the aftermath of the September 11 events, much of the world has rallied in support of the United States. Some did so with deep sympathy and with enthusiasm. Others, however, did so equivocally, and still others did so reluctantly. The immediate response that we have seen will undoubtedly be the high point of support. As actions are taken in response to the terrorist attack, support will gradually dwindle. The demonstrations against the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan are a harbinger of eventual disagreements with American policy. For the moment, the outside world has been shocked into attentiveness. There is a good deal of apprehension: *what will the Americans do?* How will it affect us and (most importantly for foreign leaders) public opinion in our countries?

In itself, that underscores an important point. While the international spotlight is on the United States, it is essential, if we are to preserve our international position, that the actions we take be regarded as successful—preferably highly successful. The first requirement in deciding what to do is to avoid actions that can be deemed a failure. We do not need a repetition of Desert One—or even a lesser muck-up like the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. It is perhaps less important precisely what actions we take than that those actions be deemed impressive and successful.

The first set of actions seems almost mandatory, and indeed obvious: go after the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban regime that has provided it protection. The entire international coalition expects such action—and will support it. Driving the Taliban from power should be relatively straightforward. The Russians, who are painfully familiar with the difficulties to be encountered in Afghanistan, agree

that the Taliban can be removed.¹ But they admonish us that it cannot be accomplished by bombing alone. It will require U.S. ground forces in Afghanistan to weaken or destroy the elite forces that support the Taliban. That judgment is correct. But it will require sustained firepower from the air to protect the modest friendly forces on the ground—especially if they are led into traps by false intelligence.

I believe that such actions can and will be successful, and that the international coalition will stay with us throughout, though with diminishing enthusiasm. One admonition should be borne in mind, however. The removal of the Taliban should be accomplished as expeditiously as possible, not least because the situation in Pakistan is delicate. Some significant part of the Pakistani public vehemently disagrees with President Musharraf's decision to ally himself with the United States. The more quickly the removal of the Taliban becomes a *fait accompli*, the less will be the internal strain within Pakistan and the more secure will be our own arrangements in that country.

A further point to bear in mind is that actually capturing bin Laden may be neither quick nor easy, or even eventually be accomplished with certainty. One should recall that even in Panama we were unable to find and apprehend Manuel Noriega—until he foolishly located himself for us by taking refuge in the residence of the papal nuncio. But if finding bin Laden is time-consuming, or even if it is ultimately unsuccessful, the fall of the Taliban will be regarded internationally as an indication of American success.

The Next Stage

THE CRUCIAL—and difficult—question is what comes next, after the Taliban has been removed and bin Laden has been killed, captured or put on the run? It is

then that the President will be obliged to make a decision that is laden with complexities and burdened by risks. We have asserted that the war on terrorism involves not only rooting out the terrorists themselves, but also those who harbor them. To do so is a demanding and a lengthy task, and, realistically, we must recognize that it can never be wholly successful. We may assert that we will root out all “terrorism with a global reach”, but not all agree on just who are the terrorists and who are the legitimate resistance fighters. When and if we go after other nations—other than the obvious culprits in Afghanistan—we must expect international support to diminish and the international coalition to fray. That in itself poses a simple but critical question: Is the creation and preservation of an international coalition a means to an end, or an end in itself?

Our rhetoric about confronting those who harbor terrorists almost obliges us to take further action. We have regularly spoken of the “next phase.” But unavoidably, that next phase will be fraught with difficulties. We must bear continuously in mind the injunction that failure would be far worse than taking no additional action. So, as we move into that next phase, *we must assure ourselves that the political and logistical problems that might preclude success have been meticulously examined and redressed in advance.*

The target of the next phase most discussed in Washington has been Saddam Hussein's Iraq. If it turns out that Iraq has been the source of the anthrax bacteria planted in various places in the United

¹In 1998, the Russians strongly warned the United States of the threat posed by Osama bin Laden. They have repeatedly urged cooperative action against him and his organization—but the offer was rebuffed with the assertion that the Russians were only seeking to reassert themselves in Central Asia.

States, that would clearly provide us with sufficient justification for action against Iraq to ease the concerns of most members of the coalition, though not all. We must anticipate vehement objection to any possible American action by some other nations, and particularly by Iraq's Arab neighbors. Such action might destabilize one or more of the moderate regimes in the region.

To move successfully against Iraq, one must have appropriate bases. Yet even Turkey has of late been moving toward warming its relations with Iraq, and, given its preferences, would wish to take no part in any such action.

The situation in Saudi Arabia is even more problematic. The Saudi regime has long practiced a balancing act, in which limited collaboration with its Western protectors is weighed against support for conservative elements within the Kingdom that resent the association with and the presence of those protectors. It has long been a fiction of many in the West that there is a substantial liberal opposition in Saudi Arabia seeking greater openness, transparency and tolerance. The real opposition comes from conservative elements that passionately believe that the Saudi government has gone much too far in accommodating Western "infidels." That has been the source of bin Laden's support. The great irony is that charitable contributions from Saudi Arabia go to support the religious schools outside of the country that are undermining the regime and seeking its overthrow.

Since it is scarcely in the American interest to weaken a government that is partly responsive to our desires, and even less so to contemplate what a successor government might look like (bin Laden himself would emulate Khomeini), careful assessment of the consequences in Saudi Arabia of any American decision is essential. The bases in Saudi Arabia are almost a necessity for successful action against

Saddam Hussein. To be sure, bases in Israel might be a partial substitute, and the government of Israel likely would be amenable, but that raises difficult political questions even as it solves logistical ones. The fragility of Saudi Arabia and the delicacy of our own relations with its government underscore the need for caution. One must reiterate that any action taken against Saddam Hussein must be successful—or it should be avoided, at least for the time being.

Moreover, we must also bear in mind the question of oil supply and price—especially as the global economy sinks into recession. A move against Saddam Hussein immediately removes more than two million barrels a day of oil from the international supply, and would before very long have a sharp impact on prices. Moreover, being associated with a U.S. attack on an Arab country makes it extraordinarily difficult for other Arab oil-producing states to compensate for such a loss of supply—and no one aside from the Arab producers has the requisite spare capacity to attempt such compensation. The upshot of all these considerations is that any presidential decision must be carefully weighed on the basis of sound intelligence and a full spectrum of political and economic assessments.

THE TERRORIST actions of September 11 represent a testing of the United States—its strength, its will and purpose, its tenacity, in short, its international position. The episode poses the question as to whether the United States can be repeatedly attacked with impunity. We have no alternative but to react very forcefully to this episode. To do otherwise would weaken our international position, as well as expose the United States to a continuation, if not an increase, in such terrorist acts.

THE NATION senses this. The public's response to this attack has been both impressive and gratifying. One rarely has seen such an immediacy of stalwart response, or such intensity of national unity as has been demonstrated over the past several weeks. But the administration has wisely emphasized that this will be a lengthy struggle, and so the key question is, will our national unity last? Will we, indeed, stay the course, even in the face of disappointments and future unpleasant surprises?

Many have compared the events of September 11 to those of December 7,

1941 at Pearl Harbor. One hopes that that will prove to be the case and that, as before, this country is ready for a lengthy campaign. But we should also remember that our engagement in 1965 in Vietnam started with a similar if less dramatic display of national unity—with the Tonkin Gulf Resolution and with General William Westmoreland brought back from Southeast Asia to address a cheering joint session of Congress. But then came the disappointments and the unpleasant surprises. National unity disappeared and the national will faltered. One trusts that that will not be the case in this complex, difficult and lengthy struggle. □

from "Song of Myself"

Enough! enough! enough!
Somehow I have been stunn'd. Stand back!
Give me a little time beyond my cuff'd head, slumbers, dreams, gaping,
I discover myself on the verge of a usual mistake.

That I could forget the mockers and insults!
That I could forget the trickling tears and the blows of the bludgeons and
hammers!
That I could look with a separate look on my own crucifixion and bloody
crowning!

I remember now,
I resume the overstaid fraction,
The grave of rock multiplies what has been confided to it, or to any graves,
Corpses rise, gashes heal, fastenings roll from me.

I troop forth replenish'd with supreme power, one of an average unending
procession,
Inland and sea-coast we go, and pass all boundary lines,
Our swift ordinances on their way over the whole earth,
The blossoms we wear in our hats the growth of thousands of years.

—Walt Whitman

A Strange War

Eliot A. Cohen

THE SEMANTIC contest to define the conflict that began, or rather became manifest, on September 11 started immediately: Would it be crime or war? Instinctively, Secretary of State Colin Powell said, "You can be sure that the United States government will do everything to find the perpetrators of this cowardly attack against innocent people and bring them to justice." The President, however, seemed to frame the matter differently by declaring three days later at the National Cathedral that "war has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder."

Despite the President's words, the truth is that this argument continues today, albeit in muted public form. But once the focus on Afghanistan has passed, once the targets become less clearly compelling to some and diplomatically more prone to cause allied dissensus, the argument will return. Indeed, in some measure it persists in the spontaneous remarks of all those who discuss the current crisis. Seemingly random choices of words reflect, in fact, profound differences over how the United States will approach what may be a protracted, and

certainly a very dangerous, struggle.

The case for considering the American reaction to the suicide hijackings of September 11 through the prism of police work is, on the surface, a strong one. Quite aside from the fact that it reflects the continuity of U.S. policy, no state claimed responsibility for these deeds, and most of the publicly available evidence (though not all of it) points to the operations of terrorist groups whose links with foreign states are not those of servant and master. Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda is a non-state organization, even if it has had working relationships with Pakistani, Iraqi or other nations' intelligence services. As ghastly as their consequences were, the attacks reflected the work of a small band of operatives—fewer than a score directly, with a supporting infrastructure of a few hundred at the most. These were not the uniformed representatives of another country, and their physical support and training came from within the United States and Europe, where they had dwelt, acquired many of the necessary skills, and whence they operated.

Arguably, too, the attacks of September 11—although they slew almost three times as many people as perished at Pearl Harbor—could not have been countered or even pre-empted by American military power. The front-line forces on that day and in the months preceding consisted of airport security personnel, Immigration and Naturalization Service agents, FBI

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database managers and hosts of others whose concern is domestic security and law enforcement, not war-fighting. In months and years to come, such people will continue to be the most important line of defense for the American homeland, not the American military. Even abroad, secret agents and spies may play a more important role than soldiers or pilots. The day after the attack, despite the losses in Washington, the American military was essentially untouched: these were blows struck at American society, not its military. The Pentagon was as much a symbolic as a military target. And one might argue that as horrible as the events were, the attack, like most spectacular criminal acts, did little permanent damage. How, then, can this be a war?

The language of “criminals” being “brought to justice” is, in the end, a comforting definition of a hideous problem. America’s law enforcement resources are enormous and its bureaucracies for coping with homeland defense extensive, if ill-coordinated. It is reassuring to have “outlaws” as opponents, for it assumes that the civilized world—indeed, humanity itself—regards those who committed these atrocities as acting out of all norms of decent behavior. The language implies a comforting restriction on the threats we face, and therefore on the responses we must consider.

All true—and all beside the point. September 11 marked a climactic battle in an ill-defined war, but a war nonetheless. The hesitation shown by some to fully embrace the language of war reflects a wish to define war narrowly and rigidly, as the kind of conflict the United States seemingly won so decisively against Iraq in 1991. That is to say, it is a definition of war that has neat beginnings and decisive endings, waged against a state, or more precisely, against its armed forces, accompanied by clearly defined objectives, “end states” and “exit strategies.” This con-

stricted understanding of war, which reflects both a lack of historical perspective and the post-Vietnam quest for simplicity and certainty in the conduct of armed conflict, is and has always been inadequate. Mankind has fought many different kinds of wars, and if this one looks strange to us, it is only because we have closed our eyes to the varieties of conflict that have long afflicted humanity. According to the standard, narrow definition, Vietnam was a strange war, hence the extreme and dangerous insistence of many strategic thinkers and senior officers in expunging its memory, save as a cautionary example of a kind of conflict never again to be fought. Strange, too, was the century-long contest between France and Great Britain for control of North America. To an even greater degree, so were the struggles of medieval Europe.

Understandably, it is out of fashion to talk about the Crusades, but the truth is that, considered as an unfamiliar form of war, they have much to teach us. They combined both a “clash of civilizations”, in Samuel Huntington’s words, and more conventional interstate struggles. They involved armies as the recognizable forces of states along with a welter of entrepreneurs, religious orders and bandits. They saw strange and shifting alliances in which religious fanaticism could give way to cynical calculations of individual and state interest, only to be replaced once again by cultural and religious animosity of the most virulent sort. Above all, these were wars without end states and exit strategies, wars that resist the neat classifications of those who impart military doctrine at war colleges, or of politicians and generals who seek clarity and order when all is obscurity and confusion.

This is, then, war, but it is a strange war. In this war, September 11 was one battle, and should be understood as such. It was a battle even though it was waged exclusively by civilians who never wore a

uniform in their lives. “Battles”, Winston Churchill wrote in his biography of the Duke of Marlborough,

are the principal milestones in secular history. Modern opinion resents this uninspiring truth, and historians often treat the decisions of the field as incidents in the dramas of politics and diplomacy. But great battles, won or lost, change the entire course of events, create new standards of values, new moods, new atmospheres, in armies and in nations, to which all must conform.

What are the new “standards of values”, the “new moods” and “new atmospheres” for us today?

The extraordinary success of the terrorists of September 11—their ability to operate undetected and to wreak tremendous damage—demonstrated, first and foremost, American vulnerability. An Egyptian journalist, writing in *al-Abrar*, a newspaper of the Egyptian Liberal Party wrote:

Oh yeah, guys, they told us that he who stings America ends up in the grave. They told us that [America] protects the Arab royal families. They told us that [America] can find a black ant on a dark night in the parched desert; that it has the most powerful intelligence apparatus in the world that can detect what happens in our bedrooms—an apparatus that knows what kind of underwear the president of Iraq [wears]. . . . It has been proven that it was all an illusion.

In theory, of course, everyone knew that an open society could suffer these kinds of attacks; few of the relevant experts thought that American intelligence and domestic security was so good that it could thwart every attack of this kind. But the vivid demonstration of American vulnerability has changed atmospheres and values. The success of the attacks and their reverberations throughout the

U.S. economy and a stunned, and let it be said, frightened society have given a boost to America’s enemies. (If they pay closer attention, however, they will have noticed as well the relative absence of panic, the extraordinary restraint and even sympathy shown in dealing with Muslim and Arab-American minorities, and the general note of quiet patriotism.) The world may not have changed in the most visible sense—the attacks will, for example, merely accelerate and deepen somewhat an economic slowdown that was already in train—but in mood and feeling it has. Many of America’s enemies have drawn not merely delight but encouragement from this turn of events; some of its rivals may see opportunities; its people have begun to mobilize their spirits. In the realm of intangibles, which is where wars are shaped, a very great deal has changed in ways that we cannot hope to measure.

September 11 marked a battle in another way, too. Crime has either the objective of illicit gain, or mere sadistic pleasure in seeing victims suffer. The latter certainly played a role here, but the terrorists clearly acted with political purposes in mind. These have been described clearly in the *fatwa* issued by bin Laden on February 23, 1998, called “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.” In order of importance, bin Laden’s World Islamic Front views as *casus belli* the presence of the United States on the Arabian peninsula, the continued suffering of the Iraqi people from U.S. military and economic pressure, and American support for Israel. The purposes of his struggle are equally clear: “to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip . . . [to force] their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.” These may be unrealizable strategic objectives, but so are most objectives in wartime.

The understanding of this conflict as war, therefore, should dominate our discussion of it. To wage it successfully requires clear and dispassionate thinking—always a scarce commodity in wartime. “The maximum use of force is by no means incompatible with the simultaneous use of the intellect”, Karl von Clausewitz observed. Yet the many emotions stirred by war and loss, and the press of urgent business, means that clear strategic argument will be much rarer than one might hope—or than trusting citizens might think actually occurs. For senior decision-makers, judgments in wartime come in a flood of micro-decisions, reflecting assumptions and beliefs that receive little scrutiny once they have crystallized in speeches, briefings and memoranda. Yet the stakes are too large, the outcomes too potentially dangerous, to engage in decision-making by historical cliché or television sound bite. Three questions at least should be at the top of the strategist’s agenda: Whence did this war come? What directions might it take? And how shall we adapt ourselves to it?

The Origins of War

IN WAR it is often easier to know *whom* one is fighting than *what* one is fighting. Even World War II, seemingly a model of clarity in the matter of enemies, was more obscure than is commonly taught. That the Allies were fighting Germans and their proxies, everyone knew. But what was the enemy? Nazism? Hitlerism? Prussian militarism? A return in wrath of Germany’s *Griff nach der Weltmacht*, the drive for world power that had failed in 1914–18? Defining the enemy made a difference not only in terms of the peace the Allies would seek, but in understanding it so as to defeat it. In the United States and Great Britain there were many who believed that the

Germans were rigid and orderly Teutonic masterminds, formidable in preparing and executing elaborate nefarious schemes, but thrown off balance when one disrupted their plans. The truth was just the reverse: Nazi Germany was a chaotic welter of competing organizations, and its generals excelled in spontaneous reaction to unforeseen events. The relationships between officers and enlisted men may well have been easier and more informal in the Wehrmacht than they were in the U.S. Army. The real nature of the enemy was unclear, in many respects, until after the war was over—and is even today a matter of scholarly dispute.

So, too, here. The *who* is, for the moment, clear: members of the Al-Qaeda terrorist network. But *what* is the United States fighting? Understandably, American political and military leaders feel a powerful urge to define the enemy as narrowly as possible. Thus, the enemy is “a fringe form of Islamic extremism”, as President Bush and others have put it—an isolated, marginal and alien element in the Arab and Islamic worlds that is utterly at odds with their societies and the tenets of their religion. It is a belief reinforced by many voices in those worlds for a variety of reasons: genuine conviction, fear of the repercussions of a *Kulturkampf* between the West and Islam, or instinctive abhorrence when faced with the massacre of innocents.

A narrow definition of *what* we fight as an illegitimate, crackpot splintering from sane and healthy religious and national communities may soothe consciences, serve short-term political ends and provide reassuring boundaries to our fears. But it is incorrect. Al-Qaeda draws upon much larger movements in the Arab and Islamic worlds, tapping artesian rivers of hatred and resentment that rush beneath the surface of controlled societies. It is neither easily isolated nor taken

to be illegitimate to all but a few fanatics. Even a cursory look at the Arab press reveals spontaneous expressions of delight at the humiliation of the United States. The studious avoidance by many Islamic clerics of unconditional condemnation of such techniques of struggle is revealing. Osama bin Laden is by no means a figure of execration and revulsion throughout the Arab or the Muslim world—and as inconvenient a fact as that may be, a fact it remains.

Normally, statesmen leave the sifting of the causes of war to historians—the wise do so because they know that they are too close to events to see them clearly, the more typical because they think they understand very well matters of which they often have but a superficial grip. In the current case, however, at least some kind of preliminary analysis is necessary. An understanding of causes may not tell us how to shape strategy, but it can help explain where a conflict may go, how long it may persist, and what turns it may take. So, for example, to know that World War II in Europe had a great deal to do with the psychopathology of Adolf Hitler on the one hand, and the sinister power of National Socialism as an ideology on the other, was not, perhaps, of much use in telling Winston Churchill whether to reinforce the Middle East in early 1941. But it surely shaped his view of how extensive the war might be, how long it might endure, and what kind of measures might be required to win it.

Like some of the great wars of the past, the current conflict may be understood at three levels. The deepest causes of this war, which are also the most intractable, have to do with the long encounter between Islam and the Arab world to the one side and the West to the other. As many historians have noted, for nearly three centuries that encounter has taken place to the disadvantage of Muslims in general, and the Arab world

in particular—and in ways for which neither faith nor the political experience of the preceding thousand years had prepared the peoples of the Middle East. The repulse of the Turks from Vienna in 1683 marked the true beginning of the long retreat of Islam from Europe, and the penetration—military, economic, political and even ideological—of the Islamic world by the West. It has been three centuries of barely mitigated humiliation, punctuated most recently by the success of the Jews—a despised if not always a severely persecuted minority—in creating and maintaining a state in the face of armed hostility from nearly the entire Arab world. This sense of historical dislocation and injustice animates the views of many in the Arab world, and to some extent in the non-Arab Muslim domains beyond it.

The immediate cause of the war is, of course, the peculiar personality of Osama bin Laden and his associates, including fugitives from Egypt and Saudi Arabia who have helped him create a remarkably extensive and sophisticated coalition of terrorist networks. Bin Laden's story is well-known and needs no repeating here. It reminds us, however, of the importance of decisive personalities in history—a matter mostly forgotten in the recent decades of political mediocrity that have characterized the leadership of the Western world. We have seen, in a small way, what unusual leaders can do—a Margaret Thatcher or a Ronald Reagan, for example, who, though neither a Winston Churchill nor a Franklin Roosevelt, nonetheless transformed the spirit and outlook of their respective countries. Lee Kuan Yew is, as Henry Kissinger has observed, a statesman too large for his country; in a very different vein Saddam Hussein has, despite evidence of titanic miscalculations, some qualities of an evil genius. On the whole, however, while Americans have demo-

nized some leaders (Ayatollah Khomeini, for example), and have reveled in the personal peccadilloes of others (Bill Clinton springs to mind), we have tended to underrate the role of individuals as a factor of importance in international relations. Bin Laden may change that.

It is, however, the *intermediate* causes of this war that deserve closest scrutiny. They are, in no order of importance, the irruption of American power into the Arabian peninsula in 1990, the collapse of some states in the Middle East and South Asia, the failure of many others to provide decent governance, and the heightened visibility of the prolonged and increasingly bitter struggle between Israelis and Palestinians. The resulting frustration and embitterment of domestic politics and the mobilizing effects of new mass media (best exemplified by Al-Jazeera, the satellite broadcast system based in Qatar) mean that the other side is guaranteed a continuous supply of recruits and enthusiasts. It means, as well, that the sudden apprehension or killing of Osama bin Laden will not bring this war to an end.

In the rush to respond to the attacks of September 11, members of the U.S. government were, understandably, in no mood to reflect dispassionately upon some of their own decisions that brought us to this pass. But it would be well to do so, if only because these events have resulted from two broad failures of policy and judgment in which Republicans and Democrats alike have shared. The first was the radically incomplete victory of the Gulf War, including the deliberate choice not to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein, and the second a pervasive indifference to the forces of liberalism and modernity in the Arab world. Without facing up to these mistakes—which, though explicable, were grave indeed—the U.S. government can understand neither its current predicament nor

find an adequate strategy for dealing with it.

The failure to eliminate Saddam Hussein's regime when it was possible to do so—when the Iraqi military had crumbled and millions of Iraqis hoped for liberation from a brutal and catastrophic tyranny—bred a number of ills. One of these, of course, was Saddam's survival, and with it Iraq's sponsorship of terrorism and persistent efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The inconclusive finish to the Gulf War had three other equally troubling outcomes. It led to the permanent stationing of large, visible and obtrusive American forces in the Persian Gulf, including Saudi Arabia; it brought about enormous additional Iraqi suffering through the brutal suppression of the Kurds and Shi'a, as well as the combined effects of the Ba'athi regime and a prolonged economic embargo; and it undid, in some measure, the deterrent effects of the demonstration of American power. The failure to clinch the victory, even over the feeble protests of Arab allies, testified to the unwillingness of the Americans to see a job through to the end. That apparent softness encouraged others to see if they could find ways of outlasting or hurting the Americans enough to keep them out of their way. In Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic misjudged his own weaknesses and failed; in Somalia, Mohammed Farah Aideed got it right. From the remarks of Osama bin Laden since September 11, it is clear that he thinks he has got it right, too.

The United States thus left Saddam's exceptionally dangerous regime in power—exceptionally dangerous because its leader has cunning, persistence and ruthlessness far beyond the normal lot—and at the same time planted itself in a region bound to resent the mere presence of American soldiers, especially its (by local lights) immodest women in the unnatural and even humiliating role of

warriors. Perhaps worst of all, it played a visible role in prolonging the suffering of the Iraqi people who were, after all, Saddam's first victims. We may yet find the hand of Iraqi intelligence in the planning of the attacks of September 11, and the subsequent use of sophisticated varieties of anthrax in attacks upon governmental and media targets in October. If, as it now appears, a leader of the September 11 plot met with Iraqi intelligence officials in Prague, one must wonder why. But in any event, failure to finish off the Iraqi regime in 1991 has left a potent source of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of an exceptionally ruthless regime.

The error of leaving Saddam Hussein in power has persisted for one decade only; the other error—neglecting our natural allies in the Middle East—has lasted much longer. One could make the argument that moderate monarchy is the most decent available alternative in much of the Arab world. One could point to the phenomenon of “one man, one vote, one time”, and suspect the consequences of introducing democratic forms into societies not inured to democratic habits of the heart. One could argue, as well, that (as in the case of the Iran-Iraq War) there has been little to choose politically between the two sides. By and large, however, American statesmen, and those who have advised them, have inclined rather to ignore the issue or dismiss it. Perhaps in Europe or even Asia the development of clean and reasonably free political institutions was a goal of American policy. In the Middle East, however, a combination of clientilism, realpolitik and cultural condescension meant that there was no interest in (to take just one example) the courage of a Naguib Mahfouz as a spokesman for values that Americans share.

The height, or rather the depth, of this short-sightedness can be found in the eagerness of both Republican and

Democratic administrations to deal with a Palestinian Authority dominated by a corrupt and brutal clique. After thirty years of Israeli occupation, and in part because of it, Palestinian society has evolved a relatively well-educated civil society and an awareness of what democratic norms mean. Yet in all the negotiations between the Palestinians and Israel neither the Americans nor the Israelis have much cared what that civil society could and should become. Yasir Arafat was the man who could deliver his people and state-in-making, and there was no point in being squeamish about his methods. Indeed, most American and Israeli politicians and bureaucrats preferred having a corrupt thug on the other side of the negotiating table because they were more concerned about his capacity to “deliver” than they were about *what* he could, or would, deliver. Israel is now paying a price for its lack of interest in the health of Palestinian civil society. To the extent that American leaders close their eyes to the realities of the sick and thwarted societies of the Arab and, in parts, of the larger Muslim world, they will fail to understand the essential nature of the war in which they find themselves engaged.

Where Will the Conflict Go?

THE UNITED STATES does not deserve the bulk of the blame for the sorrowful conditions of the Middle East: that rests primarily upon that region's own leaders and circumstances. The failures of American (and more broadly, Western) policy in the 20th century, however, coupled with the deeper troubles of a civilization that has not yet come to terms with modernity, has created an international system of exceptional volatility. This war, unlike most others, has the potential to take new and dangerous forms with great speed and little warning.

Conceivably, of course, everything could break the West's way. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan could disintegrate and special forces units or aircraft tipped off by intelligence could eliminate Osama bin Laden and his key associates. The rage of the Arab street has always been a mercurial phenomenon; it could subside under a demonstration of American technical virtuosity, amplified by the power of conspiratorial paranoia that pervades both elite and mass thinking in the Arab world. The moderate but repressive regimes of Saudi Arabia and Egypt could choose a path toward reform, and, under astute American guidance and pressure, the Palestinian-Israeli dispute could give way to a new *modus vivendi*, if not a genuine peace.

Such, at least, one may hope. The chances for such outcomes are not great, but the United States should be poised to exploit a lucky set of successes just as it should be prepared to cope with new waves of terror. Unfortunately, it is more likely that a quick or easy victory (a far from certain outcome) would not lead to any change in the behavior of states whose internal corruption has led so many of their citizens to choose fanatical faith. It is more likely that the stresses of this conflict will bring some regimes we call moderate to the breaking point. If Osama bin Laden can command the allegiance of millions of Muslims, he may well be able to throw counterpunches capable of wrecking states and broadening the levels of violence that have already bred deadly riots even in remote Kano, Nigeria.

That the war will persist at home is certain. It may involve further large-scale losses of life, and almost certainly an erosion of Americans' carefree way of life. This has been a conflict made possible by cheap and easy international communications, by television, telephone, the Internet and even the U.S. Postal Service.

The responses will similarly tap the information revolution: Americans have just begun to see the expansion of surveillance and monitoring that will include an ever greater pooling of security data in the hands of government.

It is difficult to imagine, however, no matter what further assaults await us, that the fundamental institutions of this country will suffer radical or lasting damage. Lincoln suspended *habeas corpus*; Wilson allowed a draconian stifling of dissent; Roosevelt imposed press censorship; Truman and Eisenhower presided over a system of loyalty oaths—but none of these lasted and none left our civil liberties permanently altered. The remarkable resilience and calm of the American people is, possibly, the least noticed feature of this crisis. There have been no riots, no breakdown of law and order, no pogroms against Arab or Muslim Americans, no fits of public hysteria. This is war, we should remember, waged by organizations and mobs that are alienated, frustrated and failed losers against the successful and wealthy societies of winners. We are the latter, and for good reason.

Abroad, however, the possibilities are far more dire. Four possibilities at least deserve consideration: massive violence in South Asia; the collapse of an allied Arab state; the exploitation of the crisis by others; and metastasized terrorism on a global scale.

For the moment, the Pakistani government looks secure; the degree of anger and hostility on the Pakistani street, however, and the inherent fragility of that state, may bring down the military regime of Pervez Musharraf. Should that happen, America would not only lose access to Afghanistan from the south, but a small trove of nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of Islamist extremists. Communal violence on a scale not seen on the subcontinent since partition could ensue as well. It is difficult to imagine that

India could tolerate anarchy or a Taliban-type regime on its frontier, particularly after the nuclearization of Pakistan. Nor could Indian society—which has seen appalling amounts of intra-ethnic violence in recent years—escape the consequences of radical Islam in a neighboring society. The degree of bloodshed could be truly horrific; violence directed at tens of millions of civilians and, quite conceivably, the use of one or more nuclear weapons in anger for the first time since Nagasaki.

At the moment, the Saudi and Egyptian regimes look solid, but so did the government of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in 1978. In the nature of things, we will discover only too late the extent of rot in the security and military services of those countries; revolution is, by definition, always a surprise to the *ancien régime*. In these and other cases, an Islamist revolution would probably be accompanied by scenes of chaos and disorder, and in all cases the temptation for a new and shaky government to escape domestic discontents by joining a *jihad* against infidels.

This would be particularly true if such acts could be directed against Israel. One could imagine, for example, the Egyptians announcing a militarization of the Sinai peninsula, or the Saudis firing one of their long range Chinese-made missiles at Israel. Either event would be certain to evoke a violent and dramatic Israeli response. For Israel, the stakes could soon approach life and death, and the fear of appearing weak would surely trump any plea by the United States for restraint. Most Israelis, across the political spectrum, believe that their precipitous withdrawal from Lebanon encouraged the Palestinian Authority (which interpreted it as a sign of weakness) to launch a small war, commonly mislabeled as a second *intifada*. Once again, the use of nuclear weapons, initially to demonstrate intent, cannot be ruled out.

Other states may attempt to exploit the current crisis and thus inadvertently widen the war. Saddam, for example, seeing an opportunity to break loose from a U.S.-led encirclement, might attempt to provoke Israel with a few more missile shots at Tel Aviv. China might use the opportunity to resolve the Taiwan issue by threats or even the use of force. Russia could attempt to ratchet up its influence in most of the Central Asian republics, partly to reverse the consequences of the breakup of the Soviet Union, partly out of a quest for security against Islamists in that part of the world. These and other events that might not be directly related to the assaults on the United States could create a new international disorder of unprecedented complexity.

Finally, it is possible, even likely, that the successes of Osama bin Laden will not only attract new followers, but lead others to emulate him. As it is, he seems to direct a loose network of groups, not a tight and hierarchical organization. Having achieved spectacular successes using a loose network, he will inspire others to similar acts of violence, even if such acts are not directed by him. The result could be a far higher degree of uncoordinated background violence—bombings, poisonings and assassination—than known in civilized countries except during the most violent revolutions, and this time on a global scale. Many societies could find themselves struck by waves of violence that will weaken economies and societies, undermine political institutions, and threaten many aspects of day-to-day life.

How Shall We Adapt?

THIS WAR DOES not lend itself to the clean, neat and simple listing of objectives, goals and courses of action—strategy in the manner of Martha Stewart rather than Karl von Clausewitz. This being a real

war, and not an international police action like the conflict in Kosovo, objectives will change as the war takes its course. It may not end in the lifetime of anyone reading this article, and it may take altogether unpredicted directions. Raids, campaigns and decisions of all kinds will hinge on prudential considerations and detailed knowledge that will be difficult to discern from afar. Better, then, to ask how this country should adapt to the fact of a long war than what it should do next week.

The first and most important step is to accept reality unflinchingly. This means understanding the complex origins of the war and the extent to which our own errors have helped bring it about. It means rejecting some supposed lessons of the Gulf War—the creation of an elaborate coalition as an end in itself, and deceptively precise or simple objectives.¹ It means accepting the possibility that we may enter a period of global violence on a scale unknown since World War II. Above all, it means rejecting the idea that our enemy is a caricatured international terrorist of the kind that served as a foil for James Bond. Osama bin Laden is not Ernst Blofeld, the non-ideological head of SPECTRE. Bin Laden is evil, but recognizing that fact will not help us understand his power, his appeal or his menace.

Confronting reality also means engaging not only our enemies but those who sit on the fence. From President Bush down, American politicians have, appropriately and honorably, been scrupulous in guarding Arab-Americans and the larger Muslim community from bigotry and discrimination. It is also, however, right to expect an unconditional and unreserved denunciation of terror by leaders of those communities, and to summon them to war against it. That is no more than one would ask of any other American community in a similar posi-

tion. A positive response to that call is not a matter of patriotism, but of civic obligation.

Secondly, American leaders must display creativity with the staffing, organization, and functions of government that are at odds with past orthodoxies. Now is the time to bring into temporary or permanent government service the best of this country's extraordinary talent. This means sweeping away restrictions (on conflict of interest, in particular) dear to Democrat and Republican alike; it means rewriting from scratch the rules of a stodgy and rigid civil service system; it means setting aside the complex array of preferences and political patronage that have made the creation of new administrations such protracted and excruciating affairs.

The United States must mobilize not only people but new organizations to fight this war. The new Office of Homeland Security under Governor Tom Ridge will require not merely authority to coordinate, but real power, to include control over budgets. That may just be the beginning: it will probably prove necessary to move a number of agencies under its direct control.

To fight the war of information and public relations will require something like the World War II Office of War Information—a testimony to the recognition by Franklin D. Roosevelt that he would wage his war for and with ideas, and not merely with arms. These and other organizations will cost much money, so much that the dogmas of decreasing taxes and shrinking government that were appropriate to September 10 must no longer apply. Some of government's roles may expand—in the field of airport security, for example. In other cases new, quasi-governmental organizations may suffice.

¹For a succinct rendition of the view argued against here, see Brent Scowcroft, "Build a Coalition", *Washington Post*, October 16, 2001.

But government will surely have to expand its resources and its reach, while changing its way of doing business. As important as growth in size and spending will be changed cultures—a military that does not see itself as devoted only to conflict with well-ordered armies for limited goals, intelligence agencies that play the dirty game of covert action with a vigor not seen since the 1950s, public safety organizations (the Food and Drug Administration, for example) that prepare themselves to react swiftly and on a large scale to the kind of attacks we know are possible but have never really taken seriously.

Finally and most important of all, Americans must steel themselves. For the generation now entering its twenties, we have entered an unrecognizable world. That generation grew to adulthood without a Cold War, in the rich optimism of an age in which the stock market would always rise, jobs would be there for the asking, and the Internet and globalization promised a wealth of entertainments and excitement. It was a world in which the virtues of tenacity, altruism and grace under pressure seemed quaint.

In that world, war was a far-off affair, waged cleanly and precisely by a few select warriors; its consequences never came home. Older generations, including the one that remembers the weekly listing of several hundred American deaths in Vietnam, the assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr., race riots and mass protests, have known life under a shadow of awful things. But for all Americans, this post-September 11 world was not the world we expected, and if even *some* of the dreadful possibilities mentioned above come to pass, we will experience things shared only by those who still remember the dark days of 1939–45—and even those horrors did not strike as close to home as these may.

Put a little differently, the challenge of this war includes the reality that it has

a front in our own hearts and minds. This war may directly touch any of us, and in ways as unexpected as those faced by the doomed passengers of the hijacked planes of September 11 and the office workers who perished in the Pentagon and the World Trade Center. Bland cheerfulness, or a denial of the magnitude of the threat, or (even worse) can-do swagger of the kind that has masked more than one half-measure or failure in the past, have no place here. What is needed is a stoicism of the type long-celebrated in American popular culture—the taciturn willingness to do what must be done, as depicted in *High Noon* or in Owen Wister's *The Virginian*, and manifested in reality by the World War II generation that lived those values. So, too, did the mainly working and lower-middle class young men who shrugged their shoulders and fought in Vietnam because it did not occur to them to do otherwise. Our self-indulgent narcissism and voyeurism—displayed endlessly on American television—must yield to something sterner.

IF AMERICANS are to endure as well as fight, they will have to know what they are enduring and fighting for. This should be a time to rediscover the civilizational values that make this country what it is—that have given it freedom and tolerance, its opportunities for individual growth and collective life. Indeed, if one can speak of good coming from catastrophe, one positive result may be a deeper and wider appreciation of what the West has achieved in the half millennium past than has been reflected in attacks on “the canon” and “Eurocentrism.”

Despite the cultural pessimism of many observers of the United States, the foundations for such a spiritual rearmament remain intact. They may be seen in the popularity of films like *Saving Private*

Ryan, or the sale of David McCullough's biographies of Harry Truman and John Adams. They became clear to all in the fearlessness of hundreds of New York City firefighters and police officers who plunged into burning buildings out of a sense not of zeal, but of duty. They remain in the symbols of open and free government and discourse, and the poise

with which political leaders of both parties have stood their ground. There are, in other words, grounds for confidence. The tasks in this area, however, as in others, remain great. For if this is, or becomes, a "clash of civilizations", it is at least as important to know what we are fighting for as to know what we are fighting against. □

New York Times Bombs

'I don't regret setting bombs', Bill Ayers said. 'I feel we didn't do enough.' Mr. Ayers, who spent the 1970s as a fugitive in the Weather Underground, was sitting in the kitchen of his big turn-of-the-19th-century stone house in the Hyde Park district of Chicago. The long curly locks in his Wanted poster are shorn, though he wears earrings. He still has tattooed on his neck the rainbow-and-lightning Weathermen logo that appeared on letters taking responsibility for bombings. And he still has the ebullient, ingratiating manner, the apparently intense interest in other people, that made him a charismatic figure in the radical student movement. . . . 'Everything was absolutely ideal on the day I bombed the Pentagon', he writes. . . .

Mr. Ayers, who in 1970 was said to have summed up the Weatherman philosophy as: 'Kill all the rich people. Break up their cars and apartments. Bring the revolution home, kill your parents, that's where it's really at', is today distinguished professor of education at the University of Illinois at Chicago. . . .

As Mr. Ayers mellows into middle age, he finds himself thinking about truth and reconciliation, he said. He would like to see a Truth and Reconciliation Commission about Vietnam, he said, like South Africa's. He can imagine Mr. Kerrey and Ms. Boudin taking part. . . .

Thinking back on his life, Mr. Ayers said, 'I was a child of privilege and I woke up to a world on fire. And hope and history rhymed.'

—Dinitia Smith, *New York Times*, September 11, 2001

A New Strategy for the New Face of Terrorism

—L. Paul Bremer, III—

“THE THIRD World War was begun on Tuesday, September 11, on the East Coast of the United States”—so began the French magazine *L'Express* two days later. Whether these words turn out to be prediction or exaggeration will depend on how the world now reacts to the new face of terrorism represented by the vicious attacks of that day.

The September 11 atrocities made for the most dramatic day in American history, dwarfing even the events at Pearl Harbor sixty years ago. Three times as many Americans died in New York and Washington as died at Pearl Harbor. And this time innocent civilians, not military men, were the intended targets. But this was not just an attack on America. Citizens of at least eighty countries died in the collapsed World Trade towers. We are all, in a direct way, victims of the new terrorism.

The Changing Nature of Terrorism

WHILE THE attacks were shocking for their audacity and effectiveness, they should have surprised no serious student of terrorism. A large-scale attack on

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American soil has been widely predicted by experts. For years they have drawn attention to a disturbing paradox: while the number of international terrorist incidents has been declining over the past decade, the number of casualties has risen. This trend reflects the changing motives of terrorists.

During the 1970s and 1980s, most terrorist groups had limited political motives. For them, terrorism was a tactic mainly to draw attention to their “cause.” These groups reasoned that many people would sympathize with that cause if only they were made aware of it. Designing their tactics to support this objective, these “old-style” terrorists rarely engaged in indiscriminate mass killing. They rightly concluded such attacks would disgust the very audiences they were trying to convert to their cause. So most terrorist groups designed their attacks to kill enough people to draw in the press but not so many as to repel the public. Often they used terror to force negotiations on some issue, such as the release of jailed comrades. As one terrorism expert put it, these groups were seeking a place at the negotiating table.

Eventually, most terrorist groups in Europe overplayed their hands and the publics turned against them. But anti-terrorism policies helped win the day. With vigorous American leadership, European countries and the United

States developed a counter-terrorist strategy to deal with this threat. At the heart of that strategy were three principles: make no concessions to terrorists; treat terrorists as criminals to be brought to justice; and punish states that support terrorism. On balance, this strategy worked.

Over the past decade, however, it has become clear that many terrorist groups are motivated less by narrow political goals and more by ideological, apocalyptic or religious fanaticism. Sometimes their goal is simply hatred or revenge, and tactics have changed to reflect these motives. Rather than avoiding large-scale casualties, these terrorists seek to kill as many people as possible. They are unconstrained by the respect for human life that undergirds all the world's great religions, including Islam.

Beginning with the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 in December 1988, through the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, to the chemical attacks in the Tokyo subways in 1995 and the attacks on two U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, terrorist actions have resulted in increasing numbers of casualties. The September 11 attacks killed more than 5,000 people, making it the single worst terrorist attack in world history.

Things could get even worse. During the 1990s, concerns arose that terrorists might use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear agents. In the 1980s, terrorist groups could have developed such weapons, but they did not do so, apparently calculating that their use would make public support for their causes less likely. But far from steering away from such agents, the new terrorists might find these weapons attractive precisely because they can kill tens of thousands. This was the goal, fortunately unrealized, of Aum Shinrikyo's chemical attack on the Tokyo subway. Indeed, there is evidence that some new terrorist groups, including bin

Laden's Al-Qaeda, have tried to acquire nuclear, biological and chemical agents. It is known that the terrorist states of North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria all have tried to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, in the 1990s, information about chemical and biological agents became widely available on the Internet. The recent anthrax attacks may foreshadow a major escalation to bioterrorism by Islamist and perhaps other terrorists.

The changed motives of these "new-style" terrorists mean that at least two-thirds of the West's old strategy is outmoded. One pillar of that strategy, not making concessions to terrorists, remains valid. But it may be irrelevant when faced with groups like Al-Qaeda. Such groups are not trying to start negotiations. They make no negotiable "demands" that the West can comply with to forestall further attacks. These men do not seek a seat at the table; they want to overturn the table and kill everybody at it.

It is an honorable reflection of the basic friendliness of the American people that most of us find it difficult to believe that anybody hates Americans. Many find it especially confusing that men who lived among us, sometimes for years, attending our schools and shopping in our malls, should hate the very society whose freedoms they enjoyed. That they somehow must not understand us is the first reaction of many.

But this reaction reflects a misunderstanding about the new terrorists. They hate America precisely because they *do* understand our society; they hate its freedoms, its commitment to equal rights and universal suffrage, its material successes and its appeal to so many non-Americans. Thus, the question of whether or not to make concessions in the face of such hatred is simply irrelevant. Nothing America can say or do, short of ceasing to exist, will satisfy these terrorists.

Our long-standing objective of “bringing terrorists to justice”, the second pillar of U.S. strategy, is also irrelevant to the new fight. During the past decade, an increasing percentage of terrorist attacks, especially those conducted by Middle Eastern groups, have involved suicides. This underscores the perpetrators’ extraordinary commitment to terror, but it also shows the futility of relying on the concept of using criminal justice to punish them. Men who are prepared to die in an airplane crash are not going to be deterred by the threat of being locked in a prison cell. We need to revise our thinking; now our goal should be, as President Bush has suggested, “bringing justice to the terrorists.”

Terrorism—The New Face of War

IN THE BROADER sense, the September 11 attacks preview the kind of security threat America will face in the 21st century. Terrorism allows the weak to attack the strong. It is relatively inexpensive to conduct, and devilishly difficult to counter.

Relative to all the other powers in the world, America is stronger than any country has ever been in history. The Gulf War showed that even a lavishly equipped conventional force (at the time, Iraq possessed the world’s fifth largest army) was no match for America. The lesson for would-be tyrants and terrorists was clear: America could only be attacked by unconventional means, and terrorism is a fundamental tactic of asymmetrical warfare.

Terrorists take advantage of two important asymmetries. First, in the fight against terrorism, defenders have to protect all their points of vulnerability around the world; the terrorist has only to attack the weakest point. This lesson was brought home to the U.S. government when Al-Qaeda attacked the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam

in August 1998, two embassies thought to be in little danger and thus ill-protected.

Secondly, the costs of launching a terrorist attack are a fraction of the costs required to defend against it. To shoot up an airport, a terrorist needs only an AK-47 assault rifle; defending that same airport costs millions of dollars. The September 11 attacks probably cost less than \$2 million and caused over \$100 billion in damage and business interruption. Thus, the new terrorism reverses the conventional wisdom that, in military operations, the offense must be three times as strong as the defense.

How, then, are we to fight this new and increasingly dangerous threat?

The proper objective of a counter-terrorist policy is to prevent attacks before they happen. So, more than in any other field of foreign and national security affairs, success in the fight against terrorism depends on having good intelligence. But there is no more difficult or dangerous kind of intelligence to collect. The surest way to know about an attack ahead of time is to have somebody tell you the plans. That means having a spy in the terrorist group itself.

Inserting an agent inside a terrorist group is among any intelligence agency’s most difficult task. These groups are by nature clandestine and suspicious, even paranoid. Membership is often based on ethnic, tribal, clan or family ties, so Western intelligence agencies can rarely use their own nationals to infiltrate such groups.

There are two other possibilities for getting this valuable “human intelligence.” Our agencies can, and do, work with friendly intelligence agencies in the Middle East. Often those organizations can use their own nationals to infiltrate terrorist cells. And if we handle such a relationship properly, our government can get useful and timely information about terrorist plans that enables us to disrupt

them before they can be carried out. Such a relationship helped foil Al-Qaeda's planned millennium celebration attacks.

The second path is for the CIA itself to recruit a member of the group. This is exceptionally dangerous since the penalty, if caught spying, is certain death. We have also made the task more difficult for ourselves. Over the past 25 years, the United States has seriously undermined its capability to acquire "human intelligence." In the mid-1970s, politicized attacks by Congress damaged CIA operations and morale. In the late 1970s, a large number of the Agency's best officers specializing in collecting human intelligence were fired. These trends were exacerbated when, in 1995, the Clinton Administration imposed rigid and bureaucratic procedures governing the Agency's recruitment of spies who themselves have been involved with terrorist organizations. These new guidelines had the effect of making such recruitments even more difficult than they already were.

The bipartisan National Commission on Terrorism, which I chaired, carefully investigated the effect of these 1995 "guidelines." During our work in 2000, we heard testimony from serving CIA officers, at home and abroad, from first-tour case officers to station chiefs. Their testimony was unambiguous, unanimous and conclusive: the "guidelines" were an obstacle to the recruitment of effective spies in the struggle against terrorism. We strongly recommended their immediate cancellation.

The CIA's response to this recommendation was curious. Its leaders stated that they had never turned down a proposal *presented to them* to recruit a terrorist spy. But this entirely misses the point. By the time a proposed recruitment makes it to the CIA's leadership, it has already passed through a welter of rules, regulations, procedures, committees and lawyers that essentially guarantees that

only the least suspect person will be suggested (assuming that after this tortuous and time-consuming process the terrorist is still around to recruit).

As the Bremer Commission noted, the major problem with the "guidelines" is the effect they have in the field. Officer after officer confirmed to our commissioners that the prospect of having to navigate Washington's bureaucratic jungle-gym was a clear disincentive even to begin the process of such recruitments. Many officers told us that they simply decided to go after easier targets. The "guidelines" have become an effective, though undesirable, bureaucratic prophylactic against risk-taking. They must be changed.

A New Strategy for Countering Terrorism

THE ELEMENTS of a new strategy to deal with the new threat are at hand. We need only the will to implement that strategy.

Our strategic objective must be to deny terrorist groups safe havens from which they can operate and garner various kinds of support from governments. As President Bush stated in his September 20 address, America intends to punish not just the terrorists but any group or state that has in any way supported them.

We must apply this strategy ruthlessly and creatively. Our tactics should range across the entire spectrum of activity from diplomacy, political pressure and economic measures, to military, psychological and covert operations. As the President has emphasized, this will be a long campaign demanding patience and cunning. The battle will be less like an American football game, with its fixed "battle lines" and clearly defined moves (as in the Gulf War), and more like European football: open, fluid and improvisational.

American actions must move beyond the episodic and limp-wristed attacks of

the past decade, actions that seemed designed to “signal” our seriousness to the terrorists without inflicting any real damage on them. Naturally, their feebleness demonstrated the opposite. This time the terrorists and their supporters must be eliminated.

Our strategy should operate in three concentric circles. In the first and innermost circle, we must deal decisively with those most immediately responsible for the September attack. This means destroying all the terrorist camps, personnel and infrastructure in Afghanistan and getting rid of the Taliban regime. We must avoid thinking that the fight is only about bin Laden. It is one of the habitual failings of U.S. policy to over-emphasize one individual terrorist and ignore the broader dangers. In the late 1970s, Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi was America’s enemy number one. In the mid-1980s, Abu Nidal took his place. Ten years later, it was, and remains today, bin Laden.

There are two dangers with this approach. First, it tends to build up the terrorist leader, in his own eyes and in the eyes of his supporters. The concentration on one individual may thus paradoxically make it easier for him to find new recruits. Secondly, over-emphasis on one man may mislead the public into thinking that if only the “bad guy” could be eliminated, the terrorist problem would go away. It’s just not so. Even if bin Laden were to die today, our problems would not end, for Afghanistan has become a cesspool of terrorism, much as Lebanon was in the 1980s. At least a half dozen other terrorist groups have training camps and facilities in the country, all welcomed by the Taliban. That is why our initial actions must go beyond destroying the terrorist camps. As long as the Taliban rule in Afghanistan, the terrorists’ infrastructure can be quickly reconstituted.

It would be preferable if the Afghan people, who have suffered greatly under

the harsh rule of the Taliban, could throw that regime out themselves. Certainly, the West should encourage this by supporting the exiled king, Mohammed Zahir, in his call for an uprising. Still popular among the Afghan people, the King is a Pashtun and thus has a crucial role to play in the establishment of a credible alternative government (though we must respect his need to avoid being seen as an American puppet).

This political strategy must be wedded to a three-pronged military plan. Our military forces and those of our allies must first degrade the Taliban’s military capabilities. This will bring about a new balance of forces on the ground. Then we must encourage the creation and arming of an effective Pashtun military force, using as its core those Taliban commanders who have already defected. Finally, we and our allies should support the Northern Alliance, which still controls 10 to 15 percent of the country and which has support among the Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara communities.

The harsh reality is that any campaign that does not result in a change of regime in Kabul will be a failure. This is the *sine qua non* of our entire strategy. We therefore cannot exclude the possibility that it may be necessary to introduce ground troops into this hostile topography.

America’s seriousness of purpose in the new war on terrorism will be demonstrated by U.S. and allied actions in this first phase. If we are weak, hesitant or ineffective, we will pay a heavy price later.

Ending State Support for Terrorism

THE SECOND objective of our strategy must be to deny terrorists operating bases. This means rooting out terrorist camps, bases and cells wherever they are, including in the United States. It is likely that some of the Al-Qaeda terrorists will escape us in Afghanistan. They will try to

relocate elsewhere, perhaps seeking out friendly governments or weak states in the Middle East, Central Asia or in Africa. We must pursue them and destroy them, with or without the help of the relevant governments.

The President made clear in his address to the American people on September 20 that any state that harbors or supports terrorist groups will be henceforth considered “a hostile regime.” This statement has important implications beyond the obvious countries of Iran and Iraq. Syria, with which our European allies and we have regular diplomatic relations, still hosts over a dozen terrorist groups. So do Sudan and Lebanon.

Yet for too long American policy has contented itself with merely identifying states that support terrorism without forcing any serious consequences upon them in turn. Our European allies have been even less forceful, seeming to ignore state involvement in terrorism, often in the hopes of winning commercial advantage. For example, the European Union’s long running “constructive dialogue” with Iran may have won European firms handsome contracts to develop Iranian energy resources, but it has not in any respect altered Iran’s continued and open support for Middle East terrorist groups. Iran remains the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism. Groups such as Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hizballah, which regularly target innocent civilians, all depend on Iranian support. In fact, as the State Department has pointed out, Iranian involvement in terror has actually increased since the election of Mohammad Khatemi as president four years ago.

Some commentators argue that the new terrorism is caused by discontent with America’s role in supporting Israel. The implication is that if America would just weaken that support, the terrorism would end. This argument is wrong on two counts. First, bin Laden has made

clear in his own words, for years, that he attacks America because he hates who we are, not because of whom we support. Secondly, dealing effectively with radical Islam is the prerequisite to moving toward a broader regional peace, not the other way around. It was America’s decisive (though incomplete) victory over Iraq in 1991 that was the necessary precondition for the Oslo peace process. Now as then, countries in the Middle East and Europe will pay attention to American ideas for regional security when we have shown that we are prepared to act decisively against threats to that security.

A War on Islam?

PRESIDENT BUSH and all his senior advisors have been clear: We do not consider the American response to the September 11 attacks to be a war against Islam. He is right. Bin Laden and his allies in the Taliban are a fringe minority far removed from the teachings of mainstream Islam. But there is a real danger now that “moderate” Muslims are allowing these radicals to hijack Islam, and thus to define Islam as an enemy of the West. Until now, we have heard too few voices of restraint from the Islamic world. Quite the contrary. For example, through their controlled media, the Palestinians and even some “moderate” Arab governments have spewed out anti-American hatred with impunity for years. On the very day of the suicide attacks, the newspaper of the Palestinian Authority, *al-Hayat al-Jadida*, praised suicide bombers as “noble . . . the salt of the earth, the engines of history They are the most honorable among us.” Inflammatory articles like this have contributed to an environment that made possible the appalling spectacle of schoolchildren in Gaza and Ramallah cheering the news of the American tragedies.

Europeans, who provide the bulk of money to the Palestinians, should make clear that until such inflammatory rhetoric stops, there will be no more euros for Yasir Arafat. Nor should American taxpayers be expected to send another penny to the Palestinian Authority until Arafat roots out, expels or imprisons the Hamas, Hizballah and Islamic Jihad terrorists who operate from his territory.

In Pakistan, Islamic *madrassas* regularly indoctrinate young boys to hate America. At one school, after the September 11 attack, eight year-old boys vied with one another to be the one who would grow up to bring down the Sears Tower in Chicago. Here in America, some Islamic leaders have said that the September 11 attacks violate the Quran. But several have then made the astonishing statement that, this being the case, Israelis or Americans themselves must have conducted the attacks.

Moderate Islam is on the front line now. Its leaders have a solemn responsibility to make clear, in public, that the purposeful slaughter of innocent civilians is anathema to Islamic beliefs and that those who commit such acts are apostates who will go to hell, not to heaven. Unless they speak out now, there is a real risk that Islam will be defined by the radicals at war with the West. And then this *will* become a war with Islam, declared *by* Islam.

Delegitimizing Terror

FINALLY, American strategy must have as a broader objective rebuilding the international consensus against terrorism that flourished briefly during the 1980s, but then fell into neglect. If done effectively, this can delegitimize terror.

There are many areas where better cooperation will prove useful. Intelligence cooperation is the most urgent need.

Clearly, no matter how good its intelligence organization, no one nation alone can hope to gather enough specific information on a worldwide terrorist network. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, it has become clear that America's intelligence failure was mirrored in many other countries: none seemed to be taking seriously enough the clear declarations of war by bin Laden, and none was sufficiently attentive to the activities of suspicious people. Sharing intelligence with friendly countries is an essential step in developing a common strategy. As noted, during the 1980s America and its European partners found ways to deepen cooperation in this vital area. This effort must now be accelerated and broadened to include cooperation with friendly Muslim states.

There must also be more vigorous and persistent efforts to track terrorist funds. Too often, terrorist groups have been able to use front organizations, non-governmental organizations and willing dupes to raise and distribute money. Out of ignorance, laziness or cowardice, most governments have looked the other way. The recent U.S. decision to seize terrorist assets is a good first step. So is the UN Security Council resolution calling on all states to take robust action against terrorist finances.

To maintain broad support for the struggle against terrorism, the United States will have to accept that the problem goes beyond those terrorist groups with a "global reach." While such groups are the proper objective of our initial strategy, we will have to show that we share the concerns of our allies who are subjected to Irish and Basque terrorism, for example, if we are to get continuing support from Britain and Spain in the fight.

As to legal matters, no doubt there will be proposals for new international conventions and treaties concerning terrorism and state support for it. Each of these should be examined on its merits

and pursued where useful. But we should not let the search for an illusive international legal consensus stop us from vigorous action against known terrorist groups or states.

WE HAVE seen the face of the new threat to our security in the 21st century. Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the United States is fully justified in taking any and all means of self-defense against that threat. The United States has made clear that it welcomes the assistance of any country in anti-terrorist military operations, and so far the American government has done a masterful job of assembling broad support for the initial phase of the campaign in Afghanistan. The challenge will be to sus-

tain that support as the battle wears on, and especially when the campaign enters the second phase, after we have dealt with Afghanistan.

We must destroy the terrorists before they destroy us. They hate us and are so dangerous that they must be stopped before they can take the battle to a still higher plane of lethality. We must disrupt, dismantle or destroy terrorist groups wherever they are and deny them safe havens. Americans should therefore be under no illusions about the campaign we have embarked upon. There will be war with more than one country. As in all wars, there will be civilian casualties. America will win some battles but lose others. More Americans will die. But neither our allies nor our enemies should be in any doubt: We shall prevail. □


“The Martyr”

There is sobbing of the strong,
And a pall upon the land;
But the People in their weeping
Bare the iron hand:
Beware the People weeping
When they bare the iron hand.

—Herman Melville

When Saddam Has the Bomb

Saddam Husayn's former chief nuclear scientist reveals in the current *Middle East Quarterly* that Iraq's dictator is getting ever-closer to weaponizing an atomic bomb. When that happens, warns Khidhir Hamza, the Arab street will rally around Saddam and weaker governments of the Middle East might topple. "I can foresee Saddam controlling the Middle East," he concludes.



Hamza's answer? Remove Saddam.

Bold, provocative, smart, the *Middle East Quarterly*, edited by Martin Kramer, offers stimulating insights on this perplexing region.

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The Little Man's Revenge

—Robert D. Kaplan—

IN 1884, ANARCHISTS tried to blow up the Greenwich Royal Observatory outside London, then the symbol of modern scientific thought on which Britain's world empire was based. The novelist Joseph Conrad found the act "a blood-stained inanity of so fatuous a kind that it was impossible to fathom its origin by any reasonable or even unreasonable process of thought." He could not grasp why anyone would blow himself to bits "for nothing even remotely resembling an idea." Conrad, like so many writers, discovered the answer to his question by a writing a book.

The Secret Agent, published in 1907, is about a shadowy anarchist, Adolf Verloc, who owns a shop selling low-end goods in a grimy, working class district of London. He supports his wife, her retarded brother and his mother-in-law with the help of money from Russian diplomats, in return for information he provides them on his fellow radicals. Russia's reactionary regime, worried about the increasing openness of British society—which threatens to alienate London from St. Petersburg—believes

that only an act of sheer madness will bring Britain's security establishment to its senses; and thus Verloc is activated to blow up the first meridian. "This country is absurd with its sentimental regard for individual liberty", complains the czarist diplomat, Mr. Vladimir, to Verloc. "The imbecile bourgeoisie of this country make themselves accomplices of the very people whose aim is to drive them out of their houses" and destroy them. Pressured by Vladimir to act soon—or risk losing his stipend—Verloc recruits his retarded brother-in-law, Stevie, to plant the bomb. But it explodes too early, leaving Stevie a bloody heap whose remains have to be collected by police with a shovel. After finding out what happened, Verloc's wife, Winnie, murders her husband, and then commits suicide.

The plot of *The Secret Agent* does not parallel the terrorist attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, but Conrad's uncanny insights into individuals and their society provide an analysis of what America is now up against that is unavailable in media reports.

Conrad is helped by his mastery of atmospherics: he likens the "murky, gloomy dampness" of London streets to "a slimy aquarium." Verloc lives among the "brick houses which existed in large quantities before the era of reconstruction dawned on London." His house is "hidden in the shades of the sordid street sel-

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dom touched by the sun." Verloc and his wife, Winnie, have no friends in the neighborhood. Their only contact is with an old charwoman who occasionally cleans their store. Anonymity, a common feature of mass societies, not only provides Verloc safe cover for his activities, but it removes any sense of shame he may harbor since he is without relatives or friends nearby. Moreover, his slovenly, tenement-style surroundings contrast sharply with the affluence of the diplomatic precincts of London that he thoroughly despises. "All these people had to be protected", Verloc sneers. "Protection is the first necessity of opulence and luxury." Conrad is intimating that nations that combine prosperity with anonymity require a tremendous security apparatus.

Vladimir explains to Verloc that assassinations do not have the effect that they used to, since they have become a normal condition for heads of state. An attack on a restaurant or theater, meanwhile, might merely be considered an act of "social revenge." To truly threaten an advanced capitalist society, therefore, an act "must be purely destructive" so as "to make a clean sweep of the whole social creation." According to Conrad, "Capitalism has made socialism, and the laws made by the capitalist for the protection of property are responsible for anarchism." Ultimately, the most horrifically violent acts are begot by envy and resentment.

The most envious, most resentful character in Conrad's tale is "the professor", an associate of Verloc, who walks the streets of London with his right hand closed around an india-rubber ball in his trouser pocket that activates an explosive, ready to blow himself up along with a crowd of people at any moment. "Lost in the crowd, miserable and undersized, he meditates confidently on his power." The professor combines an icy, "almost

ascetic purity" of thought with an "astounding ignorance of worldly conditions." A former assistant instructor in chemistry at a technical institute that fired him, the professor nurses psychological wounds that have developed into a complete hatred of society. Always willing to commit suicide, he tells Comrade Ossipon, another anarchist, that the character of most people is "built upon conventional morality. It leans on the social order. Mine stands free from everything artificial. They are bound in all sorts of conventions. They depend on life . . . whereas I depend on death, which knows no restraints and cannot be attacked. My superiority is evident."

Because Conrad is a great novelist, his story, perforce, centers on individuals rather than on impersonal forces. The professor hates a society that has not adequately rewarded him in his career, while Verloc is burdened by the need to support his family and find some useful work for his retarded brother-in-law. Look closely enough at any act of terrorism, the author advises, and one will find an intimate "domestic drama" lurking in the background. Conrad would assume that every one of the hijackers on September 11 has a comparable personal mystery to be fathomed: a failed career, no chance to marry and sire children, people he hates in the emerging Westernized middle class of his native Middle Eastern country. Terrorism is the little man's revenge.

Though *The Secret Agent* is a bleak, uninspiring tale, there are, nevertheless, hints of optimism. Let one suffice for now. Near the end of the book we read: "The thought of a mankind as numerous as the sands of the seashore, as indestructible, as difficult to handle, oppressed" the professor: there were simply too many ordinary people, intent on going about their lives, for him to vanquish. □

What War Means

Dimitri K. Simes

THE TRAGIC terrorist attacks of September 11 are likely to have a profound impact on American policy at home and abroad, not to mention on the American way of life. However, it is less than certain that September 11 will truly become a transformational event with enduring consequences. Much depends on subsequent developments, such as possible new terrorist attacks against the United States and the duration and relative success of the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, to ensure that September 11 has the appropriate impact on America, we have to be honest with ourselves in assessing what went wrong. The purpose of such honesty is not to justify the unjustifiable, to develop sympathy for our enemies, or to blame America for its own victimization. On the contrary, our goal in evaluating the past must be to ensure that it is we who will shape the future.

A process of intense introspection is clearly in order, and several questions must be answered. At the broadest level, how could the United States have fallen so far, so quickly? In the space of one late summer morning, Americans were forced to move from celebrating U.S. global political, military and economic pre-eminence and the advancing triumph

of democracy worldwide, to confronting a shocking vulnerability. More narrowly, how could 19 terrorists have penetrated four layers of defenses designed to protect U.S. citizens—by receiving visas, organizing a substantial conspiracy undetected from within America, carrying crude but deadly weapons through airport security, and seizing control of four huge passenger jets? And what could motivate people to sacrifice their lives to kill Americans? How could they have been unaffected by living among us? How could they have failed to develop any empathy for their future victims, to say nothing of some level of identification with the American people?

Rigorous, honest self-examination is not easy. Yet we must be honest with ourselves in understanding the complexities behind the attacks. It is emotionally satisfying to reduce the problem to one of “right vs. wrong”, as National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice has done. It is politically appealing to suggest that September 11 represented an attack on the innocent citizens of eighty nations rather than an attack on America—that the tragedy merely happened to take place on American soil—as President Bush has said. But these answers are intellectually inadequate. While it is true that Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network hate modern Western civilization, there is little doubt that they view America as the main

Dimitri K. Simes is president of The Nixon Center and associate publisher of *The National Interest*.

obstacle to their objectives and therefore as their principal target. Bin Laden and his network were certainly prepared to inflict “collateral damage” on eighty countries, but the goal of the operation was to strike at the United States. Nineteen terrorists were willing to commit suicide to fulfill that mission. And the organization behind them was willing to risk devastating retaliation in waging a war against the United States that it had declared publicly several years ago.

It well serves American purposes for the Bush Administration to frame the events of September 11 as an attack on eighty rather than an attack on one at a time when Washington is attempting to assemble a broad international coalition. But useful diplomatic rhetoric and patriotic flag-waving must not blind us to reality.

Who We Are, What We Do

THE BIG, the powerful and the wealthy are always resented to some extent, and America’s essential defense of its interests—including support for Israel and for moderate Arab states—could not but cause some hostility. But it is also clear that the propensity of the first truly post-Cold War U.S. administration for global social work—whether through diplomatic pressure, sanctions or occasional cruise missile attacks—contributed to a worldwide backlash. The Clinton Administration explained growing anti-Americanism with a new theory: some hidebound foreigners resent America regardless of what it does, because it is the most powerful nation committed to liberal democracy and free markets. This self-serving approach to the problem of anti-Americanism allowed the administration to portray its efforts at nation-building and its intervention in other states’ internal political disputes as relatively cost-free; the United States would have to shoulder only the modest expenses of the operations

themselves, not the burdens of their larger consequences.

Though this theory was eventually elevated to the status of conventional wisdom among much of the country’s foreign policy elite, it is demonstrably false. The entire history of terrorism contradicts the notion that abstract issues of political philosophy are, by themselves, sufficient to trigger violent attacks. This has certainly not been the case in Israel, where there is a clear connection between terrorism and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nor has it been the case with respect to terrorist attacks in India, Sri Lanka, Russia, Spain or the United Kingdom, where particular ethnic or religious groups seek independence or even union with a neighboring country. Terrorism in Colombia and the Philippines has been a product of rebel groups with very specific agendas, as has terrorism by Islamist extremists in Algeria and Uzbekistan. The foiled plot to hijack a French airliner and use it to destroy the Eiffel Tower was connected to France’s relationship with the Algerian government and the latter’s war on domestic Islamist extremists. America’s own experience with Middle East terrorism in the 1980s was triggered by Palestinian anger at the United States for its strong support of Israel and similar anger among Lebanese Shi’a and their Iranian and Syrian sponsors over the U.S. role in Lebanon’s civil war.

Why should Al-Qaeda be any different? Al-Qaeda may have originated in the Wahhabi branch of radical Islam—which rejects Western civilization—but it has not attacked targets in the Western world at random. Nor has it concentrated its efforts against the most secular and permissive Western nations, which are in Europe, not North America.

On the contrary, bin Laden’s terrorist network has been obsessively focused on the United States. The reason is that specific U.S. policies are unacceptable to Al-

Qaeda and threaten its perceived core interests and beliefs. First, bin Laden is clearly outraged at the American military presence in Saudi Arabia, the site of Islam's most holy sites. Second, and in practical terms perhaps most important, he deeply resents American support for moderate Arab regimes, some of which, such as Egypt and Jordan, have cracked down on fellow radical Islamists. Finally, bin Laden opposes America's role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. While this final issue may be low on his list of priorities, and appears to be a relatively recent addition to the list, there is no question that television images of wounded and dead Palestinians enrage radical Muslims and inspire many to fight the United States.

This is *not* to say that the United States has been wrong to protect Kuwait, to establish military bases in Saudi Arabia, to support regional leaders such as Egypt's Anwar el-Sadat and Hosni Mubarak, or to support Israel, which is both the only true democracy in the region and a key ally. But we should not pretend that there are no consequences to the determined pursuit of U.S. national interests. The notion that particular U.S. policies and actions could have painful consequences may contradict America's post-Cold War triumphalism, but no law of history says that good deeds go unpunished.

As the American public lost interest in international affairs in the 1990s, narrow elites and special interest groups won increasing influence over U.S. foreign policy decision-making. Many such groups seemed to argue that commendable objectives—at least as they saw those objectives—could be pursued at almost no cost because of their inherent virtue. Meanwhile, those who called for a more realistic definition of American national interests, for the establishment of priorities, or for difficult choices among conflicting goals, were accused of indifference to American values by those parad-

ing their purportedly superior morality. Former House Speaker Newt Gingrich once described himself as a “cheap hawk” to signify that he was a hawk who nevertheless wanted to spend less on defense. By the mid-1990s, “cheap moralists” joined the “cheap hawks” as principal architects of U.S. foreign policy.

The origin and shocking success of the September 11 attacks derive precisely from this fundamental contradiction between American policy, on one hand, and our national self-image on the other. The combination of what is perceived as hegemonic conduct abroad with a remarkable laxity in defending the U.S. homeland (with the notable but insufficient exception of predominant U.S. military power) was a prescription for disaster. Of course, in the absence of intelligence information, no one could have predicted a terrorist use of commercial jets as weapons of mass destruction with such devastating success. But anyone who watched the United States dance on a global minefield during the Clinton Administration could have seen that an explosion was in store.

The Clinton Legacy

ONE FECKLESS military intervention followed another in the Clinton years. Yet U.S. military power was used not against those who threatened America or attacked its allies; instead, it was deployed against those whose practices we found disagreeable. In Somalia, for example, the Clinton team escalated America's involvement from protecting United Nations humanitarian aid to the destruction of a particular warlord and an effort at nation-building. The result was the loss of American lives and a humiliating withdrawal. In Haiti, the United States invaded an island ruled by a corrupt and repressive but basically friendly junta in

order to restore power to a corrupt and repressive left-wing priest. That priest, by the way, re-established diplomatic ties with Cuba immediately before leaving office, as if to tell Washington what he really thought of its help.

In Bosnia, the United States eventually facilitated NATO intervention to protect the region's Muslims. The Muslims could have been protected more effectively, however, if the administration had sought the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina—which had no history as an independent state—into three ethnically homogeneous entities. This solution was clearly preferred by the Serbs and Croats, the majority of the republic's population, and resisted only by the Muslims, who, being a plurality of the population, accordingly expected to dominate the government of any unitary state. Despite this, the Clinton Administration rejected the Vance-Owen plan and all other proposals that could have ended the civil war quickly and saved lives. The administration justified its position by arguing that it did not want to “reward Serbian aggression.” Nevertheless, it never adequately explained why it was permissible for Bosnia to withdraw from Yugoslavia, but impermissible for the Republika Srpska to secede from Bosnia.

In the case of Kosovo, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright—the administration's principal champion of promiscuous nation-building—allowed the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), earlier described as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, to manipulate the United States into supporting an Albanian rebellion. In Paris, the Clinton Administration issued an unrealistic ultimatum to Slobodan Milosevic, demanding that NATO troops be granted free passage and portage rights in Serbia proper, which guaranteed a NATO-Serbia conflict. Widespread killings of Albanian civilians did take place, but only after the newly

energized KLA stepped up its activities, provoking a predictably brutal response that led NATO to announce plans to attack Serbia.

In addition to angering those on the receiving end of its cruise-missile diplomacy, the Clinton Administration successfully alienated a number of important countries, including China and Russia, in the process. The Clinton team's response to its inadvertent attack on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was cavalier in this context. Washington seemed unable to understand why the Chinese were not satisfied with the explanation that the strike was accidental. At the same time, the U.S. media portrayed the widespread indignation among Chinese students as totally unprovoked. The best way to assess the Chinese reaction to this incident may be to imagine the U.S. response had China unintentionally bombed the American embassy in a relatively friendly country—Thailand, for example—during a bombing campaign that proceeded over U.S. objections and without approval from the United Nations Security Council. In such a context, would we view such an act as a simple accident?

Interestingly, in the one instance during its tenure in which genocide was unquestionably taking place, in Rwanda, the Clinton Administration did worse than nothing, for it retarded the efforts of others to extend assistance. Rwanda was too far away, was not a feature of nightly news reports, and lacked a domestic constituency in the United States.

Sanctions of various types also became a weapon of choice in U.S. foreign policy during the Clinton Administration, though the Republican-controlled Congress—eager to make statements about foreign policy, but limited in its ability to shape it—also shares responsibility for this development. Between 1993 and 1998 alone, the United States

imposed sanctions 61 times—out of a total of 125 cases since World War I. Sanctions eventually targeted 75 countries and some 42 percent of the world's population for reasons ranging from support for terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or other sensitive technologies, to concerns over human rights and the environment and even the mislabeling of tuna. While unilateral U.S. sanctions were described by one study as effective in only 13 percent of cases, they were hugely successful in generating animosity toward the United States on the part of governments and peoples around the world.

While not everyone who resents the United States is able and willing to resort to terrorism against America, the Clinton Administration acted as if the targets of its diplomacy of force had no means of retaliation. However, as history has shown, terrorism is the retaliatory weapon of choice among the weak. Yet the Clintonites never made the struggle against terrorism a real foreign policy priority—even after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, which was quickly determined to have had the same ultimate objective as the subsequent successful attack on the Twin Towers. The Clinton Administration did not make tolerance of and financial support for Wahhabi extremists a focal point in its discussions with Saudi Arabia or Egypt. With respect to Pakistan, the United States concentrated its efforts on trying to dissuade Islamabad from developing nuclear weapons—something virtually inevitable after its rival India had already done so. Instead, it should have been encouraging Pakistan to force Afghanistan's Taliban regime to end its support for bin Laden, a goal that was more important even at that time, and certainly more achievable. The introduction of sanctions against Pakistan in 1998 further limited Washington's ability to

persuade Islamabad to put pressure on its Afghan clients.

During the 1990s, Moscow could also have been of help in dealing with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. Russian troops were guarding the Tajik-Afghan border and the Kremlin saw the Taliban as a threat to the stability of Central Asia as a whole. The Russian government also claimed that a connection existed between bin Laden and at least some groups of Chechen rebels, and called for cooperation with the United States against Islamic extremism. All of this was contemptuously dismissed by the Clinton Administration, which was convinced that Moscow merely sought to persuade the United States to turn a blind eye to Russian brutality in Chechnya and its attempts to regain influence in the Caspian region. In 1999 and 2000, the United States went so far as to discourage Uzbek President Islam Karimov from working with Russia to help the Northern Alliance.

The Clinton Administration's response to terrorist acts directed against others was deplorable both in its lack of understanding of terrorism as a strategy and its lack of sympathy for victimized societies. Despite an undeniable terrorist past, Yasir Arafat became a regular visitor to the White House, even as his Palestinian Authority systematically disregarded its commitments under the Oslo Accords. Similarly, Gerry Adams, leader of the Sinn Féin political wing of the murderous Irish Republican Army, was also received several times by President Clinton and treated as if his terrorist affiliations were no more than a minor blemish.

In the case of Chechnya, not only the Clinton Administration, but also much of the Congress and the American political establishment more broadly, had no sympathy whatsoever for Russia's exposure to terrorism, even after bombings that leveled apartment buildings in Moscow and other cities. There were mitigating condi-

tions: several Russian liberals and media commentators argued that the explosions were orchestrated by the Russian security services to justify the new intervention in Chechnya, and to create a climate in which Boris Yeltsin's hand-picked successor—former KGB Lt. Colonel Vladimir Putin—would be more likely to be elected president. Strange circumstances surrounding the discovery of what seemed to be explosives in a Ryazan apartment complex only added to the uncertainty.

Yet Chechnya was for all practical purposes an independent country from 1996 to 1999. During that period, it became a lawless region ruled by warlords where the kidnapping and murder of civilians—including foreign aid workers—were common. What passed for a legal system was based on Taliban-style *sharia* courts. In 1999, Chechen rebels invaded the Russian region of Dagestan and occupied several villages. The group, which included Arab and Afghan volunteers, was led by the Jordanian “field commander” Ibn-ul Khattab, who did not hide his connections to Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.

Not only the Russian government, but also liberal politicians critical of the Chechnya operation—such as Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinskii—asked the United States to share intelligence on financial support to the Chechens and to apply pressure to Georgia to prevent the rebels from finding sanctuary across the mountainous border between Chechnya and Georgia. The United States refused these Russian pleas; serious cooperation against terrorism and Osama bin Laden was never given a chance.

Even if the United States had conducted a prudent foreign policy, acting assertively only on matters truly important to America's fundamental interests and values, America's role as the sole superpower would surely have generated some opposition. But the Clinton

Administration's arrogant intrusiveness in other countries' affairs could not but strengthen the backlash while simultaneously weakening America's ability to manage it. Despite this, and despite the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the August 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and the bombing of the U.S.S. *Cole* in Aden harbor in October 2000, the administration continued to act as if the United States led a harmonious global village full of people eager to accept American guidance. To the extent that serious threats were recognized, the United States seemed to assume that they could be addressed by its superior military power. To genuine homeland security it threw some money and gave much lip service. It was not enough.

Since September 11, there has been much justifiable criticism of U.S. domestic security practices—and, clearly, it goes well beyond the frailties of the Clinton Administration. It has been known for some time that visas are issued at American consulates by the most junior, and often least promising, Foreign Service officers. Moreover, because consular officers are overworked, foreign nationals employed by U.S. embassies in their home countries conduct most interviews of visa seekers. Within America, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Border Patrol have been widely viewed as over-stretched and underfunded for many years.

Airport and airline security was also known to be weak. Numerous commission reports, spot inspections, and television exposés pointed out long before September 11 that airport security was easily breached, that underpaid and poorly trained security screeners are frequently not American citizens, and that many screeners do not even have proper documentation to work in the United States. Particularly in the wake of the foiled plot

to crash an airliner into the Eiffel Tower, it should have been evident that airlines needed better on-board security procedures, stronger cockpit doors and more air marshals to complicate the plans of potential hijackers.

At the broadest level, too, coordination and information sharing among U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies was also known to be insufficient. Many reviews of the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and other studies had concluded as much, and offered practicable recommendations for improvement.

Ultimately, most of these individual problems can be traced to one fundamental source: lax administration of security efforts, abetted by societal attitudes that have downplayed its importance. Everyone knew that America's borders were porous. But few were willing to call for heightened scrutiny of those entering the United States, either as immigrants or visitors, in the prevailing climate of political correctness and the undifferentiated celebration of ethnic diversity. None of these problems could be properly addressed in a context where any important ethnic constituency could complain that its members had been unfairly singled out. Criticism of profiling by police and other security agencies became so intense that it became impossible for U.S. government agencies to approach particular groups of visitors or immigrants with special vigilance. Such constraints remained essentially unchanged even after investigations into the 1993 World Trade Center bombing made clear that Islamic extremists driven out of the Middle East had begun to seek asylum in the United States in fairly large numbers. Our permissiveness allowed some of them to use our territory to conspire not only against America's moderate friends in the Middle East but against the United States itself.

Win the War

AT THIS fateful juncture, evaluating our past shortcomings should help us to take purposeful action, some immediately, some in due course. The first order of business now, however, is to win the war. Taking into account that our enemies have demonstrated both brutality and effectiveness—and that they are not a conventional power with which compromise might be possible if we desired it—they must be destroyed. Further, time is of the essence. While there are obviously advantages to proceeding carefully, to building a coalition, and to avoiding collateral damage, these considerations must be measured against the overriding need to eliminate as quickly as possible a foe that has demonstrated the capability and the willingness to kill thousands of Americans.

Similarly, these considerations must also be weighed against the danger of appearing irresolute to not only our foes, but also our friends. There is little doubt that displays of strength will have a greater impact on our enemy—and in much of the Arab world, where sympathy for America is limited and unlikely to increase—than displays of humanity. To some extent, the same is also true of friendly governments in the region, to whom the sense that America will follow through and do what is necessary to destroy its enemies is at least as important as the visibility of our efforts to protect the innocent.

There are, of course, both moral and practical reasons for the United States to make efforts to limit civilian casualties. But we should not make the mistake of guaranteeing to our enemies that we will pursue our objectives in a strictly calibrated fashion. The United States should not be motivated by lust for revenge, but no less should we forget what has been done to us in striving to ensure that it can never

happen again. A visit to Ground Zero in New York makes clear what is at stake.

The first principle of the American response to September 11 must be to recognize that we are at war, and to adopt a war-fighting mentality. The scale of the loss of life and destruction surely justifies this, as does the knowledge that our opponents declared “holy war” on the United States years ago. Clearly, adopting a war-fighting mentality bears several implications. Unlike criminal investigations, for example, war requires no evidence that a particular bullet from a particular gun killed a particular individual. It is difficult not to wonder whether the United States might now be better off if it had struck immediately at Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and Taliban headquarters and residences before they were evacuated.

Another element of a war-fighting mentality is the fact that in war, victory is the paramount objective. This applies both to conventional military attacks and to whatever response the United States may take if it is determined that the wave of anthrax-laden letters directed at prominent individuals and institutions originated abroad. In the latter case, it has always been the U.S. position that we would rule out nothing, including nuclear weapons, in responding to an attack on America with chemical or biological agents. While nuclear weapons should obviously be used as weapons of last resort, and only against those whom we are convinced are our enemies, we should be ready to deploy them if we reach an informed conclusion that a state has sponsored chemical or biological attacks against the United States, or provided chemical or biological weapons to terrorists who have done so. Governments facilitating such attacks should not be allowed to hide behind their civilian populations any more than Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan were allowed to do so. While the United States

should strive to limit innocent deaths to the extent possible, our war-fighting strategy must be defined primarily by the need to prevail.

There is, however, another side to the coin of being prepared to be severe, and even ruthless, in dealing with adversaries. The United States also needs to be flexible, creative and realistic in establishing its priorities and addressing seriously the unpleasant but inevitable trade-offs that arise among conflicting policy objectives. In a certain sense, it is fortunate the United States was in this instance attacked for doing important things, such as protecting Kuwait and Israel, rather than as a result of one or another of the Clinton Administration’s capricious military escapades. September 11 should be a powerful reminder to policymakers to avoid exposing Americans to another major terrorist attack on account of secondary or tertiary goals.

Similarly, given the priority of the present campaign against international terrorism, it would be unwise to be too particular about the motives of those ready to support America in this struggle. We ourselves have not been above hypocrisy in dealing with terrorism; Presidents Clinton and Bush each coached Israel not to “overreact” to terrorism and to make deals with the Palestinian Authority, which has harbored the terrorists attacking Israel. Though some such hypocrisy may be necessary if we are to include moderate Arab states in a U.S. coalition against Islamic extremism, we should at a minimum avoid sounding too pure in passing judgment on the motives and priorities of others.

If anything, the fact that leaders such as Russian President Vladimir Putin, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf have been much more willing to support the United States than their respective populations should call into question

another pillar of conventional wisdom: that democracies are invariably America's best friends. Mature and stable Western democracies that share our values are surely among those closest to the United States. But new and unstable democracies with different historical traditions, virtually no middle class and an underdeveloped or maimed civil society can easily be subverted or captured by nationalists or extremists with dangerous consequences for themselves and others.

Russia is a case in point. It goes without saying that President Putin has self-serving motives in supporting the U.S. campaign against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, including encouraging a more understanding U.S. attitude toward Russian policy aims in Chechnya. Yet, at no small political risk to himself, Mr. Putin seems to have made a strategic decision to join the war on terrorism as America's junior partner.¹ It is in America's interest to demonstrate to President Putin and to the Russian people that helping the United States is the right choice. This does not mean assisting Russian forces in Chechnya or abandoning the commitment to missile defense. What *is* required is a new understanding of Russia's concerns and priorities—an understanding not so different from that which we are typically prepared to offer to other important states, not least, say, Saudi Arabia. Those

who demand immediate improvements in Russian human rights practices should ask themselves why they have not made the same demands of Turkey, which has often dealt harshly with its Kurdish minority and has suppressed some religious freedoms. Encouraging another state to act as a friend requires, at a minimum, not treating it as an adversary.

It has yet to be established whether the outcome of the war inflicted upon us will be a tougher and stricter America, more realistic, more focused and more prepared to put an end to its security permissiveness at home and its exhibitionist posturing abroad. America has reached a new moment of truth. While finding terrorist cells may be difficult, no nation that harbors them is outside America's reach now that the end of the Cold War has deprived them of a superpower protector. Responding selectively but resolutely to September 11 will likely allow us to destroy our enemies, enhance our global leadership and preserve the fundamentals of our way of life. America should not settle for less. □

¹Russian public opinion polls show that only ten percent of respondents express full support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, while some 70 percent oppose Russian cooperation in providing America with access to bases in Tajikistan. This poll was conducted on October 10.



Lifting the Veil on Afghanistan

—Julie Sirrs—

BUMPING ALONG in a dilapidated bus on a dusty road in October 1997, I could barely see through the mesh of the all-concealing Afghan *burka* I wore. But I was at least as excited to be entering Afghanistan as my companions, some Afghan-American friends who were returning to their native country to visit family. Unlike them, however, this was my first trip inside, for even as a U.S. government analyst specializing in Afghanistan, I had never actually been able to visit the country. I was doing so now only by taking annual leave and spending several thousand dollars of my own money to sneak across the border from Pakistan.

Yet even for my Afghan friends, this trip was a new experience, for their family had only recently returned to Paghman, a western suburb of the capital, Kabul, from a Pakistani refugee camp. They had been prompted to move back because they were pleased by the Taliban militia's capture of the area in September 1996. They claimed that the reason for their cheer was that the Taliban had restored order, in contrast to the "chaos" that had prevailed under the previous *mujaheddin* government. But the real reason for their happiness was

revealed in the gleeful gesture one of them would frequently make, blowing on his open hand to emphasize how deftly the Pashtun Taliban had ousted the largely Tajik government from the capital. His joy had little if anything to do with the way the city and country had been governed by the former rulers, and everything to do with his euphoria over his own Pashtun ethnic group being back in charge.

Even more telling, perhaps, was that this friend and his family had based their perceptions of pre-Taliban rule not on first-hand experience, but on what they had heard from others. Their attitudes also obscured their vision of the present, so that they seemed not to notice the teenage Taliban soldier who boarded our bus midway through the journey and ordered the passengers around to his whim; or the bribes we paid along the way; or the informant network set up by the Taliban secret police, so pervasive that we had to cut short our visit once word got out that the family was hosting a foreigner.

In this way, my friends were like so many others, including today's policymakers, whose view of Afghanistan is based more on myths circulating outside Afghanistan's borders than on the reality inside. This favoring of fiction over fact has not only caused the situation in Afghanistan to go from bad to worse, it has also repeatedly misled American policymakers. Perhaps nowhere else do such

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myths prevail as strongly as on the subject of Pashtuns in Afghanistan, related particularly to the legends surrounding the Taliban, bin Laden's involvement there, Pakistan's role, and a post-Taliban future for the country.

The Taliban Myth and Afghan Realities

CHIEF AMONG these legends is the how—and why—of the Taliban movement itself. Briefly, the story of the Taliban's rise goes something like this: after ousting the Afghan communist regime from power in 1992, a government of *mujaheddin*—some of whom are now in the opposition United Front—took over and promptly fell to fighting among themselves. An era of lawlessness ensued throughout the entire country, characterized by widespread looting, rape, murder and general mayhem. Out of this chaos emerged the Taliban, a band of religious students and teachers (Taliban means “religious students” in Arabic), including some former *mujaheddin*, in the Kandahar area of southern Afghanistan.

At around the same time, so the story goes, the Taliban's leader, Mullah Mohammed Omar, had a dream in which God instructed him to bring order across Afghanistan. The Taliban's ranks rapidly swelled as people—wary with lawlessness and war—rallied to the militia's side, or at least did not resist its advances. The Taliban then made rapid gains across Afghanistan, spreading order through their strict and uncompromising interpretation of the Quran, their only obstacle being a band of ethnic and religious minorities holding onto a mere sliver of the country.

Mullah Omar may well have had such a dream, but the rest of the story is wild exaggeration that warps attitudes toward Afghanistan to this very day.

What really happened is at the same time less dramatic and more germane to the country's future.

Prior to the Taliban's rise, various regional administrations with considerable autonomy held power throughout Afghanistan: that of Ismail Khan in western Afghanistan, Abdul Rashid Dostam in the north, the Shi'a Wahdat party in central Afghanistan, the Islamic State's government in Kabul and the northeast, and the Eastern Council in the four eastern provinces. Almost immediately after the collapse of the Afghan communist regime in 1992, these various governments began to provide services, particularly in the area of education, that the Taliban have never been able to match. Certainly none of them introduced the draconian, delphic and often bizarre edicts that typify Taliban rule.

The main areas of disorder in pre-Taliban times were relatively few. These included the roads linking the Pakistani border with Kabul and Kandahar, the city of Kandahar itself, and occasionally the city of Kabul. Even in Kabul, however, the worst disorder stemmed from the constant barrages of rockets supplied by Pakistan, often launched in salvoes of hundreds per day, first by the forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and then by the Taliban. This, combined with a siege by the same forces, made it difficult for the Kabul government to devote sufficient resources to internal security and establish stronger links with other Afghan regional governments. Yet despite such difficulties, schools and offices inside Kabul continued to function throughout this period, with the active involvement of females.

Furthermore, the *mujaheddin* who took power after 1992 realized that the lawlessness that prevailed, especially around Kandahar, was unacceptable. Then-governor of the western provinces, Ismail Khan, for instance, tried to resolve this problem as early as 1993, and then-

Defense Minister Ahmed Shah Masood provided funds to the Taliban in 1994 when the militia claimed that its only purpose was to restore law and order. It is particularly significant that these efforts were made even though the billions of dollars in foreign support that had aided the *mujaheddin* in war had almost completely disappeared once they attempted to make peace. Their Taliban opponents, however, have been consistently well-funded from numerous foreign sources, particularly from Pakistan and pro-bin Laden sympathizers in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf.

Once in power, the Taliban established only a façade of security. Although murder and rape had occurred in Afghanistan prior to the Taliban's arrival, UN and U.S. State Department human rights reports indicate that such atrocities increased dramatically in scale and organization *after* the Taliban took control. These documents relate that the Taliban separated women and girls from their families "by the truckload." A woman who escaped several months after she was kidnapped reported that she had been imprisoned by Taliban soldiers and repeatedly raped. A recent defector from the Taliban has reported that pro-Taliban mullahs inside Afghanistan would issue Taliban soldiers "temporary marriage certificates" to encourage them to rape women during battle.

By contrast, an American journalist who lived in Kabul during much of the reign of the *mujaheddin* from 1992–96, relates that the law and order situation invariably improved when front-line pressures subsided and soldiers could be tasked with keeping order instead of fending off invaders. Indeed, far from bringing peace, the Taliban have brought war to areas of Afghanistan that had been relatively untouched, such as the city of Mazar-e Sharif. And this is not to mention the Taliban's wanton destruction of

the 1,400 year-old Buddha statues in Bamiyan province.

The Pashtun Stew

SO IF NOT through the establishment of much-desired order, how then were the Taliban able to convince others to join their movement? How did its leaders facilitate defections from within opponents' ranks? Though the Taliban are best known outside Afghanistan for their harsh ideology and for their harboring of Osama bin Laden, the movement capitalized initially on the fact that its members are predominantly Pashtuns. But not all Pashtuns are created equal in the land of the Taliban. They do not comprise a homogeneous group; they are more like a boiling ethnic stew.

The Taliban are primarily—almost solely—a movement that draws its leadership from among the Pashtun tribes of southern Afghanistan. A common complaint from Pashtuns elsewhere is that the Taliban use locals to gain territory and then push them aside in favor of overlords from the south, especially from the Taliban's Kandahar heartland. Thus, while Pashtuns in other parts of the country, including in such northern areas as Mazar-e Sharif and Konduz, proved crucial to the Taliban's victories in those places, they have not fared particularly well under Taliban rule. Fortunately for the Taliban, the movement has proven successful in crushing the resultant dissatisfaction, for instance, by assassinating the Pashtun governor of Kunduz province and arresting other commanders and their men on the verge of defection.

Even southern Pashtuns, however, have not always willingly joined the Taliban. The same Taliban defector mentioned earlier relates that he and many others he knew from the Kandahar region were coerced into joining the Taliban. In his case, the Taliban had arrested and

refused to release his grandfather until the family agreed to send a man to join the Taliban's ranks. In my own travels through non-Taliban areas of Afghanistan, I have met numerous Pashtuns who have suffered under the Taliban's rule and fled from it. These people report that the Taliban are not the pro-Pashtun party they expected, but instead are increasingly dominated and driven ideologically by foreign extremists, particularly Pakistanis and Arabs who care little more for Afghanistan's Pashtun population than they do for any of the country's other ethnic groups.

Yet disaffected Pashtuns have been unable to overthrow the Taliban for a variety of reasons. For instance, when the Taliban take over an area, they make it a top priority to disarm the population. And while some dissident Pashtuns from the south have journeyed to the United Front's northern stronghold seeking weapons, their efforts are stymied by the opposition's own chronic supply problems. When uprisings have occurred, the Taliban have been able to quickly move additional soldiers into the area to crush them. Finally, would-be defectors were deterred in the days immediately following U.S. air attacks because Washington failed to send a clear message that the Taliban would be overthrown. It conducted few strikes at targets that could have seriously weakened the Taliban's forces on the ground.

While Pashtuns comprise the largest single ethnic group in Afghanistan, they make up only 38 percent of the population. Tajiks come in second with approximately 25 percent. The remaining population includes Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkomen, Pasha'i, Nuristanis and others. To argue that it is natural that Pashtuns should dominate all the others—a situation possible only by dint of repression—ignores the ethnic realities of the country. It particularly ignores the realities of the last two decades, when these other groups learned to enjoy considerable autonomy

and acquired the capability to defend themselves. Also relevant is the fact that the United Front, in terms of party composition, has significant Pashtun representation, with two predominantly Pashtun factions, but only one each of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras.

Osama bin Laden's Role

EVEN BEFORE the Taliban's pro-Pashtun image had begun to fade, the movement found a powerful ally to redirect its outlook beyond Afghanistan. In June 1996, Osama bin Laden returned to Afghanistan from Sudan and initially settled in Nangarhar province, a region of the country that was neutral in the war between the Taliban and the Kabul government. The Taliban first established contact with bin Laden in September of that year when the militia took over Nangarhar. Taliban officials evidently forged close ties with bin Laden, for the ex-Saudi soon moved to the Taliban's headquarters in Kandahar.

From that point forward, the Taliban became increasingly less interested in southern Pashtun domination of Afghanistan and more oriented toward extremist international Islam. A case in point occurred in 1997, when Taliban leader Mullah Omar forced a plane carrying the leader of Tajikistan's Islamic resistance, Abdullo Nuri, to land in Kandahar. Nuri was returning to Tajikistan in order to form a coalition with members of the former communist government with whom he had been at war since 1992. Omar encouraged Nuri not to compromise, but instead to establish a base in Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan in order to continue the battle for the establishment of a "pure" Islamic state in Tajikistan.

Nuri demurred, but other Central Asian opposition groups readily accepted similar offers from Omar, particularly the

Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). (The State Department has designated the IMU as a foreign terrorist organization because of its involvement in several hostage incidents, including one involving four American citizens.) Many of the Taliban's foot soldiers also express internationalist aspirations. A Pakistani prisoner-of-war held by the United Front has stated that although he harbors no personal hatred toward the people of the United Front, their resistance must be eliminated in order for the Taliban to establish a "secure base for *jihad*", including operations against the United States and Israel. Even Osama bin Laden has become more radical during his time with the Taliban, issuing in 1998 his most extreme *fatwa* urging his followers to kill Americans everywhere.

The Taliban leadership has also echoed elements of bin Laden's ideology, calling on U.S. forces to leave Saudi Arabia, for Israel to receive a "tooth breaking response", and threatening, pre-September 11, that if the United States again struck at bin Laden targets, the Taliban would "retaliate with full force." Thus the Taliban are not "harboring" bin Laden out of the Pashtun code of hospitality to a former enemy of the hated Soviets. After all, others fitting that description, such as a former Wahdat party leader, have been killed while under the "protection" of the Taliban. Instead, the Taliban are sheltering bin Laden first and foremost because of a shared worldview, best exemplified by the mutual assistance they provide one another: safe haven for bin Laden, money and men for the Taliban.

Pakistani Motivations

THE ASPECT OF contemporary Afghanistan that is perhaps the most dangerously misunderstood concerns Pakistan's role as a perceived American ally in the region.

In fact, Islamabad's involvement has been so contrary to Washington's interests in Afghanistan that Iran has become America's most practical ally against bin Laden, because it aids the only active resistance to his forces. Pakistan, on the other hand, has been the chief supporter of bin Laden's Taliban backers. Without Pakistani support in the form of money, military supplies, advisors, fighters and even some regular troops, the Taliban could not have achieved power, nor would bin Laden have had the sanctuary from which to plot against Americans.

Islamabad has consistently tried to install governments in Afghanistan that not only protect its interests, but would also be the most malleable to them. It has taken pains to ensure, for instance, cheap transit routes for Pakistani trade links—for both legal and smuggled goods—to Central Asia, and to create the stability that the laying of lucrative pipelines for Central Asian energy resources requires. Most of all, however, Pakistani fundamentalist groups and their sympathizers within Pakistan's government, particularly its military and intelligence services, share bin Laden's and the Taliban's ideology, including its anti-Americanism. Typical of this was a conference held in northwest Pakistan in January 2001, in which members of these parties and former Pakistani high government officials openly chanted "long live Osama."

Additional proof of Pakistani government sympathies are revealed by those whom Islamabad has consistently supported for over two decades in Afghanistan: the extremists. Notably, Afghan Pashtun moderates have historically received little support from the Pakistanis. Yet Pakistan's military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, has repeatedly claimed that his government was supporting the Taliban because of their shared Pashtun ethnicity. The foreigners fighting within Taliban ranks

paint a much different picture, however. A survey of Pakistanis captured by the United Front shows that nearly 70 percent of such fighters are non-Pashtun, and therefore must be motivated by a cause other than ethnic solidarity. When I interviewed them, these POWs (who also include Arabs and Chinese) claimed that they came to help the Taliban in order to acquire skills that would be helpful in a *jihad* outside of Afghanistan, both against their home countries and against the United States.

Post-Taliban Afghanistan

THE KEY TO defeating an enemy is understanding him. In this, bin Laden and his Taliban allies have already proven helpful. The CIA admits that it was bin Laden who was behind the assassination of United Front leader Ahmed Shah Masood just two days before the September 11 attacks on the United States. Bin Laden likely calculated that murdering Masood would decapitate the Afghan resistance just when the United States would need it the most. But Washington has been slow to heed bin Laden's message: that the greatest threat to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network—at least inside Afghanistan—lies with those who can physically oust it. The

people of the United Front have been suffering from the atrocities of bin Laden and the Taliban for years. They may be the only people in the world who hate bin Laden more than Americans do. While only a genuinely broad-based coalition government representing all ethnic groups, including southern Pashtuns, will be able to govern in a post-Taliban Afghanistan, one thing is certain: as long as the United Front is allowed to play a strong role, no foreign Islamist militants will be allowed on Afghan soil.

That the U.S. government has so much difficulty grasping this fact shows that Washington has been listening a little too closely to the Taliban's and bin Laden's allies in Islamabad. This is not surprising given that Americans officials stationed overseas who are tasked to monitor Afghanistan are based primarily out of Pakistan. Not coincidentally, the most negative media stories about the United Front tend to come from the same place. Yet if we continue along this path of willful ignorance in the wake of more than 5,000 dead Americans, it will likely prove fatal to many more of us. Instead, we must strain to peer through the mists clouding our vision of Afghanistan, lest we view that country no more clearly than I first did through the veil of a *burka* on that bus ride many years ago. □

"Long, Too Long America"

Long, too long America,
Traveling roads all even and peaceful you learn'd from joys and prosperity only,
But now, ah now, to learn from crises of anguish, advancing, grappling with direst
fate and recoiling not,
And now to conceive and show to the world what your children en-masse really are,
(For who except myself has yet conceiv'd what your children en-masse really are?)

—Walt Whitman

The Pakistani Pivot

Dennis Kux

ON SEPTEMBER 10, 2001, Pakistan was a country of secondary interest to the United States. Although it had been America's "most allied ally in Asia" in the 1950s and an indispensable partner in the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the relationship unraveled after the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan. In October 1990, the United States suspended economic and military aid under the Pressler amendment because Pakistan had developed nuclear weapons. Its May 1998 nuclear tests and the army's overthrow of the civilian government of Nawaz Sharif in October 1999 led to further sanctions against the one-time U.S. ally.

Thus, when President Bill Clinton touched down for five hours in Islamabad on March 25, 2000—the first journey to Pakistan by a U.S. chief executive in more than thirty years—the mood was tense, and contrasted sharply with his highly successful five-day visit to India. In their talks, Clinton and General Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military dictator,

differed over major issues: how best to deal with the fundamentalist Taliban in Afghanistan and other Islamic extremists; how best to deal with the Kashmir dispute; a timetable for the return of democracy; and nuclear weapons issues. Clinton outlined his concerns to Musharraf in a frank but conciliatory manner and then repeated them in a television address to the people of Pakistan. Out of the public spotlight, the President worried about Pakistan's chronic political instability, the growing threat of fundamentalism, its mounting economic woes and the continuing fixation on India. With the country drifting toward national failure, the worst-case fear was that, like its neighbor Afghanistan, Pakistan might be engulfed by Islamic fundamentalism. A Pakistan ruled by religious extremists and armed with nuclear weapons posed a nightmare scenario with ramifications far transcending South Asia. Amid such concerns, Clinton's inability to produce a better U.S. relationship with Pakistan inevitably left the impression that the United States was "tilting" toward India.

The incoming Bush Administration picked up where Clinton left off, this despite the Cold War tradition of Republican warmth toward governments in Islamabad. The new leadership in Washington soon made clear that its top priority in South Asia was to continue the process of improving relations with India.

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Pakistan's image remained largely negative both in official Washington and in the prestige press.

The events of September 11 have changed all that. Geography and history have once more made Pakistan important to U.S. interests. Islamabad's support is required in order to deal with Osama bin Laden, his Arab terrorist colleagues in Al-Qaeda and their Taliban hosts. Pakistan's long common frontier with Afghanistan, the intimate ethnic links between Pashtuns on both sides of the border, and the in-depth knowledge that Pakistan's intelligence service has of its neighbor make Islamabad a key partner in "bringing the terrorists to justice or justice to the terrorists", as President Bush put it on September 20. Pakistan has become pivotal.

Here We Go Again?

TO AN EXTENT, the post-September 11 situation is a replay of what happened after the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Then, as now, Pakistan was ruled by a military dictator. Then, as now, U.S.-Pakistan relations had been in disarray. In 1979, relations were at their nadir following a mob attack on the U.S. embassy in Islamabad that November. The United States had also cut off economic aid because of Pakistan's secret nuclear program, and had been strongly critical of Pakistan's lack of democracy and poor human rights record.

After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, President Jimmy Carter quickly shifted policy gears. Pakistan became a "front-line" state. Carter revived the 1959 U.S.-Pakistan security agreement and offered economic and military help. Washington feared that Pakistan might be the Soviets' next victim but, just as important, U.S. officials realized that without Pakistan's help, it was virtually impossible to cause

trouble for the Soviets inside Afghanistan. In the midst of the Tehran hostage crisis, no cooperative action was feasible with Iran, the only other country that then bordered on Afghanistan.

Although Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, the then-Pakistani dictator, quickly decided to oppose the Soviets and to provide covert support to a nascent anti-communist guerilla movement, he rejected Carter's offer of \$200 million worth of aid as "peanuts." A year later, however, Zia and the Reagan Administration agreed on a cooperation package involving \$600 million in U.S. aid a year (including the potent F-16 fighter-bomber); an understanding that the nuclear issue would not be "the centerpiece" of U.S.-Pakistan relations; an end to U.S. criticism about Pakistan's internal scene; and channeling all covert CIA aid to the Afghan resistance through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI). Zia knew that he had a strong bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the Americans, hung tough, and in the end got what he wanted. So did the United States. Seven years later, in 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev decided to pull the Soviet army out of Afghanistan after the rag-tag but well-armed Afghan *mujaheddin* held 100,000-plus Soviet soldiers at bay.

But there were serious negative consequences as well. The arms supplied through the covert U.S. aid program flooded Afghanistan and became an important cause of the violence and lawlessness that has racked that country ever since. The more fundamentalist Afghan resistance groups, who, in keeping with Zia's instructions, received the bulk of the weapons, gained strength and political legitimacy during the war, as did their Pakistani counterparts. (These counterparts became even more important in the 1990s through their cooperation with the ISI in supporting the insurgency against India in Kashmir.) Ultimately, the collapse

of the state structure in Afghanistan, the virtual destruction of the economy, the mass refugee exodus during the anti-Soviet insurgency, and the ensuing civil conflict created the political vacuum that spawned the Taliban and enabled Al-Qaeda to make Afghanistan its base of operations.

To its discredit, the United States simply walked away from Afghanistan after the Soviets departed, leaving it to the Pakistanis to arrange a political settlement among the fractious Afghan *mujaheddin*. The main U.S. aim, as former Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost has said, "was getting the Russians out. Afghanistan, as such, was remote from major U.S. concerns. The United States was not much interested in the internal Afghan setup and did not have much capacity to understand this." Although a more active American role might still have failed to resolve the Afghan problem, Washington was remiss in not trying harder.

But there are important differences from 1979. The United States today is not totally dependent on Islamabad in dealing with Afghanistan. Russia and the new Central Asian republics to the north, especially Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, are bitter foes of the Taliban regime, whom they have blamed for stirring regional instability and Islamic militancy. Iran detests the Taliban, who had executed a number of Iranian diplomats after they captured the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif in 1998, and was already supporting the anti-Taliban resistance, the Northern Alliance. Although their past record was unpromising and their most capable leader, the redoubtable Ahmed Shah Masood, was assassinated just days before the terrorist attacks on the United States, the Alliance offered a means of applying military pressure on the Taliban. And, of course, they were Afghans.

Probably the most significant difference lay in the fact that Pakistan in 2001

was not just part of the solution to an Afghan problem, but also part of the problem. In the wake of the Soviet departure from Afghanistan and the fall of the communist Najibullah regime in 1992, Pakistan tried unsuccessfully to cobble together a stable arrangement for a *mujaheddin* coalition. However, the *mujaheddin* commanders fell to fighting among themselves, with the conflict taking on an ethnic character. Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and northern Baluchistan, clashed with Tajiks, the second largest Afghan ethnic group, and the less numerous Uzbeks and Shi'a Hazaras. The capital city of Kabul suffered more damage from this intra-Afghan strife than it had during the eight-year struggle against the Soviets.

Fed up with the chaos and disorder in Afghanistan, Maj. Gen. Nasrullah Babar, Benazir Bhutto's interior minister, became the godfather of a new Pashtun grouping called the Taliban, or "students", that sprang up in 1994 in southern Afghanistan near the city of Kandahar. The Taliban were mainly Afghan refugees who had studied in *madrassas*, or religious schools, in Baluchistan that were affiliated with the fundamentalist Deobandi school of Sunni Islam. Their ability to pacify areas around Kandahar by suppressing and disarming unruly *mujaheddin* commanders impressed Babar. The interior minister then took the Taliban under his wing, arranging for the ISI to provide communications equipment, transportation, fuel and advice.

After firming up their base in the south and west during 1995, the Taliban advanced rapidly northward in the summer of 1996 to capture Kabul in late-September. What quickly set the Taliban apart was the puritanical nature of their version of Sunni Islam. They were, as Barnett Rubin aptly put it, "fire and brimstone, backwoods preachers with an AK-

47.”¹ Taliban leader Mullah Mohammed Omar, a one-eyed Afghan war veteran, proclaimed that Afghanistan would become “a completely Islamic state.” He then proceeded to show what he meant by enforcing a rigid code of Islamic law: women were to remain at home and not work; girls were to receive no schooling; men were to wear beards; television and Western music were forbidden; and strict Quranic punishment for crimes was to be enforced.

Over the next two years, as the Taliban imposed their control over almost all of Afghanistan, driving their Northern Alliance opponents into the extreme northeast corner, Pakistan’s ISI continued to provide supplies and advice. Students from Pakistani *madrassas* also fought for the Taliban, as did an Arab brigade composed of several thousand Arab fundamentalists who made Afghanistan their base. Osama bin Laden was the most prominent of these. The wealthy Saudi exile and former *jihadi* against the Soviets developed his Al-Qaeda terrorist organization to wage holy war against the United States, which he had come to regard as the mortal enemy of Islam.

Pakistan was the only country to accord diplomatic recognition to the Taliban, apart from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Several factors explain Pakistan’s stance. Even if the Taliban were making themselves an international pariah by their treatment of women, they were Pashtun, whom the Pakistanis believed should rule Afghanistan as the largest ethnic group. The desire to see a friendly regime in Afghanistan that would assure “strategic depth” against India, a longtime hope of Pakistan’s strategic planners, was a second factor. Finally, the Taliban were willing to reciprocate for the help the ISI provided by permitting use of Afghan territory by militant Pakistani groups in

support of the insurgency in Kashmir against India.

Although the military dimension of the Kashmir dispute had been mostly dormant for nearly two decades, it flared up in 1989—just as the Soviets were completing their departure from Afghanistan—as a result of heavy-handed interference by New Delhi into the state’s internal politics after the 1982 death of the legendary Kashmiri leader, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. The final straw came with the rigging of the 1987 elections to prevent pro-Islamic elements from winning seats in the state assembly. Frustrated Kashmiri Muslim youth, who until then had been willing to vent their displeasure with Indian rule peacefully, turned to violent protest. The Kashmiri *intifada* began. For Pakistan, the temptation to fan the flames was too great to resist. Drawing on the extensive experience in orchestrating the Afghan resistance against the Soviets, the ISI began to provide active backing and training for the Kashmiri *intifada*. Before long, Pakistanis and Arabs became heavily engaged in the anti-India struggle. A nexus took shape linking the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and other Arab terrorists, Pakistani Islamic militants and the ISI.

Students, Spies and Soldiers

AGAINST THIS background, it is not hard to understand why, with the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, Osama bin Laden became a cult hero among Pakistani fundamentalists—a sort of Arab David standing up to the U.S. Goliath. Support for the Taliban and their narrow and obscurantist brand of Islam, however, lay mainly in the Pashtun-populated areas

¹Quoted in Kenneth J. Cooper, “Kabul Tests Islamic Limits”, *Washington Post*, October 6, 1996.

of Pakistan. The Pashtuns, or Pathans as they were formerly called, represent about 15 percent of Pakistan's 150 million people. Their strong tribal traditions, martial character and conservative religious views set them apart from Punjabis and Sindhis, Pakistan's two largest ethnic groups. The unruly Pathans had posed a major security problem for the British Raj, which never fully succeeded in pacifying them. After independence, Pakistan's leader, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, withdrew the army from the tribal areas, gambling correctly that a Muslim government would succeed in winning allegiance from the Pathans where the British had failed.

Meanwhile, Pakistani society itself has changed. What has happened in Pakistan is not so much its "Talibanization", as some have claimed, as its Islamization. This development began in the late-1970s when President Zia sought to gain greater political legitimacy for his unpopular rule by making Islam a central feature of Pakistani life. Although Pakistan was created to provide a homeland for the Muslims of India, its founding fathers, Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, were secularists. They supported the idea of a separate state not for religious reasons but from fear that the Hindu majority would not respect Muslim minority rights in a united India. Until Zia took over, Pakistani leaders paid lip service to Islam but not too much more. In his Islamization policy, however, Zia substituted traditional Quranic punishments for Western legal norms, established a special *sharia* court to ensure that Pakistan's laws were consistent with the Quran, cooperated with religious parties, especially the Jamaat-i-Islami (which, ironically, had opposed the formation of Pakistan), and promoted the establishment of *madrassas*.

In the two decades since, the *madrassas* have spread widely and now number in

the thousands. The government's failure to provide educational facilities, especially in rural areas, created a void that the religious schools have filled. They have produced a large subculture of youth who are lettered in the Quran but little else, and are inculcated with religious fanaticism for *jihad* against India, the United States and other alleged enemies of Islam. The Taliban are the most prominent product of the *madrassas*, but other graduates have provided the foot soldiers for several militant fundamentalist groups that have become a destabilizing feature of Pakistan's internal scene. In recent years, for example, sectarian violence between militant Sunni and Shi'a groups (the Shi'a minority constitutes 15 to 20 percent of the population) has become a serious problem, intensifying the overall sense of insecurity that has gripped the country.

Since the mid-1970s, Pakistan's military intelligence service, the ISI, has also become a much more important player both domestically and in national security policy. Established in the late 1940s, the ISI at first operated much as the CIA and other external intelligence services do, collecting intelligence and running covert operations outside the home country. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, unhappy with the work of the internal service, the Intelligence Bureau, gave the ISI a mandate in the mid-1970s to undertake domestic operations as well as those abroad. The ISI has ever since been an active and destabilizing force in Pakistan's political life, promoting the army's agenda and opposing perceived opponents. Thus, the ISI vigorously supported Nawaz Sharif against Benazir Bhutto in the 1988 and 1990 elections.

As a result of the Afghan war, the ISI grew in both size and power. At Zia's orders, it served both as the conduit for all foreign assistance flowing to the Afghan resistance and as the planner and coordinator of *mujaheddin* activities. Covert aid

from the CIA, which was matched dollar for dollar by Saudi Arabia, began rather modestly—just \$30 million in 1981. By 1986, however, the total Afghan program had ballooned to more than \$1 billion a year, all flowing directly through the ISI's hands.

After the Soviets left Afghanistan, the ISI continued to mastermind Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan. Since 1994, this has meant working with and supporting the Taliban. The ISI has also had the responsibility for orchestrating *jihadi* groups active in the anti-India insurgency in Kashmir. After years of cooperation between the ISI and the militants, it is not surprising that support for fundamentalist views has gained ground within the intelligence agency. It is wrong, however, to see the ISI as an independent actor or a "rogue elephant." It takes its orders from the government, even though at times, when the lines of authority are blurred (for example, after Zia's death in 1988), it can gain more independent leeway.

Career civilian intelligence officers and army officers on temporary assignment staff the ISI. The head of government appoints the director-general, who has traditionally been a serving army general. Even though the ISI technically stands outside the military chain of command, reporting directly to the head of government, the fact that its chief and an important part of the staff are serving officers has given the army leadership a decisive influence over the intelligence agency.

The army, in its own right, has been a dominant force in Pakistan's political life since the mid-1950s and has ruled the country for half of its 54 years. Unlike India, where Jawaharlal Nehru firmly established the primacy of the civilian political leadership over the military and the civil service elite, the opposite occurred in Pakistan. After the death of Jinnah in 1948 and the assassination of

Liaquat, his successor and chief lieutenant, in 1951, Pakistan lacked capable political leadership. Senior military officers and civil servants, who did not believe that the country was ready for democracy, filled the void. In 1958, following a period of internal instability, the Pakistani army took over, declaring martial law and sidelining the political parties. Pakistan has swung back and forth between military and civil rule ever since. Even when civilians have been in charge, however, as in the 1990s, the army has had the decisive say in national security issues. In times of dire economic straits, too, military spending has continued to account for about a third of the budget and six percent of GNP. The army has also bridled at interference in its internal affairs by the politicians. It was Nawaz Sharif's attempt to put his people in charge of the army by firing Pervez Musharraf that triggered the October 12, 1999 military takeover. The army had accepted the forced resignation of Musharraf's predecessor a year earlier, but had vowed not to permit such a thing to happen again. And it didn't.

Musharraf's Choice

ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, Pervez Musharraf had been in power for 23 months. His record was mixed. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) gave good marks to Musharraf's Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz, a former Citibank official, for his efforts to clean up the country's finances. Debt relief was forthcoming, although not as much as Pakistan wanted. Development lending was extended for the first time in a number of years. Corruption had tapered off, and few alleged that Musharraf and his colleagues were lining their pockets. Still, the economy remained in the doldrums, suffering from lack of domestic investment.

Observers also accepted Musharraf's good intentions in trying to decentralize government even if they questioned the practicality of his proposed reforms. Musharraf also seemed to be serious about handing back power to elected national and provincial assemblies in the fall of 2002 as directed by Pakistan's supreme court. At the same time, he made clear that he intended to stay around. In June of this year he pushed aside the figurehead civilian president and appointed himself president in his place (he was previously styled "the chief executive"). More recently, he re-appointed himself as Army Chief of Staff, the real seat of power in a military regime. At the same time, Musharraf left the press relatively free and did not impose martial law.

Before the events of September 11, Musharraf had made little change in Pakistan's foreign and security policies. He maintained a hardline approach toward India, continuing Pakistan's support for the insurgency in Kashmir. He also continued friendly ties with the Taliban, disregarding the global opprobrium that the Taliban earned by their outrageous conduct.

Although Musharraf has a secular outlook and is not an Islamic extremist, his government before the September 11 terrorist attacks failed to rein in the major religious parties, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan, and the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (which, in particular, supported the Taliban). For example, the Musharraf government backed off from moderating Pakistan's harsh anti-blasphemy laws in the face of objections by the religious parties. It appeared, therefore, that Musharraf was content with the status quo—but that status quo begs a short description.

Despite official patronage from Zia and the ISI, the religious parties have never been able to attract mass support and have rarely gained more than five

percent of the vote. The clout of the fundamentalists has come from their militancy, their ability to bring mobs into the streets and their willingness to exert pressure on the administration of the day, whether that of Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif or Pervez Musharraf. It was as if Pakistani regimes had made a Faustian bargain with the fundamentalist parties, affording them political space and legitimacy in return for their service as a vehicle to promote Pakistan's national interests, via the ISI, first in Afghanistan and more recently in Kashmir.

On September 11, the day the terrorists struck, Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, the since-replaced Director General of ISI, was in Washington on a routine liaison visit. The next day, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage called him in to deliver what amounted to an ultimatum. In moving against bin Laden and other terrorists in Afghanistan, the United States wanted to know where Pakistan stood. Would it be willing to provide intelligence cooperation, allow U.S. overflights and offer logistical support? Armitage did not say what the United States would do for Pakistan in return. Secretary of State Colin Powell followed up with a phone call to Musharraf saying, in effect, that Pakistan had to choose between joining the fight against terrorism and international isolation. Unlike the Carter and Reagan Administrations of 1980 and 1981, the Bush Administration played hardball with Islamabad.

The decision was not easy for Musharraf and his senior colleagues. They realized that public opinion in the country was opposed to cooperating with the United States. Even if active backing for the Taliban and bin Laden was limited to the religious parties and their supporters, the average Pakistani did not like the idea of becoming involved in a conflict with neighboring Afghanistan and deeply distrusted Washington. Pakistanis believed

their supposed U.S. ally had betrayed them not only by refusing to help in the 1965 war against India, but, even worse, by cutting off the military and economic aid on which Pakistan depended. More recently, in 1990 Pakistanis felt that after Washington no longer needed Pakistan to afflict the Soviets in Afghanistan, the United States discarded them “like a piece of used Kleenex”, imposing nuclear sanctions and suspending aid, to boot.

But paradoxically, despite this disenchantment and the absence of military or significant economic help since 1990, the United States still casts a long shadow over Islamabad. Only partly in jest, Pakistanis say that their country is ruled by the three A's: Allah, the Army and America. Among the English-speaking elite—senior military officers, civil servants, rural landlords (the so-called feudals) and the business community—the American connection runs strong. They may bemoan U.S. policy, but they send their children to the United States for education and seek political, security and business links with America. Many in the elite have relatives in the 400,000 strong Pakistani-American community. Pervez Musharraf's own brother is an American citizen, a doctor in Chicago.

The average non-English speaking Pakistani tends to hold stronger anti-American views, reflecting the harder line of the Urdu-language press. The man in the street in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, and especially in Peshawar and Quetta, sees the United States as not just anti-Pakistani (and of late pro-Indian) but as genuinely anti-Islamic. This opinion echoes widespread, long-standing anger over U.S. policy toward Israel and the Palestinians and, more recently, over policies such as the continued bombing and sanctioning of Iraq. The virulent criticism of America by the Taliban and bin Laden has resonated well in Pakistan.

More important than the lack of immediate public support for cooperating with the United States was concern about the reaction of the religious parties. Musharraf knew that they would quickly and vociferously take to the streets to vent their opposition to a positive response to the Americans. Although the President was reasonably sure that the security forces could contain trouble in the short-run, he had to be concerned about what might happen were the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan to become particularly bloody and protracted. If the fundamentalists succeeded eventually in staging massive anti-American and anti-government demonstrations in major cities throughout the country, especially in the Punjab, Musharraf's position would be in danger.

In the past, the Pakistani army has stepped in to prevent a collapse of state authority in the face of the mob. After disturbances rocked the country in 1969 and again in 1977, the army deposed President Ayub Khan, himself a former army commander, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, to impose martial law. The soldiers and officer corps come primarily from the Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province (as a refugee from India, Musharraf is an exception). Never comfortable with the idea of firing on fellow Punjabis, the army leadership would probably replace Musharraf with a general possessing stronger Islamic credentials if the fundamentalists appeared to be winning the battle of the streets. The danger in Pakistan is thus not of an Iranian-style revolution in which the army disintegrates, but of the army bending to street power. Musharraf's recent shake-up of the military high command to replace officers who were unhappy with the policy of supporting the United States surely went forward with this threat in mind.

Another important factor in Pakistani decisions has been the attitude of its long-

time adversary, India. In January 1980, India stood on the opposite side of the Cold War fence from the United States and Pakistan. Its statement whitewashed Soviet aggression during the UN General Assembly's special session on Afghanistan. But in 2001, against the background of improving bilateral ties with Washington and bitter opposition to the Taliban, India promptly offered full support to the United States. Musharraf knew immediately that Pakistan would find itself isolated if it refused to cooperate with the Americans; indeed, it would perhaps even find itself lumped together with the Taliban as part of an American target set.

Although the Bush Administration did not bargain for Pakistan's support—as the Carter and Reagan Administrations did in 1980–81—the Musharraf government was doubtless aware that Washington would reward Pakistani cooperation. Lifting several layers of sanctions on Pakistan and India was already under consideration before September 11, so this was likely to be the first reward—as indeed it was. Pakistan can now acquire spare parts for its aging military equipment and has already begun to receive badly needed economic help. In the 1980s, the United States and its friends poured in assistance to bolster Pakistan. While circumstances differed on September 11, Musharraf had good reason to expect a generous response to Pakistan's pleas for debt relief and financial help if it joined the anti-terrorist cause.

Musharraf justified his positive response to the United States in a national television address on September 19. He first spelled out what help the United States had requested, but indicated that he did not know what U.S. plans were. Stressing that the decision was difficult, he argued that cooperating with the Americans was in Pakistan's interest, while refusing to do so presented grave

dangers to the country. Refusal to cooperate, he declared, could even threaten Pakistan's sovereignty, its economy, its security assets (nuclear weapons) and its Kashmir policy. Making clear that he had India in mind, he undiplomatically told New Delhi to lay off.

Predictably, the religious parties took to the streets to oppose the decision after mid-day prayers two days later on September 21. The demonstrations were boisterous but largely limited to Peshawar and Quetta, where Afghani and Pakistani Pashtuns form the majority of the population, and to Pashtun areas of Karachi. The police contained the disorders and the rest of the country remained relatively quiet. Although public opinion opposed Musharraf's decision, he received the backing of the Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples' Party, the major mainstream political parties. They provided that backing partly because of the sheer horror of the terror attacks, and because about 250 Pakistanis or Pakistani-Americans died in the World Trade towers. The blindly negative stance of the Taliban in stonewalling last-minute Pakistani efforts to convince them to hand over bin Laden may also have been a factor.

Since Musharraf's initial decisions, Pakistani authorities have exerted more vigorous pressure on the religious groups than they have in the past. Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the firebrand leader of the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam, the party closest to the Taliban, is under house arrest. The fact that Washington wisely decided to limit the use of Pakistan as a base of operations has also reduced the potential for political upheaval. In so doing, the Bush Administration showed sensitivity to Pakistani public opinion as well as to Pakistan's ambiguous position *vis-à-vis* the Taliban.

The rigidly inflexible attitude of the Taliban, which virtually invited the U.S.

military response, has also enabled Musharraf to shift Pakistani policy from trying to preserve the Taliban to writing them off. In reversing gears, Musharraf, in effect, has accepted that Pakistan's efforts to manipulate Afghanistan for its own purposes has reached a dead end. His focus has shifted to ensuring that a post-Taliban government is willing to accommodate more modest Pakistani interests—giving the Pashtuns a major voice and not adopting an anti-Pakistani policy. After years of the ISI's opposing any role for the exiled former King Zahir, Pakistan now speaks of him as an important transitional figure in shaping a post-Taliban Afghanistan. As events unroll in Afghanistan, Washington should not grant Pakistan a veto over U.S. policy toward Afghanistan, but it must recognize that no government in Kabul is likely to succeed for very long in the face of Pakistani opposition.

America's Interests

ONCE THE dust settles in Afghanistan and a broad-based regime replaces the Taliban, it is essential that the United States not walk away as it did after the end of the Soviet war. A sustained international effort, preferably led by the United Nations, is needed to reconstruct Afghanistan after twenty years of devastation and disorder. As long as its legitimate interests in Afghanistan are taken into account, Pakistan has much to gain from such an outcome. A stable Afghanistan would permit the return of legitimate commerce, the opening up of new trade routes to Central Asia, the repatriation of Afghan refugees, and far greater regional stability over all.

Domestically, too, U.S. interests will prosper if Musharraf successfully faces down the fundamentalists. By supporting Washington, Musharraf has crossed a

Rubicon in opposing Pakistan's own extremists. If Pakistan can contain and reverse the pulse of Islamic radicalism, it will achieve greater internal stability than it has seen in many years. Increased aid inflows should have a positive impact on the Pakistani economy and permit the government to address some of Pakistan's basic economic shortcomings more seriously. Moreover, Musharraf appears committed to holding elections and re-establishing popularly-elected government in the fall of 2002. Were he to veer from that commitment, the United States should make clear its displeasure. The system that emerges may not be Westminster democracy but it could offer what Pakistan badly needs—a period of political stability in a relatively free atmosphere.

The crystal ball is less clear with regard to India. The logic of the war against terrorism is clearly inconsistent with a continuation of active Pakistani support for *jihad* in Kashmir. It is hard to see how the United States can fight terrorism in Afghanistan while ignoring it in Kashmir. Nonetheless, the Kashmir struggle has become such an article of faith for the Pakistani military and much of the public that it will be politically difficult to shift gears. Washington should oppose *jihadi* operations in Kashmir more forcefully than it has in the past, but it should also press India to reduce its military presence and accept a more open political system inside the state.

Over the years, U.S.-Pakistan relations have been extraordinarily volatile. After a decade of difficulties, however, President Musharraf's response to the terrorist attacks of September 11 has reopened the possibility of a friendlier and more cooperative U.S.-Pakistani relationship. In moving forward, Washington needs to be clear-headed about where U.S. and Pakistani interests coincide, and where they do not. Too often in the past,

both countries have overlooked underlying differences in the interest of attaining short-term goals. Washington should focus its assistance primarily on helping Pakistan to reform its economy to better provide for basic human needs. The United States should be wary, however, of again rewarding the generals with expensive and sophisticated military hardware. Quite apart from the damaging impact on U.S.-India relations such aid might cause, providing the 2002 equivalent of F-16s would serve neither U.S. nor Pakistani interests.

In the 1960s and the 1980s Pakistan stood on the edge of middle-income status, but failed to cross the threshold

because of poor policy choices and unfortunate leadership. The outlook could improve were Pakistan to enjoy a period of political stability and sounder economic policies, and were it to focus its attention on addressing domestic ills rather than pursuing foreign adventures in Afghanistan and Kashmir. Pakistan could reverse its long downward slide, reduce the danger of religious extremism and make progress toward realizing its considerable potential as a middle power. There is a silver lining for Pakistan in the wake of the tragic events of September 11; it will take much work, however, to actually acquire the silver. □

Let the Record Speak

I think it's important to emphasize that five times in the last ten years, the United States military has engaged with our NATO allies in defense of Muslims who were victims of aggression, or who were victims of war-induced famine. Starting with the defense of Kuwait in 1990–1991, the operation in Somalia, the operation in Northern Iraq called 'Provide Comfort', and then, of course, the two operations conducted under NATO mandate in Bosnia and Kosovo, I think our record is very clear.

—Paul Wolfowitz,
Deputy Secretary of Defense,
September 26, 2001

Achieving Oil Security

A Practical Proposal

—Martin Feldstein—

THE TERRORIST attacks on September 11 and the subsequent demonstrations of anti-Americanism throughout the Middle East increase the saliency of America's dependence on oil imports from the Gulf states. The United States now imports more than half of all the oil it consumes, and roughly a quarter of those imports comes from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. If there is no change in U.S. policy, that dependence will grow, since those three countries together with the United Arab Emirates have more than half of the world's reserves of oil, while the United States has only two percent of total reserves.¹

America's dependence on imported oil is a serious cause of economic vulnerability and a major constraint on U.S. foreign and defense policy. Political leaders in the Middle East know that U.S. dependence on their oil gives them leverage over American policies. The possibility of increasing that leverage emboldened Saddam Hussein to invade Kuwait in order to extend the share of Mideast oil controlled by Iraq. And while the governments of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are basically friendly to the United States, recent events have made it clear how potentially vulnerable those governments

are to radical elements within their own countries. All of this is a cloud over the stability of the oil supply from the Middle East.

Political leaders and expert commissions have been calling for a reduction in U.S. dependence on oil imports since at least 1974, when President Nixon established Project Independence with the goal of achieving energy independence by 1980. That goal was never reached. To the contrary, U.S. dependence on imported oil was still 42 percent of domestic consumption in 1980, and rose to 52 percent in 2000.²

What can be done to reverse this trend? Increased oil production in the United States could help to reduce dependence on imported oil. Some increased domestic production will occur as a natural response to higher oil prices that result from increasing global demand. A higher price will induce more exploration and more extraction from

¹The report of the National Energy Policy Development Group estimates that by 2020 the Gulf area will produce two-thirds of the world's oil.

²For a discussion of U.S. energy conditions and developments of the past decade, see Paul Joskow, "U.S. Energy Policy During the 1990s", National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 8454 (Cambridge, MA, 2001).

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such higher-cost sources as deep wells and off-shore sites. But even with such market forces at work, experts predict that oil imports will rise to 70 percent of U.S. consumption by 2020.

Relaxing some government restrictions on oil drilling can increase U.S. production further, but the impact on our dependence will be small. For example, although the administration's proposal to open some of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil drilling would eventually increase production in Alaska by 600,000 barrels a day, that would equal only about seven percent of what we now import from the rest of the world. Neither is it possible to reduce dependence on Middle Eastern oil by importing more from Mexico, Canada and Venezuela, since the U.S. already takes virtually all of the oil that they have for export.

U.S. dependence on foreign oil, and specifically on Middle Eastern oil, can only be limited in a significant way through the reduction of domestic consumption. There is substantial room to achieve such reductions, since the consumption of oil per dollar of GDP is now more than 40 percent higher in the United States than it is in Germany and France. Nevertheless, politicians have been reluctant to pursue consumption-reducing measures aggressively because it has been assumed that doing so would require a European-style gasoline tax. As anyone who has driven in any European country knows, an important reason for their lower consumption of oil is that taxes cause gasoline prices to be nearly three times higher on average than they are in the United States. The political impossibility of imposing such a tax was brought home clearly by the abject failure of President Clinton's 1993 proposal for a general BTU (British Thermal Unit) energy tax. Fortunately, however, it is possible to provide the incentives needed for a substantial reduction in oil consumption

without any new tax, by using tradeable Oil Conservation Vouchers.

Before describing how such a voucher system would work, it is useful to review the primary policy tool currently used by the Federal government to reduce oil consumption: the Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standard (CAFÉ). Automobile manufacturers are required to keep the average number of miles per gallon on the entire fleet of new cars in each model year above some level set by the Federal government. That standard has been 27.5 miles per gallon since the 1985 model year, up from 18 miles per gallon for the 1978 model year when the CAFÉ standards were first introduced. Manufacturers may produce some cars with lower fuel efficiency, but these must be balanced by cars that get more than 27.5 miles per gallon so that the average fuel efficiency for all cars sold by the company in the year exceeds 27.5 miles per gallon.

This standard has forced companies to seek ways to design more fuel-efficient cars. Because of the pricing differences that have resulted from the CAFÉ standard, it has also induced many households to shift from conventional autos to sport utility vehicles and other light trucks, since these are subject to a more lenient fuel efficiency standard (now 20 miles per gallon). The net effect on fuel economy is therefore difficult to determine.

A more serious weakness of the CAFÉ standard approach to reducing gasoline demand is that it does nothing to change how cars are used. It provides no incentive to rely more on car pools and public transportation, or simply to travel less. Neither does it provide any incentive to drive at speeds that reduce fuel consumption or to scrap old cars in favor of newer ones with better fuel efficiency. In this latter regard, several promising technologies may soon offer commercially viable substitutes for the traditional internal combus-

tion engine. These include engines that use natural gas, or that can switch between gasoline and electric battery power, or that are powered by hydrogen fuel cells. All three major U.S. auto companies plan to introduce cars equipped in these ways by 2004 or 2005. Although these cars will initially cost more, the high price of gasoline in Europe may induce some car buyers there to pay a higher up-front cost in order to achieve subsequent savings in fuel costs. It will be difficult, however, to induce American car buyers to select these new technologies because of the relatively low U.S. price of gasoline.

If American drivers had to pay what I would call the "full cost" to the nation of driving, there would be a strong incentive to change driving habits and to seek new technologies that deliver lower fuel costs. By the "full cost" I mean not just the cost of producing gasoline and distributing it through gasoline stations, but also the implicit cost to our nation imposed by the national security effects of an increased dependence on imported oil, the adverse environmental effects of air pollution, and the increased risks of automobile accidents that result from a greater number of drivers on the road.

Although the Europeans might use this notion of "full cost" to justify the very high taxes that they levy on gasoline, an acceptable solution in the United States must not involve a new large tax on gasoline. Bringing U.S. gasoline prices up to European levels by an additional gasoline tax of two dollars a gallon would impose a tax of about \$2,000 a year on the average American household. The government would have new tax revenue of more than \$250 billion a year, equivalent to one-fourth of the total current income tax revenue and more than double the annual tax cuts in the recent Bush tax package. While that money could in principle be returned by lower income taxes or a specific tax rebate, most Americans would

doubt that the funds would in fact be returned. Such a tax-based policy is clearly a political non-starter.

FORTUNATELY, we can achieve the favorable incentive effects of a higher gasoline tax without actually imposing any tax at all by the use of tradeable Oil Conservation Vouchers (OCVs).⁴ Here is how the tradeable Oil Conservation Vouchers would work.

Consider a government policy that seeks to cut U.S. dependence on oil imports in half, i.e., reducing total imports from the current level of about 130 billion gallons a year to about 65 billion gallons a year. This reduction would be about the level of total U.S. oil imports from the OPEC countries. Each Oil Conservation Voucher would permit its owner to purchase one gallon of gasoline or some other petroleum product, such as heating oil or industrial raw materials. (I will focus my discussion on the application of OCVs to reducing gasoline consumption, returning briefly after that to discuss how it might be extended to other uses of oil.)

⁴Before describing how these Oil Conservation Vouchers would work in practice, I should deal with the false but common argument that it would be better to collect the revenue and return it in the form of lower income tax rates because that would not only reduce gasoline consumption but, by lowering marginal income tax rates, would also improve individual work incentives. That argument is false because the higher price of gasoline that would result from a gasoline tax reduces the real value of additional earnings. Every extra dollar of earnings buys less if there is a gasoline tax, and the cut in the personal income tax would just offset this higher cost. There is no net gain on work incentives from imposing a gasoline tax and then giving back the revenue through lower marginal income tax rates.

Gasoline production currently requires about 180 billion gallons of oil per year. Since gasoline accounts for about two-thirds of all oil consumption, a useful starting point would be a reduction in gasoline consumption to account for two-thirds of the overall desired reduction, i.e., by 43 billion gallons of gasoline. This would reduce gasoline consumption from 180 billion gallons to 137 billion gallons, a reduction of about 25 percent.

The government would therefore distribute 137 billion Oil Conservation Vouchers to American households. There are many ways that these vouchers could be distributed, but it might best be done by the state governments. Since a household in a geographically large and rural state is likely to drive more miles per year than one in a smaller or more urban state, the Federal government might distribute vouchers among the states in proportion to the miles driven in 2001 (as indicated by Federal gasoline tax collections in each state). The states would then decide how to distribute the vouchers within their own jurisdictions. They might give an equal number to each household with a car, or an equal number per car, or a number that varies by region within the state. All of this would be easy for the states to do since they register all cars. It would be up to each state to decide what is the fairest distribution under local conditions. Since the vouchers are tradeable, the incentive effects of the OCV system would not depend on this initial distribution.

A household that receives 1,000 OCVs and that drives 20,000 miles during the year at an average of 20 miles per gallon will have just enough OCVs to purchase the gasoline that it uses. If the household that receives 1,000 OCVs wants to buy more than 1,000 gallons of gas in the year, it will have to buy a voucher from a household that receives more OCVs than it needs. A market price would quickly

evolve that brings the supply and demand for these vouchers into equilibrium. Gasoline stations, convenience stores and others might provide the service of buying and selling vouchers as a way of attracting customers, so that individuals who want to sell or buy would not have to find someone in the opposite situation.

Since the total number of vouchers available is about 25 percent less than the number of gallons that individuals currently purchase, the vouchers would command a positive price. The combination of the price of gasoline at the pump (which would not change unless there is a change in world oil markets) and the price of the voucher would have to be higher than the current price of gasoline in order to induce individuals to reduce their gasoline purchases by 25 percent. Some of that reduction would be achieved by driving less (using car pools and public transportation or simply traveling less) or being more conscious of the driving speeds that save fuel. Further reductions could be achieved over time as old cars are scrapped in favor of newer ones that get more miles per gallon. The price of a voucher would therefore be higher in the short-run (when it takes a higher price to reduce gasoline consumption) than in the longer run, when there are more ways in which demand can be reduced.

A rough guess is that the value of a voucher might be about 75 cents in the first year. If a household that receives 1,000 OCVs wishes to drive 25,000 miles with a fuel efficiency of 20 miles per gallon, it will need to purchase an additional 250 vouchers at a cost of about \$190. Conversely, if a household that receives 1,000 OCVs only wants to purchase 800 gallons of gasoline, it will be able to sell its 200 excess vouchers for \$150. Although these cash amounts are not large, the voucher system creates the right incentives because each individual recog-

nizes that the cost of another gallon of gas is both the approximately \$1.30 that he pays for the gasoline and the 75 cents that the voucher is worth. The same is true both for someone who needs to buy vouchers for 75 cents and for someone with excess vouchers that he could sell for 75 cents.

Achieving the same 43 billion gallon reduction in gasoline consumption by a 75 cent a gallon gasoline tax would cost the average American household about \$750 a year in higher taxes and produce revenue of about \$100 billion a year. Moreover, since the 75 cent value of the voucher is just an estimate, there is no guarantee that a 75 cent tax would even achieve the desired reduction. And just as the price of the voucher is likely to come down (unless the number of vouchers is reduced) as individuals shift to more fuel efficient cars, the gasoline tax would also have to be adjusted over time, making it even less likely that the policy would achieve its desired goal. The voucher system would automatically limit consumption to the desired amount and would do so in a way that gives every gasoline buyer the same incentive to conserve gasoline.⁵

Since higher-income households generally consume more gasoline than lower-income households, the likely effect of the OCV system would be to make higher-income households buyers of vouchers and lower-income households into net sellers. The most recent available data (for 1994) show that households with incomes below \$15,000 consumed about 700 gallons of gasoline per year while those with incomes over \$35,000 consumed an average of about 1,250 gallons per year. With a distribution of 750 OCVs per household (about 25 percent less than average current consumption), the lower-income households would receive about \$170 from selling vouchers while the higher-income

households would pay an extra \$150 to buy vouchers.⁶

The OCV system could be extended from gasoline to heating oil and other forms of oil consumption. The distribution of heating vouchers might also be left to the states, with the Federal distribution to the states reflecting the amount of heating oil currently used in each state. A distribution to households and businesses based on the amount of heating oil purchased in the year before the program began might be regarded as the most fair, but other distributions taking income and family size into account might also be considered. Again, the desirable incentive effects for reducing oil use would not depend on the initial distribution, since these OCVs would be tradeable. Each household or business would face the same implicit price for oil regardless of whether it was a buyer or a seller.

All Oil Conservation Vouchers could be interchangeable. Gasoline vouchers need not be different from heating vouchers or industrial use vouchers. In this way, the extra "price" implied by the value of the voucher would be the same for any use of oil. Having different vouchers with different market prices for different uses of oil would prevent available oil from being directed to its most productive uses.

⁵There is, of course, an obvious similarity between OCVs and the tradeable pollution vouchers that have been successfully used to reduce industrial pollutants.

⁶If the vouchers induce households to reduce consumption by about 25 percent, the lower-income households would need only 525 vouchers while the higher-income households would need about 950. The lower-income households would thus sell 225 OCVs at 75 cents each for \$170 while the higher income households would buy 200 OCVs for \$150.

I HAVE STRESSED the importance of reducing oil consumption to strengthen national security. A reduction of oil consumption would, of course, also cause a reduction in air pollution. For those pollutants that affect the local environment, these reductions would be significant. For carbon dioxide, the environmental effect would not be large because it is diffused into the global atmosphere and represents only a small reduction in global carbon dioxide. It would, howev-

er, have the politically significant effect of reducing U.S. fossil fuel use below the level of use in 1990, a key issue in international discussions of environmental policy.

There are no doubt ways to improve on the system of Oil Conservation Vouchers described here. The detailed design of the system is not as important as the broad conclusion that it is possible to develop a market-based plan to substantially reduce America's oil vulnerability without any tax increase. □

Open Mouth, Insert Foot

Judging from news reports and the portrayal of villains in our popular entertainment, Americans are bedeviled by fantasies about terrorism. They seem to believe that terrorism is the greatest threat to the United States and that it is becoming more widespread and lethal. They are likely to think that the United States is the most popular target of terrorists. And they almost certainly have the impression that extremist Islamic groups cause most terrorism.

None of these beliefs are [sic] based in fact. . . . Although high-profile incidents have fostered the perception that terrorism is becoming more lethal, the numbers say otherwise, and early signs suggest that the decade beginning in 2000 will continue the downward trend. . . .

[T]here are bureaucracies in the military and in intelligence agencies that are desperate to find an enemy to justify budget growth. In the 1980s, when international terrorism was at its zenith, NATO and the United States European Command pooh-poohed the notion of preparing to fight terrorists. They were too busy preparing to fight the Soviets. With the evil empire gone, they 'discovered' terrorism as an important priority.

I hope for a world where facts, not fiction, determine our policy. While terrorism is not vanquished, in a world where thousands of nuclear warheads are still aimed across the continents, terrorism is not the biggest security challenge confronting the United States, and it should not be portrayed that way.

—Larry C. Johnson, *New York Times*, July 10, 2001



After September 11: A Conversation

The Nixon Center and *The National Interest* co-sponsored a one-day symposium on October 4, 2001, called “The Impact of the September 11 Attacks.” The symposium took place at The Nixon Center in Washington, DC, with James Schlesinger serving as chairman. Dr. Schlesinger also moderated the first two panels, on foreign and defense policy. Nixon Center president Dimitri K. Simes moderated the third panel, on economic implications and policies. Adam Garfinkle, editor of *The National Interest*, moderated the fourth panel, on domestic security implications and policies.

What follows are edited excerpts from the transcript of that symposium. Despite the division of the day’s proceedings into four panels, subject matters inevitably spilled over their borders to some degree. Nonetheless, the four sections below do reflect the relatively coherent discussions that took place.

Finally, a small caveat: Any editing process in which extemporaneous speech is rendered into prose requires alterations in syntax and other devices of expression. In this case, some longer perorations have been paraphrased, and a few discussions significantly condensed. We have striven not to let these changes affect the substance of participants’ remarks, but readers are advised not to quote this transcript directly without making reference to the aforementioned editorial process.



Foreign Policy

[James Schlesinger]:* Ladies and gentlemen, we are here today to discuss the impact of the events of September 11 and subsequently on various elements of American and international life. Four sessions are planned. The first will be on foreign policy, the second on defense policy, the third on the economic repercussions of September 11, and the fourth on domestic security here in the United States. Each session will be introduced by a short presentation, in turn, by Charles Krauthammer, Richard Perle, Moisés Naím and Fred Charles Iklé.

I want to say by way of introduction to our first session that I read in the press that since September 11 everything is changed. So we may conclude that one thing that clearly has not changed is a tendency toward hyperbole in the press. One thing that *has* clearly changed, however, is that the illusion of American immunity and invulnerability has departed. In the past, we have watched from a distance as British, Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, Japanese and others were blown up, and our reaction has been, "It can't happen here"—that despite the evidence of continuing attempts at terrorism in the United States. It can happen here, and it did so in the most stunning and dramatic way. This will have major repercussions for U.S. foreign policy, and we now turn to Charles Krauthammer to outline what those repercussions might be.

[Charles Krauthammer]:* Thank you, Jim. I think we finally have an answer to the question, the famous question posed by *The National Interest* more than ten years ago. It was Owen Harries who added the question mark to Francis Fukuyama's article on the "end of history." It is good that he did, for it turns out that the end of history ends as well.

We did have a kind of holiday from history for ten years and a lot of confusion about what foreign policy was about. Henry Kissinger recently wrote a book whose title asks if the United States needs a foreign policy. But now, I think, our confusion is past, for we have been given an organizing principle of a power similar to those of the seventy years preceding the end of the Cold War. We have been given it in a way that is undeniable and immediate. How long the war against terrorism will remain the organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy is not clear, but we have had an instant tectonic change openly admitted by President Bush, who said that from this day on we will decide who our friends and enemies are, and gauge the warmth and the coolness of relations, based primarily on their reaction to September 11 and to the war that has been declared on us.

In effect, what has happened is that radical Islam has become the successor to Soviet Communism, which was a successor to fascism, as the organizing principle of American foreign policy. It is an interesting development, to say the least. On the one hand, one would have predicted the end of the unipolar world we had inhabited for ten years, for never has a hegemonic power like our own gone unchallenged, without *some* kind of anti-hegemonic opposition or coalition arising. Indeed, what was unique and puzzling about the last ten years was the absence of that anti-hegemonic alliance, which

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*Charles Krauthammer, a nationally syndicated columnist, serves on the editorial board of *The National Interest*.

everybody remarked on and tried to explain. Part of it was because of the benignity of the American imperium, at least as we see it. Obviously, however, it is not benign in the eyes of some others, and we have now discovered who the anti-hegemonic opponent will be, at least for the time being.

On the other hand, our anti-hegemonic challenger is not the historical “standard issue”, so to speak. It is not a coalition of counterbalancing great powers, which is historically what one finds when a hegemon arises. For example, a candidate for the anti-hegemonic alliance might have been a Russo-Chinese alliance, perhaps with other smaller powers included. That alliance looked as if it might be developing over the last few years, but it did not come to pass. As it is, our opponent has no great powers in his lineup. That is the good news. The bad news is that our adversaries use unconventional weapons and tactics, and are driven by a fanatical religiosity and a cult of death that makes them particularly deadly.

Ten years ago, I wrote about the unipolar moment for America; today, I would argue that the era of unchallenged unipolarity is over. It remains a unipolar world, but the United States is weaker. It is weaker because it has been shown to be vulnerable for the first time since 1814, and it is now perceived to be so in the world, by Americans and by others.

It remains to be seen whether the sense of American power or the perception of weakness will prevail; a lot will depend on the wisdom and success of the U.S. response. For now, however, it is clear that we do not yet have an opposing pole of power. The Taliban are totally isolated. All we have had to do was to push buttons and we have left the Taliban standing in the cold. All their relations are broken economically, borders are closed or are closing, there is a ring of nations tightening around them. So in that sense, we have demonstrated the residual power of U.S. unipolarity. The question is, can we translate that power into clear political results? The future of U.S. foreign relations and the structure of the world system hangs on how effective our response is. The world is expecting American power to show itself and to succeed. That has been the assumption of the last ten years, and it is the question that everybody is now waiting to see answered.

It is important that we succeed for two reasons. First, it is important in a “local” sense to show the weaker countries in the region that by joining the United States they are not joining the losing side. We must demonstrate seriousness, just as we did in 1990. The Saudis said to us then, “If you’re going to go halfway, we’re not going with you, because we don’t want to be left hanging with an unsolved problem. If you’re going to go all the way, we’ll be with you.” Today as well, we must demonstrate success in order to maintain whatever coalition we assemble.

But there is a larger sense in which U.S. success and the demonstration of its power is important: If the United States is shown to be weak and vulnerable, the entire post-World War II international system will be put at risk, for that system rests, in the end, on American power. I realize that many liberal internationalists believe that the present system depends on shared norms, the web of treaties, and changes in international psychology that have developed since 1945. But this is an illusion that would be quickly revealed as such if the fear and effectiveness of American power should wane, or if America withdraws from world leadership in the face of this threat. The entire international system, which provides for open seas, open trade and open societies lightly defended, would collapse with calamitous consequences.

One consequence, for example, of the erosion of the Pax Americana would be felt in Asia. All along the Pacific Rim, countries would increase defense spending and court a much greater risk of war. Ultimately, such insecurity could spread even to Europe. The sharp and sudden erosion of U.S. hegemony would be the functional equivalent of the collapse of empires we have seen in modern history—Ottoman, Habsburg and Soviet—but even more cataclysmic. That is why the United States must demonstrate power and achieve success, for there is a lot at stake beyond the war on terrorism.

Two complementary points, if I may. First, we are already beginning to see some tectonic foreign policy changes as a result of the September 11 attacks. Most important, perhaps, is the possible realignment of Russia. It is at least conceivable that with this realignment of countries, the resetting of American priorities and the acceptance of a new organizing principle, Russia might see its place with the West and we could see Russia occupying such a place in a way that has never happened before.

Second, and more subtle, the psychological shock of America discovering that it is vulnerable will profoundly change our self-perception. We have always acted with a great margin of physical safety. We could conduct a catastrophic war in Vietnam for a decade and in the end come out of it psychologically scarred but essentially whole as a nation—a result that would elude almost every other country. Take away that margin of safety, that illusion of the oceans protecting us, and we may witness a fundamental change in how America conceives of its national interest in foreign policy. A large margin of physical safety engenders an expansive sense of national interest. America's sense of national interest has not been as narrow as the hard realpolitik of the European powers in the 18th or 19th century; rather, it has been identified with more general ideas of freedom, with protecting smaller nations, and with highly moralistic Wilsonian ambitions. One of the casualties of September 11 may be that kind of expansiveness. Over time, we are likely to devise far more narrow definitions of the U.S. national interest.

We see examples of this already. U.S. policy has sacrificed principle for pragmatism in Chechnya. The administration's treatment of Israel in the current crisis essentially sacrifices some of Israel's interests in order to build a coalition to protect the American homeland. We will no doubt slough off other obligations and long-held positions that some might perceive as burdensome or excessively moralistic attachments as we narrow the focus. This tendency worries me, but it is an ineluctable product of the psychological shock administered on September 11, the realization that we are far more naked than we thought, far more like other countries. That may drive our foreign policy farther toward classic realism than many of us would like.

[Schlesinger]: Charles, I think I speak for everyone that that was a marvelous summary. We turn it now open to discussion.

[David M. Lampton*]: You said that the Arab countries must expect us to go all the way if we are to be successful at coalition-building, but all the way at exactly what? Isn't there a contradiction between maintaining a large coalition and maintaining maximally serious war aims?

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[*Krauthammer*]: My strong view about our goals is that we have to start with Afghanistan. That has to be where the demonstration of power is shown, and it has to succeed. I would not define success as going from cave to cave to find Osama, but rather as the fall of the Taliban regime. That is a far stronger message to send to all the other regimes who might be harboring or protecting or promoting terrorism. Our objective is to “drain the swamp”, and we do that by eliminating terrorist havens in sovereign states. If sovereign states are afraid of us and they think that their governments might be toppled, they will be far less inclined to support terrorism.

Moreover, while suicidal terrorists are undeterrable because they are irrational in the sense of self-preservation, governments are not irrational in that sense. We have little experience with suicidal governments. Pressure and power should be applied on governments rather than individuals. The minimum is Afghanistan, after which we have to apply pressure of every kind on other states in the area—Syria, Iraq and Iran being the prime suspects—that harbor, succor or tolerate terrorism.

Clearly, that is where the debate will be joined. But the debate will be different then than it is today, because success will change the psychological dynamic in the region. We can only have a theoretical debate today, but if we succeed and the government in Afghanistan has fallen, then the policy realignment we seek in other states will be much easier to achieve, our pressure will be far more credible, and our coalition more likely to endure.

[*Jessica T. Mathews**]: Nobody would quarrel with the notion that we have to demonstrate success in whatever we do, but the real question is what constitutes success, and how and when do you measure it? To me it is not so obvious that success is the fall of the Taliban. We can take out the top 100, 200 people in the Taliban because we can find them, but the consequences of doing that over a period of maybe even six months or a year might be horrific for U.S. interests. After all, this talk we hear about a national unity government in Afghanistan is hooey. The Northern Alliance is a third rail for Pakistan. It wouldn't take too much to imagine a splintering of Afghanistan with a move toward at least a proto-Pashtunistan that pulls apart Pakistan in the process. Where control of Pakistan's nuclear weapons goes in that scenario is not obvious. So defining success as taking down the Taliban is not obvious to me.

[*Schlesinger*]: I think that you've underscored that there are high risks in going in this direction. There are also high risks in not doing anything; there are high risks in going in any direction. The central part of the Krauthammer thesis is that the international order depends upon our demonstration of seriousness. And, as you say, defining seriousness is not so easy.

[*Krauthammer*]: True, but I think that if our response to more than 5,000 Americans being killed in one day is to extradite a few terrorists, as we did in the case of Pan Am 103, it will have a catastrophic effect on the world's perception—particularly the Arab-Islamic world's perception—of our seriousness. It will have dire consequences, just as the unseriousness of our response for the last decade and a half to all of these other attacks has emboldened these people to think that America is a paper tiger.

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[Robert McFarlane*]: Charles, would you comment on the respect among the rest of the world for American success, but measured perhaps somewhat differently? Today, with the deployment of all the forces that are either in or going toward position in South Asia, John F. Burns reports in the *New York Times* that the Taliban leadership is fleeing the country.* Yesterday, in talks with a commander in Peshawar, he reported the defection of one division level commander, to the extent that the Taliban have divisions, to the Pashtun *mujaheddin* and forecasts another tomorrow and the next day; in short, the unraveling of the Taliban for the very reasons you described. The question is, to what extent would people throughout the world see this unraveling, before a shot is fired, as evidence of American success; that, indeed, just the threat has had an effect?

[Krauthammer]: A completely bloodless success would be the ultimate success. If we can cause a government to collapse purely from the threat of using military power, that would be a terrific start. I'm not looking for rivers of blood. That is not necessary for a demonstration of power. I'm not so sure that the prospect of the spontaneous collapse of the Taliban is a real one, but if it were offered I would not turn it down.

[Adam Garfinkle*]: I want to return to the question of what constitutes success, what constitutes complete victory as the President has spoken of it. It seems to me that the real challenge arises when we exhaust the list of countries that the State Department says support terrorism, and recognize that real success depends on changes in regimes that are *not* on this list, but that we are taking explicitly as *allies* so far in this crisis. In point of fact, Al-Qaeda is an emanation of a deeper problem. The deeper problem is Wahhabi fundamentalist Islam, and Wahhabi fundamentalist Islam comes from Saudi Arabia, which supports Wahhabi evangelism to the tune of about \$10 billion a year over the past many, many years. And the *madrassas* in Peshawar, Pakistan, which Saudi money supports, is the incubating area for the Taliban's foot soldiers for this radical Wahhabism. So we are in the strange position of identifying Al-Qaeda as the target, the destruction of which would constitute success, whereas the deeper problem lies in two allies that we are using in order to target Al-Qaeda. The way that the Saudi regime behaves toward its opposition, and the machinations of Pakistani regional policies, are the real sources of the terrorism we saw on September 11. In this light, how do we achieve complete victory?

[Krauthammer]: Those are the hardest problems, how do you change the Saudi regime or change its policy, which in a sense has been promoting or buying off this kind of radicalism. It's not the immediate problem, but you are right: it is the ultimate problem. It cannot be solved right now, but I do think that if we create a cascade of events where there are serious penalties for those who have promoted the terrorists who have attacked the United States, the dynamic will change. The countries on the State Department's terrorism list compose one set of problems. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan need to feel pressure and need to pay a price for having promoted this kind of radicalism, so that they

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*Burns, "A Nation Challenged: On the Move", *New York Times*, October 4, 2001.

*Adam Garfinkle is editor of *The National Interest*.

will change their policies. If they see such change as being in their interest, they might actually change course. In the end, you might have a confrontation, but that is way down the road.

[L. Paul Bremer, III*]: Yes, but I don't think we can leave it too long, Charles. It is fashionable to say that this is not going to be a war on Islam, and everybody would agree that we do not want it to be a war on Islam. But everybody's focused on the wrong question. The question is not are *we* going to make war on Islam. It is whether Islam is going to make war on us. The so-called moderate Arabs and moderate Islamic leaders in the United States, in the region, and as far away as Indonesia need to step up and say, "These guys do not define Islam. They are apostates. They're not going to heaven; they're going to hell. They have violated the teachings of the Prophet; they have violated the premises of the Quran." If the Islamic leaders in Egypt, in Jordan, in Indonesia, in Saudi Arabia allow Islam to be defined in radical Wahhabist terms, then this will be a war on Islam—at *Islam's behest*.

Pressure needs to be applied directly to prevent this from happening. It can be done behind the scenes, but these guys must stop the kind of hate-filled commentary we are still seeing in the Egyptian press, in the Gulf, the kinds of things that lead eight year-old boys in *madrassas* in Pakistan to vie with one another to decide who gets the right to bring down the Sears Tower in Chicago.

[Krauthammer]: It is deeply disappointing how few official spokesmen for Islam—mul-lahs, university professors, theologians—have said what President Bush said at the Washington Islamic Center a few days ago: that the terrorism of September 11 was an act against Islam. Our President is a good man, but he is not an expert on Islam. Such statements are useful as a way to discourage the horrible discrimination against American Arabs and American Muslims, but it's hollow coming from us addressed to Muslims. It was not said, by the way, at the National Prayer Service on the Friday after the bombing, where a Muslim cleric made an appalling speech. He did not come close to saying that this act of terror was against Islam and, in fact, if you read his parable it is hard to tell if "the plotters of evil" he referred to are the guys who did this or the United States.* That's how ambiguous it was. We do not have the kind of response from the Islamic world that we need in order to make this something other than a war of civilizations. It's up to our allies in the Islamic world, and to American Muslims, to stand up and say that terrorism is against Islam. Is that asking a lot?

[Anthony Cordesman*]: Yes, it really is. Because you're inferring the whole cause-and-effect relationship here.

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*The cleric is Dr. Muzammil H. Siddiqi of the Islamic Society of North America. A transcript of the service at National Cathedral is available at www.cathedral.org/cathedral/wtc9.11/wtc/html.

*Anthony Cordesman is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Dr. Cordesman has held senior positions in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Department of Energy.

[Krauthammer]: Let's start with American Muslims who are citizens of this country. Is it asking a lot, Tony?

[Cordesman]: Yes, it really is, because you are dealing with one basic problem: the impact of the second *intifada* and the backlash from the fact that our alliance with Israel is producing a great deal of this reaction. You are ignoring the fact that the governments that we are talking about have fought their own battles against Islamic extremists. Particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia, it is important to note that this is not an oppressive oligarchy put on top of a liberal group of people struggling for democratic reform. It is a combination of a royal family and technocrats dealing with a far more conservative society over which they have limited control, and where they have to be very careful about how they act. I spent a good deal of time in Saudi Arabia when the second *intifada* hit and I watched as the Saudi government issued formal statements to the effect that Pepsi-Cola was not a Zionist slogan, a claim that was coming out of the streets, the schools and the mosques. If we act as if we did not face a massive problem over Middle East peace issues, as if this was not a key source of backlash against the United States, we will create a massive recipe for failure.

[Krauthammer]: Tony, it's simply incorrect to say that the fanning of anti-Americanism in places like Egypt in the official or unofficial press is a consequence of the second *intifada*. It predates the second *intifada* by years.

[Cordesman]: Of course it has, because we haven't had a working peace.

[Krauthammer]: We had eight years of a peace process in which Israel implemented a series of territorial withdrawals, which saw countless meetings between Israelis and Palestinians based on a sense of mutual recognition, and so forth. We can argue about how illusory it all was, but these eight years were real. If you talk about the last year, and ignore those eight years, *you* are ignoring reality.

The anti-Americanism fanned by Arab governments is cynically done in order to deflect disaffection in the street with their repressive and failed rule—repressive politically and disastrous economically. It is a cynical use of this propaganda to deflect attention on the United States and Israel, and it long predates the second *intifada*. So blaming it, essentially, on Israel I think is just fundamentally wrong.

[Cordesman]: I'm not blaming it on Israel. I'm simply saying that it is a real problem, and that we have to live with the fact that anti-Americanism in the Islamic world is a complication of actions we need to take in our national interest. To blame this on Islam or a clash of civilizations, or to see regimes as decoupled from their own interest or to promote regime change in Saudi Arabia as a practical option, is frankly ridiculous.

[Krauthammer]: Do you think that if Israel and the Palestinians signed a peace treaty tomorrow, Osama would quit?

[Cordesman]: I don't think Osama would quit. We would still have a problem with many of the same extremist elements. (Let's remember, however, that some of these are the products of our own decisions. We tolerated Mohammed Zia, who came to power as an

Islamic extremist within the Pakistani military, because he was intensely convenient to us for a while, and we now live in part with the legacy of the Inter-Services Intelligence and other elements he helped create.) Should we abandon all the realities we face? No. But to turn this into the kind of split that you guys are outlining almost ensures that we are going to end up buying problems rather than solutions.

[Schlesinger]: Let me suggest that for the Palestinians this is the predominant issue. For the Egyptians and those that lie to the west, what Tony says has particular force. For bin Laden and for those in the east, however, the American desecration of the country of the two mosques is more important than is the Israeli issue.

[Krauthammer]: For the Pakistanis, it's Kashmir.

[Schlesinger]: Yes.

[Krauthammer]: It's not exactly Palestine.

[Martha Brill Olcott*]: Back to the issue of what constitutes success. As we have already said, ousting the Taliban is not in itself a mark of success if it becomes a cause of later problems. It would be a mistake not to deal with the reconstruction of Afghanistan as we go after other targets. If we don't close the void in Afghanistan while we're riding the high of having achieved the elimination of the Taliban, then we will squander the fruits of military success in Afghanistan.

[Krauthammer]: I agree. I'm not big on nation-building in places like Liberia and Somalia, but Afghanistan has become important to us. I don't think we ought to knock off the Taliban and then just leave. We're going to have to be very deeply involved for sure.

[Michael Armacost*]: It seems to me the success in the war on terrorism is judged by whether or not we can deter additional attacks on us by disrupting their operations and destroying their interests at a very specific level. Clearly, to do this we need allies.

We've got to build an alliance that permits us to go after the immediate set of networks, and Afghanistan offers them important refuge, so bringing down the Taliban is the first task. Beyond that, however, unless we do address some of the issues in the Middle East, it will be easier for the Saudis and the Egyptians to deflect the pressure from themselves by allowing anti-American sentiment to grow, and even to subsidize it to some extent through their export of religious teaching and the tolerance they show in their media. It seems to me all a part of the effort to build a broad coalition that isolates the terrorists from those who have offered them either physical refuge or support, or ideological support through their press.

[Bremer]: I agree, but at the end of the day, we are still going to have to address the ques-

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*Ambassador Michael Armacost is president and trustee of The Brookings Institution. He was Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs from 1984-89 and was Ambassador to Japan from 1989-93.

tion of states giving refuge to terrorist groups or we will not be addressing the fundamental problem. So we're going to have to deal with Syria, with Lebanon, and eventually with Iran and Iraq. The goal has to be the expulsion of terrorist groups from those countries. As long as terrorist groups have safe havens, like they have had in Afghanistan and similar to what they had in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, this problem is going to be with us. We may eventually address these matters in the context of broader Middle East diplomatic efforts, but that is what has to happen. And if the Syrians, for example, do not take care of the problem themselves, we're going to have to do it for them.

[Geoffrey Kemp*]: There is clearly a small band of dedicated fanatics who really believe in Wahhabism, but they are drawing on a pool of discontented youth that is extraordinary throughout this region. If one looks at the demographic bulges in Indonesia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, this is one of the fundamental problems that has to be examined carefully along with all the others that have been mentioned. Obviously, this is a problem that bears on the definition of success in the long run.

My definition of success moves sequentially. If there is a change of the regime in Afghanistan and there is no chaos in Pakistan, that will be a great initial success. After that, success may depend on holding together most of the participants in this alliance. If they all start going their own way after we have dealt with Afghanistan and Pakistan, how does one get on to phase two or phase three or phase four? That's where the problems with countries like Russia and Saudi Arabia are going to arise. Once you get beyond the Hindu Kush and get into Iraq and Iran and the others, that's when the big divisions will come, not just with Russia and Saudi Arabia, but also with the Europeans.

[Nikolas K. Gvosdev*]: The definition of success may be affected by the reports that the bin Laden network is beginning to disperse in part to failed states and to areas of the world where governments have little or no control: to Kosovo, to Somalia, to the mountainous regions of Central Asia. If indeed Americans come to narrow their definition of the national interest, will we be prepared to go into such places?

[C. Richard Nelson*]: I'm not sure how long we can sustain terrorism as an organizing principle, because we cannot really define terrorism. Everybody's had this difficulty of who is and who is not a terrorist or freedom fighter. And even in our own case, getting our own house in order with regard to U.S. support for the IRA and things like that, it gets to be very difficult once you get beyond the perpetrators of this particular act. I suspect we cannot really define "radical" Islam for practical purposes either.

[Krauthammer]: It starts with the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and their allies around the world. I would include the more radical and conservative parts of the Iranian government, too, although in Iran there's a possibility for evolution.

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*Nikolas K. Gvosdev is executive editor of *The National Interest*.

*C. Richard Nelson is director of the Program on International Security at the Atlantic Council of the United States.

[Kemp]: They hate the Taliban.

[Krauthammer]: I know, but they are both threats to the United States. Iran was identified by the State Department as the number one supporter of terrorism in the world. I am not against alliances of convenience, but anybody who thinks that our tacit alliance with Iran is anything but a temporary one is living in a dream.

[Adam Posen*]: I think the alliance with Iran could go on quite a bit longer than some people think, a conclusion that builds on something that Geoff Kemp said a few moments ago about demography. We know that having lots of violent, poor young men around is bad. We also know that the two things which obviate this particular problem are, first, the creation of a middle class and second, the emancipation of women. This is statistically true across countries. So there is an objective aspect to our ideological conflict with radical Islam in that, to the degree that they behave in anti-feminist and anti-middle class ways, they are creating more of this reserve army of hatred. This leads us to think a little differently about which countries one may usefully ally with over the long term. And while I'm not an Iran expert, I know enough about the economy to say that Iran is just a flip away from its long-term development path, which is building up a bigger role for women and a bigger role for its middle class. That may make them more amenable to us for the long term.

Relatedly, it is perhaps odd that no one has yet mentioned Turkey. But that is symptomatic of the fact that we take Turkey too much for granted, especially in the public sense. Yes, they have human rights and other problems, but what they have accomplished both economically and in terms of stability makes Turkey the kind of Islamic role model we should advance.

[Schlesinger]: I think, with regard to Iran, that it is not an ally, not even an ally of convenience. I *would* trust their intelligence more than I would trust that of our long-time ally, Pakistan, because the Iranians detest the Taliban, and whatever else they may think about the Great Satan, they don't mind the Great Satan disposing of a local foe.

In the longer run, too, Iran is one of the few places in the Islamic world where Americans are actually popular with the mass of the society. I think we need to be very careful about Iran in this context, because if we take any extensive military action against Iran, we might drive that society back into the hands of the mullahs who now have control of the security apparatus.

[Krauthammer]: I agree completely. Our objective in Iran is to flip it. There is a reasonable prospect that over time that can happen.

[Kemp]: There's a statistical projection that says that by 2020, Turkey, Iran and obviously Pakistan will have populations bigger than Russia. Any precipitous action now could have serious long-term implications. Iraq is the unique case, and it deserves special attention. But I'm very troubled about lumping Iran, Syria and Lebanon together with the Iraq problem.

[Bremer]: But do you object to dealing with Syria? And I can define what I mean by

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“dealing.” We give the Syrian government an ultimatum after we’ve succeeded in Afghanistan; we say: “You’ve got the headquarters of six or seven radical Palestinian terrorist groups still in Damascus, you’ve got 14 terrorist camps still in the Bek’a Valley, you’re allowing Iran to supply Hizballah with your twice-weekly flights to the Damascus airport. That’s going to stop or we’ll stop it”—*full stop*, end of message. My guess is that it will not be necessary to use force against Syria because if we’ve shown significant seriousness of purpose in dealing with the problem we have in Afghanistan, we’re going to find, as we did in the 1980s after we took action in Libya, that the Syrians, the Europeans and others will say, “Wow, the Americans are serious. We’d better get in line.”

[Kemp]: I agree that having that threat is useful. To have them worried right now is very effective. But I do think that the definition of success will not be the physical dismemberment of every terrorist group in every state. It will be a slowdown or stopping of the arms supplies from Iran, through Syria, to Hizballah and the use of those arms against Israel. That is the practical definition of success in this case.

[Bremer]: And closing down the terrorist camps in the Bek’a Valley.

[Kemp]: Yes; they’ll move into the next valley, and they’ll be “clinics.”

[Krauthammer]: Do you agree with that as a legitimate and important American objective?

[Kemp]: Absolutely.

[Krauthammer]: We have a precedent for this approach, too, with the Syrians expelling Abdullah Ocalan under Turkish military pressure.

[Bremer]: We have an earlier example, too, which was when they expelled Abu Nidal after we withdrew our ambassador and all the Europeans withdrew their ambassadors. They have responded to pressure in the past, and they will again.

[Cordesman]: Ultimately, however, we cannot drain the swamp completely. If we pursue our national interests, and we have to, whether with regard to Israel or Taiwan or other countries, we will pressure other states and groups to employ asymmetric warfare. Even where we are not concerned today, the spillover of our status as a superpower will push other movements, over time, to strike at us. We can suppress them, tear them apart, bring them down, but we cannot eliminate them all.

Ultimatums of the kind that Ambassador Bremer has suggested, frankly, are not going to work and will only make draining the swamp harder. That kind of ultimatum will cause a confrontation with the entire Arab world. Selective efforts to weaken and undercut key terrorist movements can work. In other cases, we will simply drive them underground; they will become less visible, but the problem will persist. Whatever comes out of Afghanistan, or Iraq, in three or four years, will not have drained the swamp. Draconian solutions aimed at creating a new world order are not a practical way to control and contain this problem. We have to deal with it one country at a time. We have to focus on key movements. Half of those 14 movements in Syria haven’t done a

damned thing in years except get to be middle-aged. The other half is dangerous.

What do we want to stop? What do we really want to get Syria or others to do? However we answer these questions, our effort is not going to end during the span of most of our lifetimes. We face the problems of homeland defense, counter-terrorism, our vulnerability and that of our allies, indefinitely into the future. Victory is improving the situation as much as one can pragmatically do.

And as for coalitions, I would cite Donald Rumsfeld's viewpoint: these will be opportunistic, temporary, constantly shifting. They will often have to be with people we dislike, but that is a two-way form of opportunism. We have to be prepared to abandon others along the way out of sheer pragmatism, just as they will abandon us.

[Krauthammer]: Yes, but there is a great difference between the United States of America abandoning Syria at the end of this necessary coalition and the United States abandoning Israel to its fate.

[Cordesman]: Nobody's suggested that for a moment.

[Krauthammer]: I'm not sure.

[Cordesman]: Israel is not a terrorist state.

[Krauthammer]: True, but a lot of people are implying that if we could sacrifice Israel, this war against terror would be so much easier. I think it's a mistaken analysis, and I think that America would have a hard time living with its conscience if that's how it acted. On the issue of shifting alliances, I agree completely—as long as we aren't locked into believing that our coalitions are an end to themselves, rather than a means.

[Garfinkle]: I want to go back to a point that Mr. Nelson alluded to a moment ago—a definitional point, but one worth airing. We should all be more careful about conflating acts of violence that are not terrorism with terrorism. For example, it is common parlance to call the attack on the U.S. Marine compound near Beirut in October 1983 an act of terrorism. It is also common to call the attack on the U.S.S. *Cole* an act of terrorism, and the bombing at Khobar Towers as well. Terrorism involves random attacks on innocent civilians for a variety of political purposes; attacking uniformed military forces on foreign soil is not terrorism. It is, however unconventional, an act of war. It may be nasty, it may be awful, but it's not terrorism.

The reason this is important is that our looseness of usage acts as a form of license for others' loose usages. Thus, many Arabs claim that Israel is a terrorist state—and the United States, too. There's a particularly apt quote in the *Washington Post* from Marwan Barghouti, the head of the Fatah *Tanzim* in the West Bank, about a week ago. Israel sealed off a certain area near the green line and his response to it was, "This is real terror."* Nobody was killed, no buildings were knocked down; Israel simply made a small area a no-go zone, and Barghouti calls it terrorism. Of course, this is ridiculous, but when we called the attack on the *Cole* terrorism, that was also ridiculous.

*Barghouti quoted in Daniel Williams, "Palestinians Set Limits on Cease-Fire", *Washington Post*, September 25, 2001.

[David Speedie*]: I couldn't agree more. The definition of terrorism should be planned attacks on civilian targets for political ends. The Basque ETA and the IRA fit that bill entirely. And there's one other reason for the internationalization of this whole thing, and that is that we don't know yet how these groups are interlocked. There were four IRA colonels in Colombia four months ago, and sometime in the 1990s, Qaddafi sent material to the IRA.

[Robert Leiken*]: That suggests we need to define not only "terrorism" but also "global reach." President Bush says that we were targeting terrorist organizations with global reach. I don't know whether the IRA visiting Colombia constitutes global reach, or whether Hizballah, which has perpetrated terrorism in Latin America, qualifies if it has not directly attacked the United States.

[Schlesinger]: There may be a form of terrorism sufficiently local that it falls below the radar; that may be the case of the Basque ETA. But it is plain that the IRA is not a local operation.

[Dimitri Simes*]: I think Adam is completely right and also quite courageous in saying that. But there is another side of the coin. While we have to adopt a sensibly narrow definition of terrorism, we must acknowledge the existence of terrorists where they in fact exist. We closed our eyes to terrorists in Chechnya. We thought that maybe Putin and the Russian security apparatus was involved. We have been remarkably benign about terrorists in Israel, and remarkably benign even in dealing with terrorists in London. This double standard just has to end.

[Lampton]: I want to draw out an implication from what Dimitri has just said and from what Charles said earlier about Russia. It is not just U.S. relations with Russia that may change for the better, but we also have the best chance for a significant improvement in our relations with China since 1989–91. I think the Chinese see it that way, too.

Now, in the current context, China is not going to be among the ten most important players, but the Chinese can help us in a limited way: in UN votes and in intelligence sharing. (They've already sent, I understand, some thirty people here to talk to our people.) The implication of all this is that we would be wise to stop diddling with China on secondary issues. We have a unique chance here, with China as well as with Russia, to decide what we care most about.

[Krauthammer]: Right, which takes us back to the point that the challenge to U.S. hegemony is not coming from great powers, and that we have a chance to *improve* our relations with the two likeliest counter-balancers as a result of the present challenge. A very rag-tag gang of people have attacked us supported by relatively weak states, and they now face basically every great power on the globe: the United States, all of Europe, Russia, India, and China is at least acquiescing. If we can't win

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with that lineup, even against determined and fanatical opponents, then we're in very bad shape.

[*Kemp*]: Speaking of China and Russia, I am surprised that no one so far has mentioned what all the magazines are talking about, namely, the tools of terrorism. The nightmare is the NBC problem—nuclear, biological and chemical weapons used by terrorists. Therefore, the control of these products, the leakage of these products, presumably, is now going to get much greater scrutiny by this new alliance. This raises some extremely interesting questions about how we deal with Russia. Before September 11 the Bush Administration seemed to be walking away from some of the efforts to secure Russian facilities from leakage. That may change. And, clearly, Russian policy toward Iraq and Iran is going to come under greater scrutiny on this level; how the Russians behave with respect to those two countries, in terms of weapons transfers, must be on the agenda. That is something they may have to give a little on, which could serve our interests. We also need to revisit some of the NBC-related treaties that have been put on the back burner for the last year or so.

[*Krauthammer*]: Iraq is the central actor in this problem. It has weaponized biologics and chemicals. How would you go after that, because it is, I think, the major long-term problem.

[*Kemp*]: Carefully.

[*James Lindsay**]: I want to go back to the point that Charles started with, which is that we have now been provided with an essential organizing principle for American foreign policy. I think Charles is quite right, and I think the administration intends to make that happen. Clearly, whether we're talking about China or Russia, there's a different lineup out there, and this really is a pivotal moment in the sense of opportunities to do things that would not have been even in the realm of possibility before September 11. But how sustainable is this new central organizing principle? Our allies define it differently; they're interested simply in Al-Qaeda, and once we expunge it, it's over and done with as far as they are concerned.

Domestically, too, there is a real question of whether getting Osama bin Laden will cause our attention to wane. In some sense, a clear or dramatic success in Afghanistan may undermine the long-term goal of making counter-terrorism the central organizing principle. Indeed, if we have success against Al-Qaeda, we could see the pendulum swing quickly back and all of a sudden people will go back to more normal politics, talking about the moralistic aspect of American foreign policy. So I don't think we've necessarily moved firmly into a Bismarckian world.

[*Schlesinger*]: But hope springs eternal. (Laughter.)

[*Krauthammer*]: Yes, there is an opportunity for a change in great power dynamics that might outlive the Islamic threat. That's good.

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[*Moisés Naím**]: I wonder what this conversation would look like if we convened this same group three years from now and, extrapolating from current trends, we imagine what the situation would be. Let me suggest a few such extrapolations.

One is that the Taliban is replaced by some other coalition more sympathetic to the United States and less prone to harbor terrorism, that a massive investment in nation-building would have been made in Afghanistan, except that we don't know how to make that effort succeed. Afghanistan is not Korea. The fact that this has been done before in South Korea or Germany or Japan does not give me much hope that it can be replicated in Afghanistan.

Another assumption is that bin Laden is either dead, captured or in hiding, but Al-Qaeda still exists. It is limited in its scope of action but it does engage in some form of activity in remnants spread around the world.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are destabilized and have therefore become far more totalitarian, repressive regimes. In order to survive, they have moved toward much more repressive politics.

Syria, Lebanon and the other states that have been mentioned will do just enough to make sure that they are not accused of harboring terrorists, but they will not eradicate completely some elements of sympathy and support for such groups. But there will not be enough support to justify bombing them or "taking them out."

Terrorism becomes a fact of life around the world, not World Trade Center-scale terrorism, but constant terrorist activity such as now exists in the Basque country or Northern Ireland spread around the world. There is more control, more security, more limited personal and civil liberties, but terrorism still cannot be totally eradicated.

There is also a protracted global economic slowdown. Unemployment rises in this country and abroad, especially in the bulge of young men between 18 and 25, which tend to be more prone to violence. There is higher unemployment, and economic prospects in this country and in emerging markets are limited.

Anti-Americanism continues and even increases, and this anti-Americanism transcends the fact of continued U.S. support for Israel.

Another important assumption is that terrorism as the central organizing principle for American foreign policy will be eroded. Other problems will erupt that will distract from the focus on terrorism.

If all this happens, then the question is what prescriptions would flow today from a world that essentially moves in that direction over the next few years?

[*Krauthammer*]: That's a very pessimistic view. I find many of your assumptions compelling, but I think there is a little more prospect for demonstrations of American success in this operation than you imply.

But eradication of terrorism? No. All that we can hope for is that if we make state-supported terrorism extremely expensive for the governments that do it, they will get the message that, occasionally, a regime will incur the death penalty for supporting terrorism—as prospectively in Afghanistan. If so, terrorism can be reduced to a level that is tolerable and consistent with civil liberties, and that, I think, is a noble and important goal.

*Moisés Naím is editor of *Foreign Policy*.

[Schlesinger]: May I summarize? Charles started with a statement of immense lucidity with which not everyone agreed in its entirety. We did agree on the point that we must have success, however defined, if we are to sustain the kind of international relationships we seek. Whether or not everyone agreed that there should be something beyond Afghanistan, there was general agreement that one must start with Afghanistan.

To go beyond Afghanistan, we must recognize that this creates problems for governments that are in a precarious position, some of which are relatively moderate governments we do not wish to overthrow, but some of whose policies we wish to modify: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in particular. We must be—and this is my own conclusion—very careful about targeting the Islamic world as such or we will fall into a crusade that will unify the Islamic world against us. And there was no disagreement with the conclusion that victory should be defined as improving the situation as much as is pragmatically possible.



Defense Policy

[Schlesinger]: In his introduction this morning, Charles Krauthammer said the world is expecting American power to be used and to succeed. I emphasize that last word. And we now move from foreign policy to defense policy, which really means what military actions we should take. To start this conversation, I call upon Richard Perle, who is currently the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board which is advising the Department of Defense and Secretary Rumsfeld.

[Richard Perle*]: I approach this topic with unaccustomed humility. It is just a matter of time before someone responds to the hawkish things I have been saying by observing that I never served in the military. It is true: I am not an expert on military operations, but I have spent many years working on issues like this despite that handicap.

The first important point to be made is one already raised in the previous session. The world, and most importantly those states that support terrorism are expecting a U.S. response commensurate with the magnitude of the attack against us, and it would be a great mistake to disappoint them. Anything that looks insubstantial, anything that looks symbolic, anything that does not have an objective that can be measured and understood after the smoke clears, will be a source of encouragement to those who support terror.

The culture we are dealing with is one in which it is not characteristic to turn the other cheek, and so severe military action is required to properly get its attention. That does not mean—indeed, it *particularly* does not mean—an indiscriminate response. Fortunately, we now have available to us weapons that are capable of great discrimina-

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tion, distinguishing between targets with a high degree of accuracy. We have the capability today to see a battlefield as we have never seen it before, even a battlefield that is unconventional by most measures. The cover of darkness and the occlusion of weather have been stripped away, and the ability to track moving targets is better than it has ever been. With respect to the conventional military operational side of the U.S. response, we have a range of options that we lacked even at the time of Desert Storm, when people were dazzled by what earlier generations of the relevant technologies could do. Most senior military officers, in service and recently retired, agree that, compared to our capabilities at the time of Desert Storm, we are better today by an order of magnitude. This conclusion stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom that says we are weaker today because our armed forces are smaller and have been overstretched.

But while we are indeed stronger than we have ever been, we have a set of military institutions that have not, in my view, yet made the necessary transition to thinking in new ways about the use of military power, some of which flow from the evolution of these new technologies. If I worry about anything, it is the oppressive mindset that causes some people to think we need larger forces, and that we need to use them in the ways we have always used force in the past. But I am not pessimistic on this score because there is a civilian leadership at the Department of Defense that is not mired in old doctrine. That leadership is working very hard with the uniformed services to develop options of a kind that do not normally flow from the Joint Staff and other institutions of the government.

Now, what should we do and what shouldn't we do? We must not make this a manhunt for Osama bin Laden. Everyone in the administration with whom I have spoken agrees with this, but the impression has nevertheless been created that any U.S.-led military operation that does not end in the apprehension or destruction of Osama bin Laden will be a failure. We need to work hard to dispel this impression lest we get trapped in an objective that we may not be able to achieve, and that will cast a pall of failure over whatever we do, even if it is in fact far more significant than getting bin Laden himself.

We are faced with a special variety of terrorism carried out by suicidal maniacs. Since all of our defenses against terror have assumed that terrorists wish to survive their attacks, we therefore find ourselves ill-equipped to deal with the problem at hand. In civilian air travel, for example, we depend heavily on matching passengers and baggage. It is probably the single most important part of the existing aircraft security program. But if an individual who places a bomb on board is himself on board the airplane, that sharply reduces the probabilities of effective detection. So we have to rethink very substantially how the systems we have in place for homeland defense relate to the techniques of suicidal terrorism.

But beyond defensive measures of this sort, it seems clear that the only thing we can do that is likely to be lasting in its effect is go after the state sponsorship that permits suicidal bombers to get within range of their targets. States either allow or assist terrorists in acquiring the essentials for their missions: the logistics, the communications, the intelligence, the money, the trade-craft, the training, and perhaps most important, the sanctuary within which to plan. This is what we must end.

An image has been allowed to develop of Osama bin Laden in his cave, but operations such as those we witnessed on September 11 are not planned in caves; they're planned in offices by people who have secretaries and support staffs and research and communications and technology. Now, I may be wrong about this, but I would be surprised if the box cutters that went through X-ray machines had not been tested against

X-ray machines, and the precise choice of box cutter made on the basis of what was most likely to escape detection. That is not done in caves.

So if we can create a situation in which terrorists are unwelcome everywhere, if they have to sleep in a different place every night, if they have to communicate in ways that are more vulnerable to interception than the relatively secure communications to which they now have access, if their funds are limited, then our vulnerability to acts of terror, while it will not cease, will be significantly diminished.

The number of governments involved in supporting terrorism is relatively small. The number that do not support it but have not been assiduous in attempting to suppress it is larger. There are things we can and must do with regard to both groups. But for military operations, the most important targets are those assets of governments supporting terrorism that are susceptible to attack and destruction.

When you say this in public, as I have been doing lately, people throw up their hands and ask, "Do you mean that we're to go to war against Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon—against all of them?" To which my answer is that the cost of supporting terrorism has so far been very low. Retribution, when it was taken, was taken against the terrorists themselves and not against the governments that sponsored them. Meanwhile, the benefits have been small to the governments that are engaged in the support of the terrorism, so it will not take a sharp increase in the price to shift the risk/reward ratio in the direction of new policies on the part of those governments. Therefore, we will probably not have to destroy targets in all of them, just in some of them. The others will get the message.

The best way to get quickly to the right result is to replace one or more of the governments that now support terrorism, with the unmistakable message that supporting terrorism puts your entire regime at risk. Since these regimes, by and large, rule by terror themselves, we have a variety of options, military and political, to put them at risk. By and large, those operations should consist of specific American military assistance, including the use of American forces, alongside others who wish to be rid of those regimes in their own countries.

This applies to Afghanistan, it certainly applies to Iraq, and it will apply to each of the countries who fail to mend their ways. But, as I say, if we destroy the Taliban regime and finally rid ourselves of Saddam Hussein, we will see a mass exit from the terrorism business on the part of the Syrians, the Sudanese and others.

[Schlesinger]: Two questions. First, in our previous discussion, there was substantial agreement that going after Afghanistan initially is the thing to do, but there is no agreement on what would come thereafter. What does the approach you have outlined do to the prospect of assembling and maintaining a coalition?

Second and related, Secretary Rumsfeld has talked about floating alliances that may be expected to change as the campaign's objectives evolve. Thus, our old friends in the Sudan are suddenly allies of ours and are providing good information, so we are told. So we now have "slavers against terrorism" as part of the coalition. Would you comment on that, please?

[Perle]: I do not believe that a coalition is important now in the way that it was before Desert Storm. That coalition—let's be blunt about it—was at least as important in securing 51 votes in the United States Senate as it was in assembling forces capable of dealing with Saddam Hussein's army. Those of us who were involved in

that remember very well that the establishment of that coalition was a powerful argument to recalcitrant senators: If Egypt and Syria were signing up to go after Saddam Hussein in Kuwait, how could the U.S. Senate not do as much? And they barely did as much.

This is not an issue now. This country is unified as never before, and there has been a sea change in attitude and spirit—and we mustn't lose that—because it's crucial in winning this war. But as a practical matter, a broad coalition is not terribly important. Some alliance relationships *are* vital to us, and we should enlist the countries that possess those critical elements necessary to support our operations. But there are a great many countries whose names on the coalition list are of trivial significance. So we should not pay a high price in the coin of limits to our options and methods to encourage countries to join the coalition. Clearly, if the price of coalition-building is to shackle our operation so that in the end we cannot be effective, it's self-defeating. Alliances, like coalitions, are made to accomplish a mission, and if we start with the alliance and then look for the mission, we will end up with something that reflects the whole range of interests and outlooks of the coalition partners. And the fact is that our interests are different from every one of the potential coalition members. We are the Great Satan, and nobody else is even the Little Satan; we have a population to protect, and I do not see how it can be wise to concede the freedom to protect ourselves, in the way we believe to be most effective, by sharing that responsibility with anyone else.

Of course, if we cannot do what we need to do without a base in a particular location, I accept that we may have to engage the people who can supply that base. But I sure hope we are looking for ways to free ourselves from geographic dependence, and I think that in this regard, as well as others I have mentioned, technology is important and evolving in a very positive way.

[Morton Kondracke*]: Is it your sense that we are being shackled by geographical dependencies, and coalition limits on our options?

[Perle]: We are not yet shackled, but I am worried about things that some people are applauding. For example, NATO's support, invoking Article V, troubles me. We do not need it, the political benefits are not worth it, and if it is allowed to establish a precedent—if it is allowed to create the sense that we have to get NATO approval under Article V before we do whatever we do next—then, on balance, that support will have been more harmful than helpful.

Unfortunately, there has been a mindless quality at the State Department to the building of a coalition. In particular, the suggestions—which I don't believe have been acted on—that we should try to engage in this coalition countries that we know to be actively involved in the support of terrorism will not only corrupt our moral purpose and prove ineffective in the end anyway, but it proceeds without any clear notion of what tangible support we can expect from those countries.

Now, it is true, some cases are especially delicate, and Saudi Arabia is one of them. At the end of the day, if access to Saudi territory is essential, I believe we can secure it. We may have to say some things to the Saudis that we have not said before, but so be it. I would like to see us organized in such a way that no one base becomes critical, and it would not do us harm to reflect on why we have put such important mili-

*Morton Kondracke is executive editor of *Roll Call*.

tary assets, as we have, into Saudi Arabia. What were people thinking when they built a very important base there? Did anybody even raise the question of whether we could rely on the Saudis in a pinch? That base ought to be in Israel, make no mistake about it.

[Frank Carlucci]:* Richard, the coalition may be less useful for military purposes than it is in the interest of avoiding a confrontation between the Western world and the Muslim world.

[Perle]: This is indeed a real problem, but some of the coalition member governments we hope to enlist are themselves discredited in the Arab “street.” That’s part of the problem. The Gulf states and the Saudis have little credibility in this regard. There is a politics of the “street” that we are largely powerless to affect. We are just going to have to bear up under it. The point is that making formal allies in this war of regimes like those in Saudi Arabia and Egypt will not help us convince the Arab “street” that we are not making war against Islam; quite the contrary, I’m afraid.

Now, I don’t dispute that their interests and ours are sufficiently common so that they are our friends in a geopolitical sense, but, as has already been mentioned, those countries have their own problems, and in some cases they have dealt with them in ways that have made our situation much worse. We know that very substantial flows of money out of the Gulf and Saudi Arabia go to Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, not necessarily because they are sympathetic to their cause, but because it keeps things quiet at home. They have been doing this for a very long time. Adding governments that permit such things to a coalition does not solve this problem.

[Cordesman]: Richard, let me raise another matter, if I may. When the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] was issued this week, nobody assigned any price tag to it. We have political decisions to make in the next few months and year that go far beyond what we do in Afghanistan. As you pointed out, for example, homeland defense has to be funded. As things stand now, the bulk of that money goes to 17 Federal agencies, state and local governments outside the Defense Department, and the intelligence community. Not only do we not have a price tag, it’s not even clear if anybody is formulating a plan. Governor Ridge seems to have turned this task down, but both OMB and GAO, when they tried to cost homeland defense, reached two conclusions: there is a total lack of central planning, and there are no programs. If the Defense Department is thrust into homeland defense, it would reverse the Clinton Administration’s decision to basically take it out of homeland defense and shift the burden to FEMA and to other agencies. We cannot define the National Guard role in terms of the Clinton plan, so we also have to figure out what it is to be and who pays for it.

In short, if we take existing commitments, the readiness and procurement issues and what you suggested will be needed to deal with foreign countries and homeland defense, we approach a \$400 billion a year defense budget in real terms indefinitely into the future. That would still be under four percent of the GNP, so I would support that. But we had all better understand that we are making a commitment to a hell of a lot more money for defense. And if we do not spend the money, and are therefore forced

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to do some things at the expense of others—for example, do Afghanistan at the expense of homeland defense—then in three or four years we will be right back where we were when the World Trade Center was hit.

[*Perle*]: I take the point and, yes, we clearly need to spend more. There has never been a war that, when we total up the cost of the war when all is said and done, we would not have been willing to pay a great deal more to prevent. The ultimate cost of this attack in direct damage to the economy, to say nothing of the lives lost, will be enough to fund a much larger defense budget for several years. And, indeed, the organizational problems you have mentioned are formidable. But homeland defense becomes the last line of defense if we do the rest of it right. If we are successful in persuading countries to get out of the business of supporting or tolerating terrorism on their territory, the magnitude of the threat will be greatly diminished. Homeland defense will still be necessary, but it will be a much smaller task if we essentially end state support of terrorist networks. We can find the resources to do it.

[*Joseph S. Nye**]: I agree that the great danger is that we catch bin Laden and think we have succeeded. The history of terrorism in Germany and Japan—the Baader-Meinhof group and the Red Army Factions and Brigades and so forth—is that it really took a generation to eradicate that. That is why, when Jim Woolsey and I did something on this while in government in 1994—a very highly classified National Intelligence Estimate that identified suicidal terrorism as a threat—we made sure to do a follow-up study on how to re-organize the government to handle the problem. When we did, it became very clear to us that we cannot coordinate this out of DOD. DOD has to have and will have the capabilities, but it cannot be the coordinator. There are just too many civilian agencies that are crucial to this, and DOD lacks the culture and capacity to coordinate them.

This is also why the idea of putting Governor Ridge in another department along with the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol and so forth does not make sense, because he then becomes the 47th agency that needs coordinating. The key point is that only presidential authority can coordinate this. Ridge must have a veto power of those parts of the budgets of the 46 agencies that work on anti-terrorism, and they do not get a sign-off until he says that they have a sign-off. That would differentiate his office from the ridiculous efforts of drug czars and poverty czars and so forth.

We also need a group to do “red team/blue team” exercises systematically end to end: looking at early detection, then intelligence overseas, then prevention, then crisis management right through repair and retaliation, which comes back to defense and foreign policy. And the best way to do this is to create the modern equivalent of what we did in the Cold War with RAND. In other words, we need a Federally Funded Research and Development Center [FFRDC] dedicated to this, which would be responsive to Ridge’s needs for planning and operationalizing particular programs. He will then have the basis upon which to say, “This budget needs to have more in it, this agency has to do more of that.” That’s the way we make progress on a twenty-year campaign.

And finally, we must recognize that technology is putting in the hands of indi-

*Joseph S. Nye is dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is a former chairman of the National Intelligence Council and served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during the first Clinton Administration.

viduals and groups power that used to be reserved solely for governments in terms of destructive power. The religious fanatics are in possession of it now, but that is not the end of it, unfortunately. We must organize for the long haul.

[Perle]: I don't disagree, but on this issue of coordination it is important to first ask, "coordination for what?" and "what are the consequences of a failure of coordination?" They vary enormously, from the mere inefficient use of resources to disastrous failures of coordination of the sort where the FBI and the CIA and the prosecutors' offices don't talk to each other—and in some cases, are *prevented by law and practice* from talking to each other—so that vital information is never assessed as it should be.

The right way to get at the coordination problem is to start by finding the most dangerous failures of coordination and deal with those, because we may never get the level of coordination we really want. For example, we have a ridiculous situation over Iraq where we have a southern command and a northern command, but in the middle of the country nobody is responsible. So Saddam is bristling with air defenses in the middle of the country. That this absurdity could persist for as long as it has is a monument to how foolish we can be, and to the kind of trouble we can get into if we don't coordinate our efforts.

[Schlesinger]: Coordination about disparate objectives is inherently difficult. How do we deal with the disparate objectives of the intelligence community and the law enforcement community? Law enforcement people want to take every bit of intelligence and dump it into a court so as to get a conviction. The intelligence community wants to hold information back so that they can use it to reach out to other elements. Some lack of coordination is simply built into the missions of the various agencies.

[Perle]: True, which is why we need to rethink some old practices. For example, the idea that information obtained by a grand jury cannot be shared with the intelligence community is absurd. But that is readily fixable.

[Nye]: Just a footnote on what Jim Schlesinger just raised. We could have in the counter-terrorism center certain information that, when made available to the FBI, is made available on the condition that the CIA has ultimate control of its disposition, and that it cannot be used in court cases until released by the CIA. That's one possibility.

[Garfinkle]: I would like to move the conversation back to a military question with important political implications.

Richard, I was listening very carefully to your introductory remarks for the adjectives that you chose to describe the nature of the military action that would be forthcoming. The most graphic adjective I heard was the word "severe." I want to press you a bit on what you mean by "severe", because we are faced with at least two audiences with different ways of defining psychologically impressive military activity.

In this country, and among our European allies, people are impressed with very discriminating weapons that hit very discrete targets and in which there is little general destruction. But in the region, as we try to influence the choices of would-be future terrorists, that is not nearly as impressive as what we euphemistically call "collateral damage." Isn't there a tension between wanting to be discriminate to please constituencies in the United States, Europe and elsewhere, and needing to be ferocious to achieve longer-

term objectives in the Middle East? How do we balance these competing objectives?

[Perle]: We do it by looking at the severity of the output and not necessarily the input. For example, the Syrians may decide to get out of the terrorism business because it is looking risky, but suppose they don't. With even the very small number of B-2s that we now possess, Bashir Assad could go to bed and wake up the next morning and discover that he no longer has any air bases, that he no longer has an intelligence headquarters, and that all the camps in the Bek'a Valley have been reduced to rubble. That is severe, and it would get people's attention—but it would not entail a lot of collateral damage.

[Robin West]:* I am genuinely baffled about this notion of going after Iran and Iraq. We have been waging war against Iran at the urging of our close ally and their political agency in the United States for the last twenty years. The largest land war waged since World War II was waged against Iran. Losing a million people is pretty severe, pretty dramatic. So how are you going to make an impression on Iran that's going to change their opinion? These are very tough people.

As to Iraq, and we watch it very closely from the standpoint of the oil business, our view is the only people who are going to replace Saddam Hussein are probably either members of the party or the military—and we have no relationship with them. We don't know where Saddam Hussein physically is. We've tried blowing things up there, but it hasn't made a big impression. Moreover, Saddam doesn't give a damn about what happens to his people, only about what happens to the Tikritis who keep him in power and certain other key people. So how does this work? Are you going to carpet bomb the whole country?

[Schlesinger]: If I may: we recognize that an evolution away from the rule of the more extreme mullahs is underway in Iran and that situation has to be treated with a much greater sense of discrimination than Iraq.

[Perle]: I share that view. If we closed these doors with the talent around this room and said, "All right, what can we do to accelerate the change that seems implied by what we now know to be going on in Iran?", we would come up with a dozen good ideas. There are cleavages in that society to be exploited, and it can be done.

Iraq is a different story. There is indeed a lot that Saddam doesn't care about, but he cares about his 44 or 46 palaces and they could disappear overnight. When the air of invincibility is taken from Saddam, we will see very rapid change in that country, and there are things we could do to deprive him of that mantle of invincibility.

[West]: With all due respect, Iran is a country that, again, went through war, through hyper-inflation, and the population has doubled in the last two decades—yet it's held together. It's a country with lots of problems but enormous fundamental strength; it's not so easy to split it. And trying to isolate a country of 70 million just hasn't worked very well.

[Perle]: When the mullahs are forced to arrest people who are allied to what we regard

*Robin West is chairman of the Petroleum Finance Company. He served as Assistant Secretary of the Interior (1981–83) and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (1976–77).

as more moderate elements in Iran, that suggests that they cannot manage through less drastic means.

[West]: But the mullahs have been arresting people for twenty years.

[Perle]: Indeed they have, but twenty years ago there were many fewer moderates than there are today. The trend is clear, and there are ways to accelerate it. Iranian society is not trouble-free, and there are very few happy Iranians these days. Now, if we can't . . .

[West]: With military action?

[Perle]: No, I'm not arguing for military action against Iran. Each country has to be looked at individually. There is little in common across the list of countries. Our approach to Iran is entirely different from Iraq, and it does not include, in my view, military operations.

[West]: Go on to Iraq. What do we do with Iraq?

[Perle]: We have been very short-sighted in discounting the opposition to Saddam Hussein by looking at it as it now is and not as what it could be. There is no doubt that given the way Saddam Hussein rules there are large numbers of Iraqis who would like to be rid of him. They lack the means to accomplish that. And to sit on our hands, as we have done for a very long time now, and say that nothing can be done is most unfortunate. Even this administration refuses to give minimal support to the opposition. They will not even support an effort to create a political opposition that could compete with a post-Saddam form of Ba'athism that could be as bad as what we have now in Baghdad. I think we've just been completely blind about Iraq.

[Simes]: Could we go back to the matter of the severity of our response? As Charles Krauthammer noted earlier, what we do in Afghanistan may change the whole dynamic of our dialogues with Iraq and Iran, certainly, and to a great extent with Syria and Lebanon. So what should we do? Let me reflect on a little history to suggest a possible answer.

Two of our best friends now are Germany and Japan, and we nuked Japan, and remember what we did to Dresden. Yet when we talk about Afghanistan, we speak of precision-guided munitions, special forces and so forth. But this is not necessarily a use of force that would have a very strong demonstration effect on those in power in the region.

[Cordesman]: But Dimitri, what else are you going to blow up?

[Simes]: We should remember that we achieved a sort of victory against Serbia less because we were effective against the Serbian military but because we were effective against the Serbian civilian infrastructure. It is true that there are not many military targets in Afghanistan, but we are perfectly capable of altering the whole terrain if that is what is required to get at the terrorists in their caves. I am not saying that we *should* do this or that it is the preferred solution, but it seems to me that we have to start with an assumption that all weapons in our arsenal could be considered if that is what it

takes to accomplish the objective.

[Mathews]: What do you mean by “alter the terrain” of Afghanistan? Physically bomb the mountains until . . . what?

[Schlesinger]: Bomb them back into the Stone Age.

[Mathews]: They’re already there. I’m very serious, Dimitri?

[Simes]: You understood me exactly right. Changing the terrain means changing the terrain, which is militarily possible. And I think that most people in Afghanistan who are now on our side would not even be slightly horrified by it.

[Perle]: I don’t think that’s the only way we can do it, Dimitri. In the past, we used excessive bombing because we couldn’t find targets, and if we could find them sometimes we couldn’t hit them. That’s no longer the case. If we can find targets, and we can, we can destroy them with economy of force and we should. And I don’t think we should leave a single interesting target standing in Afghanistan, namely the leadership of the Taliban regime and the terrorists themselves and their camps. But we need not drop unnecessary tonnage in order to do that.

[Cordesman]: Richard, isn’t the real issue whether we will give the President the support over time to take as long as it takes to do this mission, even if there is some collateral damage, even if we take casualties, even if there are other problems? It seems to me that the issue here is not the intensity of a single strike. The issue is support for a persistent effort even if it takes months or more than a year.

[Perle]: The answer to that is yes, and the American people are prepared for that. But there’s no question that winning now and again helps a lot. If we have a series of early failures and fiascos, support could dissipate quickly, which is why it is terribly important that we not define the objective at the outset as “getting” Osama bin Laden, because if we do not get him, it looks as if we have failed. Unfortunately, the administration may have lost control with perceptions on this. Whether they can re-establish it, I don’t know.

[Mathews]: Our earlier discussion focused almost entirely on states. In his opening remarks, Charles Krauthammer said, “Well, we’ve pushed a few buttons and now the borders are closed in Afghanistan, and the Taliban’s totally isolated.” But this is only true if we think in state terms. Borders, of course, are not closed. And it is not so clear that things are very different even in state-to-state terms than they were before, except for the fact that some formal relationships have been broken.

The connection to your remarks concerns your description of a situation in which the terrorists had received an enormous amount of state support. Now, that they have received sanctuary is inarguable, but the other things that you describe—logistics, training and so forth—is more problematic. You said, “Well, this kind of operation doesn’t get planned in caves; it gets planned in offices with secretaries.” But not even the government in Afghanistan has offices with secretaries. They squat on the floor. It seems to me that discussions about both diplomacy and military action focused only on states misses

the point that we are fighting a war against transnational networks that need, progressively over time, for reasons of technology, less and less aid from states. Doesn't this also hit head on with Adam's point, which is that effective responses may need to be different from the kind of military action people have come to expect in a severe, punishing military response? The larger point, however, is that during the Cold War, we let ourselves get tangled up between the transnational network of international communism and nationalist issues, and I wonder whether we are doing any better at untangling those issues now.

[Perle]: It is certainly true that to the extent terror networks can operate without the state-supported amenities I was describing, simply taking those things away will have less effect than one would wish. It may be that these attacks were plotted initially by people sitting on a floor somewhere in Afghanistan, but the structure that permitted that plan to come to a successful execution included a lot of other things, like knowing the best way to enter the country, which border crossings to try, with which documentation. There is a tremendous amount of trade-craft involved in this, and it comes from experts, and the experts most often come from governments. It comes from intelligence officials in a number of countries contributing real-time information as the situation changes. It comes from advice about how to keep communications secure and so forth.

We are not going to cripple terrorists completely by depriving them of state support, but the sanctuary states provide is very important. The freedom to plan without having to pack up and move because the sheriff is around the corner also makes a big difference. Extirpating state support will not solve the whole of the problem, but it will reduce it significantly, which is the best we can do.

[Krauthammer]: This is right, and the state connection is extremely important now not just for the trade-craft, not just for permitting the means, but for allowing the weaponry to develop. Anthrax cannot be weaponized in a cave. It is very hard to do; it requires experts, laboratories and controlled conditions. The ultimate threat is terrorism armed with weapons of mass destruction. We have witnessed a demonstration of mass murder without those weapons, but there is a difference between 5,000 people and five million people killed. The reason that getting at state support is absolutely essential now is because terrorists can only acquire things like weaponized anthrax, or perhaps nuclear weapons, with the assistance, connivance and cooperation of states.

[Mathews]: I don't think that's true. The entire security argument about biological weapons is premised on that not being true. Aum Shinrikyo did not have governmental support.

[Krauthammer]: Yes, and they failed.

[Mathews]: I know they did.

[Krauthammer]: That's because it's very hard to do.

[Mathews]: I know that, but it still doesn't require state help to learn how to mill the right size spores.

[Krauthammer]: Then why hasn't anybody come close to doing it, other than Iraq?

[Mathews]: Again, it is harder to do than we frequently, sloppily talk about it. Delivering biological toxins in the right-size particles is hard to do, but if a terrorist network has plenty of money and enough expertise, it does not require state support to succeed.

[Perle]: But you wouldn't disagree that it's a lot harder to do it if you're being hunted down, if you can't have permanent facilities.

[Mathews]: Right.

[Krauthammer]: Jessica, even if you're right, it strengthens the argument that we need to go after states, because it narrows the time window. Yes, someday, in the future, terrorists will be able to weaponize anthrax in a cave, but right now we have a window in which only states can do this, so it argues for the urgency of going after the states that have these weapons now.

[Mathews]: I don't think so. First of all, the cave is a red herring; Aum Shinrikyo was invisible in Japan, and they were far away from caves. You could certainly do a lot of stuff among the 150 million people in Pakistan, not in caves, that would be damned hard to find. I don't think that there is a technological window that we can close before state support becomes less essential.

[West]: We keep using the word "military", and we never use the word "police." Now, the Red Brigade and the other terrorist groups of the 1980s were not broken by the military, but by the police. The military really isn't organized to do something like this. Are we expecting an organization like the Pentagon, which is designed to move masses of troops to fight wars, to have knife fights in alleys?

[Perle]: The Defense Department's role is largely in going after the states, not in chasing down individual terrorists and certainly not in the police function. The police function *is* very important, indeed. But on this question—because Jessica Mathews raises an important issue—Joe Nye knows a lot more than I do. So let me ask: How much better off would we be if the governments friendly to us really exerted themselves and the governments that are now harboring terrorists stopped doing so?

[Nye]: I think essentially you're both right. The state structure makes it much easier for terrorists for the reasons that Richard and Charles have mentioned. On the other hand, with enough time and leakage, there are non-state actors who are worthy objectives in and of themselves. We will therefore still have a major terrorism problem for decades even if we sharply reduce state support. If we conceive of the problem as depending too much on the role of the military in getting rid of state support, then we may take our eye off the ball. This is not just a theoretical worry. When the Hart-Rudman Report was published, the august *New York Times*, which thinks itself the pre-eminent journal of record in America, didn't even cover it. This is a symptom of the problem. If we end state sanctuary, three-quarters of the task would still be left for the longer haul.

[Krauthammer]: But isn't the greater danger now that people are going to be focusing on individuals rather than on states? Everybody agrees that we must hunt these guys

down to some extent or another, but the argument is that only the lunatic hawks want to go after states, which would supposedly widen the war and create a war against Islam. That's the danger now, is it not?

[Nye]: I see it as a question of priority. I think we need to focus on the Taliban regime, where the clearest connection to terrorism exists, and we should disrupt that regime as best we can and disrupt the networks that it supports. After that, I would look to Iraq, and so forth. My concern is that we keep our eye on priorities.

[Kondracke]: If we want cooperation from Pakistan and from other Muslim countries, what are the implications and what are the limits in the way we handle the Arab-Israeli conflict? Do we say to Sharon, "You need to cool it", or do we say, "Wipe them out"?

[Perle]: Well, the one thing you do *not* do in this situation, in my view, is anything that can be understood as rewarding terrorism. It was seriously wrong to lean on Sharon to permit a Peres-Arafat meeting, because that will be understood as one of the benefits of attacking the United States. If we create the impression that the way the Arab world can deal effectively with Israel is by engaging the United States against it, and that the way to do that is to attack New York City and Washington, we will have gravely compromised our security even further. And that is the unmistakable message.

Up until that misadventure, the position of the administration was that the violence has to stop first. Then suddenly we began to say, "Go and meet. The violence doesn't have to stop first." So Sharon asked: "Can I insist on 48 hours without violence?" And then it was 24 hours without violence. I think it was a very serious error, and in my view it represents the bankruptcy of the people who have long been regarded as the experts on how to deal with the region. I don't think they have a clue; they're giving bad advice to the Secretary of State, who is, unfortunately, taking it. And it's getting passed on to the President, whose own instincts are in fact pretty good.

[Nye]: But Richard, following that same principle, what do you do with Pakistan's support for terrorism? When the Indians come to us and say, "You know, Pakistani terrorists just blew up 38 people in Kashmir", and a lot of these terrorists, incidentally, do have cross-links with Al-Qaeda, what do we do about that? Can we condone any terrorism in any place?

[Perle]: No, we cannot condone terrorism in any place. I think it is a reasonable assumption that General Musharraf was not behind that terrorist action. We're working in the case of Pakistan with people who we believe are not engaged in terrorism, but we should not condone it or turn a blind eye to it. And if the only way we can secure their support is by saying, "It's all right to do it somewhere else", then let's find a way to get the job done without that support.

[Mathews]: I would think it would be reasonable to assume the opposite; over time, Musharraf will have to allow acts of violence in Kashmir or his government will fall. The more pressure that we put on him to be friendly with us and to move against the fundamentalists, the more he has to promote terrorism in Kashmir. Why isn't that a more compelling argument?

[Perle]: Do acts of terror like this redound to the benefit of the Pakistani government? I doubt it. I would think that certain military moves in Kashmir might redound to the benefit of the government, but I doubt that anonymous acts of terror would do so.

[Garfinkle]: On this matter of Pakistan's internal circumstances, it may be that in order to balance off certain kinds of pressure, Musharraf may allow or turn a blind eye to others doing things in Kashmir like what happened in Jammu and Kashmir the other day. On the other hand, the way I read Pakistani society, a lot of people in Pakistan look at this crisis as an opportunity to reverse what many have called the Talibanization of the country. Some are willing to have as non-violent as possible a kind of a civil war in order to re-establish the secular traditions of the government. If that's the case, then we should not expect terrorism to proliferate, or to be used as a political vehicle.

[Perle]: Don't underestimate the benefits of victory. If we destroy the Taliban, the situation will change in Pakistan, and it will change in other places as well.

[Mathews]: But for the worse, Richard, for the worse.

[Perle]: I don't think so.

[Mathews]: Fifty years of policy in Pakistan has been to avoid having two fronts, to have a friendly government in Kabul. Right now we are talking about installing a government in Kabul that is the third rail for the Pakistanis. The worst outcome for them is to have a Northern Alliance government in Kabul. Domestic politics in Pakistan is such that they have to respond in Kashmir to stay in power.

[McFarlane]: Twenty-five trips to Pakistan in the past ten years may lead you to question my judgment, but I think there has been a real distortion of reality about Pakistan by our media. Contrary to media impressions, Pakistan is not a country that's crawling throughout with young terrorists. That is a phenomenon that's growing through the *madrassas*, but look at what has happened in the last four weeks. The extremists call for mass demonstrations the weekend after that attack, and only 5,000 people turned out in Karachi, a city of 13 million. That does not threaten the government. The following week after prayers there were 10,000 in Lahore, a city of five million. In short, I don't think that the alarm about Musharraf being at risk for helping the United States is warranted.

Indeed, I think Adam's point is more relevant here, and that is that Musharraf, who declares that his model is Atatürk, has an opportunity here to move rather decisively, saying, "The Americans made me do it." Whatever it may cost him in short-term agitation—and there will be some uprisings—if the United States comes in with an aid package worthy of the name, that offers some promise to 140 million Pakistanis, then that is a major upside, and Musharraf can be happy with what happens in Afghanistan.

Now, if we form common cause with the Northern Alliance alone, you are right, that would be a bad outcome. But if we have enough brains to go with the Pashtuns, the 40 percent of the demographic weight of the country, there can be a gov-

ernment with which Pakistan can deal, and I think that is the way the administration is going to go.

[Schlesinger]: To summarize the Perle presentation, Douglas MacArthur said, "In war, there is no substitute for victory." He may or may not have been right for all circumstances and for all times. But, generally speaking, it sure helps a hell of a lot.



Economic Implications and Policies

[Schlesinger]: We have talked about foreign policy and about military policy. It just happens that some of these things might have some economic consequences, so we will now address the question of what those consequences might be. Then we will take up the matter of economic policy.

By way of introduction let me only observe that some economic consequences of September 11 are obvious, but others depend on what we do in the foreign and military spheres. If, as Richard Perle has suggested, there is a substantial follow-on to the initial focus on Afghanistan, that could have a major impact on oil supplies, which in turn could re-ignite some inflationary pressures. It certainly would cause increased unemployment. There has been discussion of the delicate position of the Saudi government, and it is not plain that, irrespective of prior public comments, the Saudis would be prepared to make up any shortfall that might come from a closing-off of Iraqi oil—though the Saudi ability to do so is beyond question.

As to the question of how to ameliorate the negative economic consequences of the September 11 attacks, we are presumably called upon to make a trade-off between how much economic pain we can allow to be inflicted on the world to the one side and the methodical pursuit of our political and military objectives on the other. I now call on Moisés Naím to lead off our discussion.

[Naím]: In discussing the economic consequences of September 11, it is very easy to fall into a competition of predictions and forecasts about how the U.S. and the global economy is going to look in a year or so. We should do some of that, but we need to be aware that the post-September 11 period will witness huge experiments in economic policy, some of which we have already embarked on. But let us start with a descriptive grounding of where we are.

We now have the lowest global growth rate in the last thirty years, as defined by the past 24 months of economic activity. The downturn is severe, it is widespread around the world, and it is already protracted. In consequence, we have a Federal funds rate that is the lowest since 1962. That, however, has not translated into a lowering of long-term interest rates.

All of this bad news comes on the heels of the great boom of the 1990s, and some of the excesses of the 1990s, no doubt. Beyond the stock market slump, venture

capital funding went from \$5 billion to \$6 billion in the middle 1990s to \$114 billion in 2000. Two-thirds of all venture capital funding in the last twenty years was raised in the last two years, in 1999 and 2000. That market is now moribund.

The combination of slow growth and the over-investment of the 1990s is now creating slow growth in corporate profits. Corporate profits in the United States have fallen by 22 percent in the last three quarters, more than at any time since 1970. This has international consequences, as well. Thirty-eight out of 41 countries tracked by J.P. Morgan are now anticipating less growth than they were a few weeks ago.

Europe is about to enter a recession, if it is not already in one. The European service sector is experiencing less growth, and manufacturing and construction sectors are also in recession.

Emerging markets are being hit by a triple whammy. First, capital flows to these countries are expected to drop by a third, from about \$15 billion to \$10 billion a month. Not only are these countries going to receive less new money, they will also pay more for it. Capital will fly to the safer havens, so that money headed to emerging markets will require bigger payoffs to offset perceptions of greater risk. That is why already-indebted countries will have to pay more to finance their debts.

At the same time, commodity prices other than oil—sugar, copper, textiles, things like that—are generally low. So revenues for these countries will also suffer. Emerging markets in countries that are dependent on tourism will suffer particularly.

Now, all of these trends are long-term and all of them preceded the September 11 terrorist attack. The attack just consolidated and accelerated some of these trends. Clearly, the world and the United States would have had to deal with these economic challenges regardless of September 11. The good news is that the September 11 attacks have opened new policy options to deal with these issues. Before September 11, the big fight was about the size of the Social Security “lock-box” and how we were going to invest the lock-box and the surplus. Now there is a sudden tolerance for fiscal deficits. Everybody expects the United States to run fiscal deficits for the first time in a long time, and nobody seems particularly alarmed by the prospect. People understand that wartime requires a war economy, and a war economy is characterized by deficits.

Before September 11, we did not expect the U.S. delegation to have much to offer in Doha, Qatar at the World Trade Organization’s negotiations. Now it is widely expected that Congress will grant President Bush trade promotion authority to replace what used to be called “fast track authority.” Tolerance for a weaker dollar is another possibility that has emerged.

While September 11 has opened new policy spaces, there is a risk of over-reacting in economic policy, just as in foreign and military policy. It is not impossible to over-stimulate the economy. It is not impossible to run larger than necessary fiscal deficits. It is not impossible to assume that we can fine tune the value of the dollar and that we can tolerate some inflation, only to discover that inflation is getting out of hand and that fine tuning the economy is an art better performed when governments have more control over events.

Despite the risks of overreaction, we are clearly about to witness several interesting experiments in economic policy that will yield some lessons about how well *domestic* economic tools can cope with a *global* economic problem. We have seen, for example, on the heels of the September 11 attack, a European Central Bank that had been reluctant to lower interest rates, and all of a sudden coordination with the

European Central Bank has become effective and easy. An international coalition is also emerging to create a more synchronized economic policy response to the global economic slowdown. But the same perils, risks, uncertainties and difficulties that plague the coalition dealing with terrorism are present in international economic policy, too.

Surely, too, we will soon test the limits of monetary policy. We'll soon know if globalization has forever altered the effects of lower interest rates in the economy. We have heretofore assumed an almost guaranteed response between lower interest rates and greater economic activity . . .

[Schlesinger]: Have you heard of liquidity preference?

[Naím]: Yes, the liquidity trap; as Dr. Schlesinger says, we will now test to see if the liquidity trap is only a Japanese phenomenon or if it can be also an American phenomenon. We will also be soon testing the limits and possibilities of fiscal stimulus. We may discover that spending a lot of government money in the economy will not really boost economic activities—as has been the case in another recent made-in-Japan phenomenon—or we may discover that it does work. We will know soon.

By the way, just as an aside, a Malaysian columnist wrote a very interesting column two days ago saying that when Malaysia employed similarly aggressive stimulus policies during the Asian crisis, it was chastised by the IMF. But when the United States does it, the IMF and all the Western experts applaud. So this is another debate we will have, and one with long-lasting lessons about the dispersion of ideas about economic policy.

We will also learn lessons about contagion. The 1990s taught us that economic accidents in one country or region can have quick, damaging and surprising effects in other countries. One lesson of the 1990s is that it is hard to predict these economic shocks, and even harder to predict exactly how they will travel around the world. Who would have thought that a crisis in Russia would have consequences in Brazil? There are almost no economic links between Brazil and Russia, and yet that is what happened. The big question now, of course, is how the shockwaves from an important American slowdown will travel around the world. We are going to find out, and we should be prepared to be surprised at the consequences.

The conveyor belt of these transmission mechanisms, of these contagions, we know includes trade and the financial flows. In trade, we are liable to see more trade agreements but less trade. There will be more political will to break the stalemate that impeded trade agreements in the late part of the 1990s, but at the same time, there may be less flow in the world trading system, mostly for reasons that do not have to do with terrorist attacks and the war on terrorism.

But another important transmission belt is expectations; business and consumer confidence travels around the world, too. This is one of the least understood aspects of economic policy. We do not have a clue how to restore confidence, mainly because it depends on subtle, psychological signals of credibility and of political leadership. We lack rigorous knowledge of such things.

What we do know from the experience of the 1990s is that there are five variables at play in efforts to restore economic confidence.

First, one needs a credible policy framework, and one that can be sustained over time. It is better to have a mediocre economic policy that lasts than to have an

extraordinarily good economic policy that stands in doubt of surviving the next few months or year.

The second variable is the quality of the economic team. In that light, one has to be worried about the fact that a day doesn't go by without reading in the newspapers some scathing criticism of Secretary O'Neill and the economic team in general—or criticism of the chairman of the European Central Bank, for that matter.

Third is the politics. Countries may have everything right in terms of economic policy but the politics of the country can simply be too nasty to create confidence. Business and consumer confidence hinge on politics.

The fourth variable is the world. An economic team can do everything right, but the winds blowing outside of one's borders can still destroy economic confidence within them.

Finally comes the leadership. Some leaders around the world are more successful in inducing economic confidence than others.

[Schlesinger]: Let me link this presentation back to our previous discussions, if I may. We have talked about the definition of success and about what the American public expects in that regard. Clearly, success in the larger politico-military realm would tend to restore economic confidence. A failure to achieve any visible success, on the other hand, will further harm consumer confidence, which, as you say, is so critical a factor. So given the state of the international scene, there is a critical link between the policies that are adopted, including military policies, and whether or not the American public responds in such a way as to minimize the economic damage done by the September 11 attacks.

[Naím]: No; I think that the matter of policy sustainability is more important. Indeed, we can have military success and still not see economic confidence restored. If we succeed in taking out the Taliban and then go further, it could engender higher uncertainty because of the reactions. If U.S. "success" unleashes a further series of terrorist attacks again around the world, that is not going to help; that will further erode business confidence. In other words, military success could cause more instability, and thus undermine the economy further.

[Schlesinger]: Well, it's better to have success than not to have success. By the way, another policy that we seem to have jettisoned is the prevailing faith in the market. We are now in the process of what we used to call a bailout of the airline industry. We are seeing a new skepticism expressed about turning everything over to the market to determine outcomes. It may or may not be true that under normal conditions the market provides the most efficient allocation of resources, but right now it is plain that even many of those who fervently expressed support for total reliance on the marketplace up until September 11 have begun to modify those views.

[Posen]: As another card-carrying economist, I just wanted to echo three points that Moisés has made. First, September 11 is accelerating trends that were already there. Its direct economic effects are small, but that raises the issue of how the administration may wish to play it. Is it wise to play up the economic effects of the September 11 attacks and thereby lower the bar of what it is reasonable to expect, since this is, after all, a long-brewing recession? Or is it wiser to not encourage people to see long-term

trends and the events of September 11 as tied together so as to buy more room for play on the economic policy front? I tend toward the first option because I agree with Moisés that we risk an overreaction on the policy side.

Second, inflation is a worry, but concern about oil is not the main reason. When U.S. growth drops at an annualized rate of four percent, the effect of that on oil prices is enormous compared to almost any shortage. Short of a disastrous disruption of supply, that much negative growth is enough to swamp other effects. But there certainly is room to fear inflation from very aggressive monetary and fiscal policies.

Third, there is the reference to Malaysia. There has long been this double standard, where the rich economies are allowed to offset their problems but the poor ones are instead supposed to exacerbate their short-term pain by tightening during crisis. This debate may not come to a head now because many countries will focus instead on claiming a need for direct aid as front-line states in the war on terrorism. But eventually this debate will come.

[Schlesinger]: Let me clarify one thing, please. The IMF has been advised to move away from a policy of urging austerity on countries in which demand is shrinking and unemployment is rising. Did I hear you say that, in effect, they are still urging the same old policies?

[Posen]: It's not that they're still doing it, at least not very much. Stan Fisher tried to change the policy in his last year in office, but the perception lingers. Also, just yesterday, the IMF told Turkey that it needed additional fiscal belt tightening at a time when an enormous shortfall in growth this year has been projected—and this at a time when they are helping us militarily. So a real tension remains.

I have only three comments of my own to offer. One is that we need to be clear there are no real economic seeds to the September 11 attack. Yes, Egypt has an enormous number of poor people, yes, Pakistan and Afghanistan are poor, but so is sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. We should avoid a simplistic economic determinism which concludes that the poor people are the ones who attacked the United States. It's not true.

Not that economics doesn't matter, but it matters in other ways. The fascism of the 1930s arose in part from the resistance to change from the petite bourgeoisie in the society, not from the abject poor. The small landowners and the economic elites whose position is based on suddenly obsolete technology are the ones dispossessed by economic change. It is not surprising that young, fairly well-off and well-educated Arabs became terrorists as opposed to those from lower rungs of society. This is what we should expect in this context.

Second, let us talk for just a moment about Europe, and about Germany. In general, the Germans have been inclined to do better than anybody else in helping economically within an alliance context. The problem is on the two key countries that we really care about long term, Turkey and Russia. The Germans are uniquely positioned to be helpful, but at the moment they're being particularly unhelpful, more so on Turkey than on Russia. A senior CDU politician recently answered my plea that the alliance do something for Turkey by launching into a long explanation of why the Europeans can't admit Turkey to the EU. If this defensive response is typical, and I fear it is, then we have a lot to worry about on that score.

Third and finally, just as opportunities are being opened up by the reshuffling

of alliances on the political side, we have to think about opportunities on the economic side. Now, Bob Zoellick may be slightly over-playing his hand tactically, but he is right to push trade liberalization now. Still, we need to have something on the table—a compromise on the American anti-dumping position might be the best thing.

I favor, too, a free-trade-in-food offer for the world. It's not totally original, but just think of all the advantages: it forces Japan's major protectionist bloc to the back door; it forces the Europeans to move forward their integration with Eastern Europe by overcoming the Common Agricultural Policy obstacle; it provides market-based aid to the poor people of the world; and it helps front-line agriculture exporters like Egypt and Turkey, which are particularly important among the countries we should be trying to help.

[Schlesinger]: You're not the first who would want to run over the French farmer.

[Posen]: No, I'm not by any means. I just want to be the last.

[Stephen Moore*]: The impact of September 11 on the economy is not just psychological and it may not be so small. I'll just give you a few concrete examples of the impact on productivity. Right now at the borders if you want to bring a truck in with cargo, you're talking about waiting in line for five hours. It used to take 45 minutes. That is four and a half hours these truck drivers are just sitting in line, not driving. It's just one little anecdote about the reverberations all over the economy. Other examples are the fact that people couldn't drive their cars into Manhattan and had to wait at the tolls for two hours and the fact that I used to be able to leave my office at 18th and K and be on a shuttle to New York in 23 minutes, if I didn't go in rush hour. It's going to take me 23 minutes now just to get through the metal detectors. The security implications of what happened are going to have a really profound jolt on productivity.

[Naím]: I disagree. The concrete transactional consequences of the September 11 attack are of some significance, but they are very small compared to the large consequences of trends that were already in place. You can bet that the recent decrease of interest rates will have far more consequences. Your 23 minutes are nothing compared to the consequences that the lowering of interest rates will have on your own life, your own cash flow, your own economic situation. The economic impact of the September 11 attack has been estimated at about \$13 billion in private and government capital, but the transactional impact that was expected to be very significant—because everybody was concerned about the information loss and all that—has proven negligible. The consequences of September 11 are in people's attitudes and in terms of confidence.

[Schlesinger]: Can I drag Robin West into this conversation? A question that naturally arises with regard to the impact of whatever we do in the political-military realm has to do with energy. One thing I think is clear is that in the period ahead we're going to face additional volatility in energy markets. If we follow the recommendations that Richard Perle was putting out in the previous session, what we have assumed to be a gradual decline and weakness in the oil markets may not necessarily be the case. We

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may see instead a sudden shrinkage of supply associated with the disappearance of Iraqi production coupled with the unwillingness of Saudi Arabia to make it up.

[West]: We believe that there is going to be recession through the second quarter of next year, and that, as demand declines, OPEC will be sorely tested to keep its discipline. We suspect that they will pass this test, largely because there is really now an alliance between Iran and Saudi Arabia—and Venezuela and Mexico maintain a very good working relationship with both of them.

We believe that the bottom of the oil market, most likely in the second quarter of next year, will be something like 1975. We then believe that it will pick up again.

Life gets very complicated, however, because, as your question suggests, uncertainty in the war will translate into uncertainty in the oil market. If the United States hits Afghanistan, there will be no impact on the market. If we hit Iraq, there could be a blip, but the markets are accustomed to Iraq coming in and out. So as long as there isn't a long-term interruption in the Iraqi supply the market can operate. The market will react violently, however, against raids on Iran, and we believe also that the OPEC consensus to moderate prices will unravel if that happens.

As things stand, the United States is pressuring a lot of countries to help facilitate the war on terrorism. Lower oil prices are one means of facilitation and the OPEC countries are helping. They are going along with the politics. Moreover, it's much easier for Middle East countries to make concessions in oil policy than it is to make concessions with more obvious domestic implications. People don't turn out in the street and riot about oil policy.

That said, we estimate that the break-even point for Saudi Arabia—not Saudi Aramco, but to run the country, which is 90 percent dependent on oil revenues—is about \$21 a barrel. Now, the producing countries have fairly substantial foreign exchange reserves, so they can endure a bumpy period into next year. But for them to be able to operate on a stable basis, oil's got to stay at about \$20 or \$21, or above. The challenge, then, at least in the short term, is, if there are raids, to keep the OPEC producers more or less cooperating with U.S. policy.

A few other points, if I may. In terms of the oil markets, the big winner in all of this is Russia. Russia will have, if not a blank check, a pretty good line of credit, and it will see its influence in Central Asia increase, as well. Russia is now the world's second biggest oil producer, and it is a free rider on OPEC. So we see Russia as a major beneficiary in all of this.

The second point is that we may no longer be right to assume that any Saudi regime would feel obliged to sell a lot of oil. The conventional wisdom on the mixture of Middle East oil and politics was demonstrated by the Iranian Revolution. What are the mullahs going to do, it was correctly predicted, drink the oil? No: indeed they sell it into the market, just like the Shah did. But if people who are perfectly satisfied to live in caves and blow themselves up take over Saudi Arabia, then all bets are off. So one of the key questions going forward is really the stability of Saudi Arabia, and lots of people do not have a good feeling about what's going on there.

Finally, our view is that economics has been a factor in radicalizing people in the Middle East. The highest population growth rate in the world is in the Middle East, per capita GDP has been falling, and in the face of this the royal families or the generals have basically kept everything for themselves. There is an enormous disaffection in the middle class. So the problem is not abjectly poor people, nor is it just religious fanati-

cism. It is part political, and part of the political has economic roots.

[*Posen*]: If the hatred of America is largely due to the dislocations caused by globalization, if globalization really undercuts the have-nots at the expense of the haves and if the American version of globalization is a particularly pernicious form of that, then a backlash is not hard to understand. That's why you have to think creatively about using the global economic system to make clear that the United States is for development. Otherwise we will lose the rhetorical war very badly.

[*Garfinkle*]: A small question to Robin West and then a larger question to the economists in the room.

The small question: What will be the effect of a political cataclysm in Indonesia that would close the Strait of Malacca and the Lombok Strait in the context of a soft oil market? Nobody knows what the likelihood is of Indonesia going over the edge in the next year or so, but it's not zero.

[*West*]: Indonesia is in our loser column.

[*Garfinkle*]: Right, so if tanker rates and insurance rates go crazy should those straits be closed, how would that affect markets in general, especially in the Far East?

[*West*]: Well, right now there's a lot of crude oil around, and if we had to reroute the tankers—it's much longer, obviously—we could. We went through a tanker war before, and the effect on price was not huge. The straits could also be reopened. I agree that Indonesia, the largest Muslim country, is quite unstable, but that's a problem we can live with.

[*Garfinkle*]: I want to get back to September 11, with my larger question. When people talk about globalization, they're really talking about increased economic integration. That, in turn, has mainly to do with the application of certain technologies—mainly but not exclusively information technologies—to how production happens, to how financial flows happen, and it is aptly described as sort of a new structure, or at least a new trajectory of global economic activity over the past dozen years or so. How does what happened on September 11, by exposing the physical vulnerability of the United States—and theoretically also exposing the vulnerability of the cybernetic systems on which this new economic structure depends—affect the prospects for either the stability or the continued growth of the new global economic structure?

[*Maurice R. Greenberg**]: I understand what you are getting at, and I would say that the structures of global integration have not been much affected by the events of September 11. But I think it is a mistake to think of this structure as separate from the larger economic circumstances in which we find ourselves. The structure, important as it is, is just a pipeline for economic activity for the actual making, selling, transporting and servicing of commodities and manufactured goods.

*Maurice R. Greenberg is chief executive officer and chairman of the board of American International Group and serves as chairman of The Nixon Center. Mr. Greenberg was not physically present in Washington on October 4, but participated by way of remote technological intervention.

And there is no doubt that the global economy has taken a hard hit. There is a “domino effect” of negative activity in the economic sphere going on even as we speak. For example, tourism is way off, and suddenly off. More than 289,000 international trips have been cancelled by would-be Japanese travelers in the past thirty days alone. That has an enormous impact on the airline business, entertainment, hotels and dozens of related service industries. Moreover, times of uncertainty lead to deferred decisions. Investment will further decline, as will trade, and consumer purchases will slacken as well.

We also have to recognize that this latter phenomenon—what consumers will do with their money—is not just a matter of irrational fear. In the late 1980s and all through the 1990s, many middle class consumers relied on the equity they had in their homes to finance many purchases. Many have borrowed heavily against that equity. If housing prices decline, and there is some indication that that may happen, consumers are going to be naturally reluctant to extend themselves further. As has been widely noted, as well, the decline of the stock market in a society in which so many people are investors has a similarly constraining impact on consumer spending. People are afraid, yes—after all, this is the first time that large numbers of Americans have been killed on their own soil since December 1941, and the first time the capital has been struck since the War of 1812. But what consumers are doing, and are about to do, is not economically irrational.

[Garfinkle]: What can we say at this early stage about the impact economically outside of our borders? I am thinking particularly of the implications for the euro come January, and for the Chinese effort to deal with its state-owned industries in the context of entry into the WTO.

[Greenberg]: In general terms, it is clear that international trends that were already worrisome will be made even worse by what happened on September 11. In some countries this may make the difference between just scraping by and real damage. Argentina may be such a case. More specifically, with regard to Europe, the Europeans will not back off from making the euro the sole currency of the European Union. They still believe in driving political integration forward and they see economic union as the prerequisite for that. But it is clear that the hard times ahead will hurt the value of the euro; it will set back hopes that the euro might reach par with the dollar anytime soon.

As for China, I am not so pessimistic. We have to understand, first of all, that China, under any circumstances, would not have been able to adapt to all the WTO rules from the start. This is a process, a development, that will take a while. China has mountains to climb, and I believe that it is in our interest as well as theirs that they succeed. For the near term, China’s economic vulnerability to a contagion from what happened on September 11 is limited by its relative insularity. Four factors are most important.

First, China has a huge domestic market, so disruptions in trade and reductions in some exports will have only a limited impact. Second, China remains a manufacturing center for the world. It can make practically everything cheaper than it can be made anywhere else. That means that China will continue to attract foreign capital—from Taiwan, the United States, Europe and elsewhere. Third, and relatedly, China has very large foreign exchange reserves. Fourth, China has a non-convertible currency, so it does not have to worry about colliding international fiscal policies in the near future.

Also, we have to remember that, despite the significant problem China has with its state-owned industries, the Chinese think of their economy in terms of a single balance sheet. While many state-owned industries are a drag, and will cost a lot of money to transform into productive assets, China still grew at about seven percent last year. So one must keep this problem in context. As long as China can maintain good economic management, and enhance it, they will do alright.

[West]: I want to pick up on Adam Posen's point, because I really do think it's critical. Before September 11 we had the situation where, for the last couple of years, emerging markets were supposed to be characterized by higher risk but higher growth. But in the last couple of years the OECD was the high-growth/low-risk market, and the low-growth/low-risk market was in the developing world. And globalization was starting to be blamed for this. Now, once we get through the overt war-making phase of this campaign, people are going to ask about the inequities I've just mentioned. In that regard it bears note that while this administration team has a pretty strong political and military bench, on economics in general and developmental economics in particular, there's nobody on the bench at all. Something's got to happen there.

[Simes]: One final question: If we attack Afghanistan, does it make a difference if it is a big bang, or if it is protracted? How will it affect economic matters? Is there any difference?

[Na'im]: I have a hunch, as I said before, that there is a contradiction between trying to regain consumer confidence and trying to win the military battle. Imagine that for some reason the big bang military attack is postponed for six months, and that during those six months there is plenty of activity that undermines the Taliban. Imagine that, in fact, significant progress in the war against terrorism is made, to the point in which in some areas it's completely eradicated. But there is no big bang. Now, compare that to a big bang that generates a very strong reaction and other terrorist attacks. That would undermine consumer spending, investment spending, and the economy is going to slow down. But I understand, of course, that there is a psychological need to retaliate, to punish, and to raise the sense of impunity. But that alone won't help rebuild confidence if it touches off more terrorism.



Domestic Security Implications and Policies

[Garfinkle]: Some of you have been here from this morning; others have come and gone, so let me just note that we started talking about the effects and the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on foreign policy, then moved on to defense-related issues, then to economic implications, and now we come to the domestic impact. Now, we have already touched on aspects of the domestic impact in all three of the other sessions. It is inevitable that they would all bleed into this particular last session at least to some

extent, for the first front of this new war is New York and Washington. We will leave it up to Dr. Fred Iklé to give us guidance as to how to maneuver ourselves into talking about the security of our own home territory.

[Fred Charles Iklé]:* With your permission, I will focus mainly on response mechanisms and other defense- and security-related activities within the borders of the United States—and particularly those on the borders themselves.

In strategic terms, in terms of our defense, what has befallen us has been a wake-up call, and a wake-up call to which a response can be a good thing. Now, whether we respond to it properly or not is still an open question.

In a proper and effective response the list of things to do is long. It has been outlined many times in many excellent congressional reports and studies, in commission studies, the Hart-Rudman Commission report being the most recent one, in Defense Department studies and in Defense Science Board findings. Starting in the mid-1990s these ideas have been developed, vetted, listed as recommendations—and then filed away.

Now that we have had a wake-up call on September 11, we are looking at the list of recommendations again, and many hold up well after the event, which is remarkable. The question is, what are the obstacles to action? There are several, but I think the most important ones concern arguments about legal issues.

In my view, for example, it is clear that, for the defense of the United States and its possessions, the Defense Department—even though it's called the Defense Department—ought to play a role in this defense. The last administration trimmed back the homeland security role assigned to DOD. Despite some sound initiatives on homeland defense, the Defense Department stepped back, changing its homeland defense role to “civil support”—the provision of tents and biscuits and tea and things like that to civil authorities at the state and local level.

The explanation given for this was that DOD was properly sensitive about public concerns that it not step into domestic issues. They cited *Posse Comitatus*, which goes back to the Civil War, and other legal constraints. It turns out that there is absolutely nothing to all of these legal constraints. Anything that the Defense Department and military ought to do, or that the president would want the military to do, is not prevented by our Constitution or by our laws. The truth is that the Defense Department and the Army are not equipped to do domestic security and intelligence and they have not been eager to get involved with it. DOD is not interested in or able really to judge and arrest people. The local and state police and the FBI can do that.

But it is curious that for so many years that screen of legal impediments has served so well, for we now hear quite clearly from Secretary Rumsfeld that homeland defense is an important mission for DOD and no one disagrees, or raises legal impediments. I wouldn't be surprised if there were soon a CINC—a Commander-in-Chief—eventually assigned to the U.S. or to North America as a whole. It's not absolutely essential, but it would carry a certain advantage in resource allocation. An initial benefit from such a change in the Defense Department's role in homeland defense would be more realistic, richer exercises from which we can learn a lot and which will build up our capabilities.

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But there are other funny legal arguments of a different kind. Let me tick off a few examples. We show our driver's licenses when we go to the airport, and after various checks we are pronounced okay. As you all know, however, driver's licenses can be obtained with easily forged documents. A study was suggested to Congress on how to make documents that are less easily forged. Only a study was proposed, not any requirement to issue such documents. Congress rejected the study in order to stop "bad things" at the beginning, before they're even studied. And that went over quite well because we are a country where we like individual liberty, freedom, and a national ID card sounds horrible. It evokes all kind of bad images from the worst aspects of the 20th century. So it is almost mandated by law that ID cards have to be made in such a way that they can be forged.

Another item in the actual existing legal structure—not the imagined legal structure such as a Posse Comitatus—that makes homeland defense more difficult is illustrated by the response to the airline security issue. Why the rush to help the airlines? The answer is fear of liability, fear of lawsuits. It was so that the airlines would not go under from liability suits filed against them that Congress cobbled together this bailout. Indeed, as people started looking into the matter, they found that the payments for the families of those unfortunate people who died on the four airplanes are very large. By contrast, for the soldiers in our volunteer army who risk their lives, their families would get considerably smaller payments. Others in different situations, even different terrorist acts in which family members are killed, will get even less. Obviously, people have mixed feelings about all this, but the airline bailout was pressed into legislative action because of our tort laws.

Another example of our tort law situation that may handicap preparedness against terrorism in our territory has to do with vaccination. The pharmaceutical industry keeps away from vaccination work also mostly because of the liability risks. The U.S. government finally managed to secure a contract on a very frightening potential biological terrorism item—smallpox—but it had to get a British company to take the contract (which now has a U.S. subsidiary) because no U.S. company wished to assume the liability risks.

In the last few weeks, we have heard all kinds of scare stories about potential biological warfare. For the more distant future, it is scary. In the near-term future, however, the effective use of biological toxins for mass-casualty terrorism is probably a remote possibility—probably. But given the evolution in genetic engineering, it could become very scary maybe ten or twenty years down the road. So it is good that the United States and its allies have the strongest pharmaceutical capability in the world. In North America, Europe and Japan is probably 95 to 99 percent of the best bioscience capacity in the world. But to get industry to work on this we have to overcome not just anti-trust laws, which is probably easy, but also this liability issue. People will remember what happened to the manufacturer of Agent Orange twenty years after they were asked to produce it for the military in Vietnam.

These are serious examples. Others verge on the humorous. The INS was ordered by Congress to have ID cards and fingerprint scanning for Mexicans who can cross our border legally on a daily or weekly basis. We produced these cards, and then Congress cut off the money for the machines to read them. Very funny.

New York City built an emergency bunker to manage crisis operations for 13 million people. Where did they put it? On the 23rd floor of the World Trade Center. Not so funny.

Legal restrictions also affect wiretap issues. I think some of these will be reduced very soon. The wake-up call has moved us to relax these unnecessary restrictions.

It is important to recognize that such legal adjustments do not put our civil liberties at risk. Our civil liberties are most at risk when they are naked to our enemies, so that a really bad event impels people to reach out for martial law, which is not necessary, doesn't make sense, and would really damage our civil liberties. The best way to protect civil liberties is to be prepared to cope with the modern world to better buttress our defenses, and that means working on things that are now inhibited by our liability laws and by tort law practices.

So, as I say, we need to see September 11 as a wake-up call to prepare ourselves so that something much worse can be prevented.

[Garfinkle]: When we discussed military matters earlier today, one opinion put forth was that whatever we do with regard to homeland security—however much we might spend, however sagacious our attempt to reorganize, however we might reform the tort laws—that there is a limit as to how effective homeland defense can ever be, especially homeland defense that would not involve betraying our values and thus do the work of terrorists for them. The argument was made that if we really want to deal with this problem effectively, we have to go to the terrorists, to the networks and to the states that allow them support and haven. How would you see the balance between homeland defense and action abroad?

[Ikél]: Nobody could argue that this can be a purely defensive strategy. The defensive side is the weak part of what we can do. The strong part is the offensive side. But it is a mistake to see these parts of a complete strategy as separate. They interact in interesting ways. For example, the more hurdles we put in the way of an attack designed to bring destruction to our country, the greater the effort required to do so. And the greater the effort of the attackers, the better the chance for our intelligence to discover them before a plot goes operational. If one guy can do a terror act all by himself, our intelligence people cannot find him. If it takes an operation of hundreds of people, there's a much better chance. That is really one important benefit of defense, not to give you a fool-proof or totally tight protection, but to force up the level of the attack so that we can detect it. Then you go offensive on it.

[Morton Halperin]:* I agree with Fred's basic point: this is a wake-up call, and we need to take it. But in fact there are no legislative restrictions on intelligence or law enforcement agencies that have anything to do with this problem. For example, the legislation that came out of the Senate Intelligence Committee directs the FBI to share information with the CIA. But in truth that Committee understands that the problem is not that there are legal restrictions on the ability of the FBI to tell the CIA what it learns, but there are cultural restrictions within the organizations.

Beyond that, the wake-up call we need most is the one which tells us that we need structures consistent with the threats we face. When the Cold War began, Truman properly said that we cannot fight the Cold War with the structures we inherited from the pre-World War II period. But we have been fighting the threats of the post-Cold War

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period with the structures of the Cold War in a way that is totally inappropriate. Fred cited the Hart-Rudman recommendations for homeland defense, and he was right to do so. Putting a man in the White House to groom him for higher office is not what the Hart-Rudman proposal was all about. It urged us to create a homeland security agency.

We also need to create a new intelligence structure that deals with this problem. Neither the FBI nor the CIA have the culture or the capacity or the interest to deal with the international terrorist problem. We need a new institution, which will raise many civil liberties issues. But we need to deal with them, because until we have an institution geared to this problem, we will not deal with it in a serious way.

The truth is that we have today a clandestine intelligence service, most of whose agents are undercover in embassies because they think their task is to recruit people in the Soviet government. They don't understand that you don't recruit agents in terrorist organizations by having people in embassies under official cover. Meanwhile, they rarely try to penetrate the terrorist groups because they don't want to ask their bosses for permission to recruit people with bad human rights records, because they thought their bosses would say no. Well, if we have people who are scared of their bosses so much that they won't go and say, "We have a potential agent in a terrorist organization who's got a bad human rights records, is it okay?", then there's something wrong with the culture of the institution.

Meanwhile, the FBI is in the business of investigating crime. It is not in the business either of preventing or disrupting terrorism or of analyzing information pertinent to it. And so we have two agencies, both of which have intense cultures totally unsuited to the task. Moreover, when a suspicious character crosses the border, we're supposed to switch agencies. That may work for some kind of things where the problem is on one side of the border or the other. It obviously doesn't work for this kind of thing. The FBI spent the last eight years trying to get its agents that do counter-terrorism into foreign embassies. Well, it's now clear that it sent them to the wrong place.

In short, we need a whole new set of institutions to deal with these problems. That is a very hard task. It requires strong presidential leadership, and I hope that when the President and his principal advisors turn from dealing with the immediate problem, that they *will* take on this task, because if we don't change the institutions, we cannot solve the problem. Fiddling with the laws won't make any difference if our institutions have neither the interest nor the capability to deal with the problem.

[Ikél]: When the President first mentioned the appointment of Governor Ridge, I thought now the step will be taken to create an agency or a department that will put together FEMA, the intelligence coordination, Coast Guard and so on. But, to put it kindly, the news about the role of Governor Ridge is not encouraging. Starting a whole new agency takes a lot of time, and we can't get people just overnight to staff such an agency. It is a worthy goal, but for now I would be happy with further reduction of the barrier between the FBI and the CIA. That is critical.

It is also worth noting that the reason creating new structures is hard is that as important as the legal impediments are the congressional impediments. There's no committee for homeland security. That responsibility is split over a number of committees in the Senate and the House. Here we have all these entities, the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Patrol, in the health area we have CDC, the Public Health Service, NIH, HHS, and what-have-you. With all of the vested interests involved we cannot even form an iron triangle because the corner in Congress is missing. It's very hard to get going on a new

organizational structure. If you had a committee in Congress with influence on appropriations, then maybe, over time, the iron triangle would form and something could be built from it.

[*Simes*]: Institutions are very important, procedures are very important, but we also need to change our attitudes and priorities. How did this disaster take place? Well, of course, they used the planes and were willing to commit suicide. But first they had to get here, and our first line of defense—our visa offices, and our immigration centers—clearly failed. Anyone who is familiar with them—and I, unlike some of you, was only on the receiving end—can tell you that they are just not working. If you come to a visa office in Moscow, you discover that the vast majority of people who come there to apply for a visa don't even talk to an American. They talk to Russian police. I don't want to criticize the State Department, because the State Department doesn't have the money to do this right. But the bottom line is that changes need to be made, and we can make them. We *can* spend enough on our visa offices: we *can* increase their prestige, making it a promising career track. We can change our attitudes to immigration work from what we had three weeks before when we were blindly celebrating diversity.

If we want to deal with this problem defensively, defense has to start at the U.S. border, and we have to develop procedures. It takes money, but it also takes a change in attitude to make crossing the border illegally much more difficult.

[*Garfinkle*]: Just as a P.S. to this: of the roughly 485 people arrested since September 12, about 145 are in jail because of immigration violations. I don't know the breakdown of the immigration violations, but I do know that of the six or seven people who were jailed after the 1993 World Trade Center attack, all but two of them were lapsed asylum seekers in this country. In other words, they had come seeking asylum, had been rejected for asylum but had not been deported; they were still in the country pending all sorts of legal procedures. Now, there was a fix to this problem in the Congress in 1996, to make the asylum law somewhat tighter so that it was less abusable. But just a couple of months ago, Senator Pat Leahy began an effort called "Fix '96", essentially to make it harder to deport anyone refused asylum. I hope Senator Leahy will now change his mind about "Fix '96."

[*Simes*]: Just to make one empirical point. If you come to New York and talk to Russians—and there are thousands and thousands of them there—they will tell you all kinds of horror stories about how difficult it is for them to adjust in America. But I have never heard a single person say that he is being deported or that a member of his family is being deported or a friend is being deported. The deportation of people who overstay their visas, unless they do something very obvious, just doesn't take place. It's very easy to stay in this country as long as you wish.

[*Kondracke*]: Is it not a fact that Mohammed Atta's tourist visa had expired? And he traveled to Spain and all over the place, came back to this country, went through our immigration—our border checks—went out again, he came back, and nobody ever bothered to say, "Hey, your visa is expired. You can't come in here."

[*Ikle*]: Yes, it is a fact. I think this is an area that straddles bigger political aspects of the Western democracies. We have all seen the pictures of the people who claim to be asy-

lum seekers at the French side of the channel tunnel. They're comfortable in France but would prefer to be in England, and there are many ways to get through the channel tunnel. Now, the reason why British authorities can't do much once asylum seekers are on the British side is the Asylum Convention, which was happily agreed to in reaction to the horrors of World War II. The expectation at the time was that it would be for 10,000 asylum seekers from the Soviet Union and maybe a few other bad places. Now, of course, it has acquired a much larger momentum and a different coloration. But it is now deeply entrenched, and acting contrary to the asylum laws in Europe will put you before the European Court, and you're likely to lose. In fact, there have been several cases where the Brits tried to tighten things, but the European Court said that Britain would violate the asylum law of 1952.

So these things are woven into the fabric of the post-World War II democratic societies. They have, for noble reasons, strong support among the elites, especially in this country for obvious reasons—our tradition of immigration. But if you ask the public, depending on how you ask the question, you get 60 to 80 percent who want to tighten things up. But that doesn't affect the elite.

[Michael Barone]:* I am finding myself more in support of what Mort Halperin said, that somehow we need a new agency and a new institutional culture. My amateur study of government agencies suggests that the culture of the agency starts early and is then perpetuated for a very long time—we only need mention J. Edgar Hoover, the EPA, the SEC and so forth. They have been the same kind of agencies for twenty, thirty, sixty, seventy years, and they cannot easily change. So perhaps this is an opportunity to create new structures, and that leads to my other observation.

We have been talking about what to do with all these immigrants and asylum seekers. It is fairly obvious, for starters, that there are some possibilities for tightening up on people who hold temporary visas. We can't expect to have 100 percent recognition of these people, but we could institute a system of better identification cards. The Mexican government voter identification card is much stronger than anything we have with our holograms, photographs, fingerprints. Everybody in Mexico on election night has either a black thumb or a forefinger, because they have to be fingerprinted when they go to the polls. Technologically, we can do that.

I don't think that this country is capable of shutting down mass immigration at this point, but the fact that we have people crossing the Arizona desert to work in hotels in Phoenix is not a threat to the national security. Those are not the people that drove those planes into the World Trade Center. These crazy proposals of recent days to close our borders for a year are just that: crazy. That's a way of closing off a large part of our economy, and in a free society we really cannot sustain an immigration policy that is wildly out of whack with the workings of the marketplace.

[Carl Hampe]:* I agree that shutting down the borders is fanciful and impractical. But an enhanced screening of people who enter before they are given a visa by the State Department is required. Unfortunately, there is no way in the current culture, where the consular work at the State Department is perceived as the lowest level of Foreign

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*Carl Hampe is counsel at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison, and a specialist on immigration law.

Service officer work and where the budgets are so inadequate, that such an enhancement can be made. The consular function is viewed as commerce facilitation rather than as defending the security of the United States. And perhaps pre-September 11 that wasn't an irrational perspective for these people to take. But it is now.

This can be fixed, but the trickier thing is the other half, which is making it so that if you come to the United States and your lack of a secure document means you're incapable of doing anything here—going to school, getting an apartment, working—that will make the value of your coming here with a fraudulent document much lower. And the only way to address that is through some form of secure national identification.

[Garfinkle]: Very unlikely to happen.

[Ikél]: Mr. chairman, I agree with your forecast that this won't happen. I would argue with Mort that, desirable as it may be to have an agency for homeland security, that will not happen either. Others may have different forecasts here.

[Doris Meissner]:* Well, a lot of assertions have been made about the immigration system, and there are certainly a lot of things that need to be done about it. But we ought not to be talking about things that in fact are not legitimate issues. So I would just raise a couple of them.

We have talked about the asylum system. The asylum system in this country is not a problem; as someone said, there was a major fix made in 1996. It *was* a problem at the time of the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993. It got enormous criticism, correctly, because people filed applications and waited for years and nothing happened. But since 1996 the asylum system has become probably the strongest of the immigration systems. It does what you are talking about. It does embody a value system in our society as well as in other Western societies that I think we would all want to protect.

[Ikél]: Do you think it's stronger than in European countries?

[Meissner]: Absolutely. And it's one of the few decision systems that uses biometrics, fingerprints, as part of the application process so that you're certain from the start that the people who are applying are who they say they are, and so forth. So some things *have* gotten fixed along the way, lessons have been learned, and they're incorporated in the way that the government operates.

I also think that this notion of just entirely remaking the government over issues like this is just not practical. Some discrete things need attention. Some of them need to really be rethought fundamentally. But that's a lot different from trying to create whole new agencies that involve major organizations that have established cultures, and not just established cultures, but whole statutory bases for their existence. Maybe new structures will emerge over the course of the next 15, 20 years, but it would be wasting time and effort, and create more controversy than is productive, to go after that sort of thing now when there are other very real and important things that can be done.

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One of these concerns is the visa problem. Consulates are not only understaffed, it's the wrong organizational model in terms of what we now face. The State Department has been on a starvation diet for the last ten or fifteen years because the Congress doesn't like those pinstriped suit diplomats. And I know very well, because at INS I was in the same appropriation package and we benefited from a lot of the money that didn't go to State, but that was not smart. This is a system that starts overseas where visas are given and then works through borders and into the interior of the country; it has to be viewed that way and it's got to be funded that way. The visa function has to be thought of as a much more professional task. For instance, Mexico only gives immigrant visas at a couple of consulates. They do non-immigrant visas at other consulates and channel the people who are applying so that they're going to the places where the staff expertise exists that can handle it properly. We need to do something similar; that would be tops on my list.

We can fix our ports-of-entry problem too, and we have to. It would do no good to put the Border Patrol in a new homeland defense agency. They have nothing to do with admitting people to the country. The ports-of-entry admit people to the country—those inspectors at JFK, Boston Logan, Miami International. Now, Customs and INS decide what's going to be an international airport, and there are cities all over this country that want to have international airports, because it's a big plum in prestige even if it's only one flight a day. How in the world are we supposed to have expert inspection staffs if we do things like that? But the local Chamber of Commerce wants that status, and so Peoria now has an international airport. We need to think these things through so that we can function in a serious and professional way.

When all is said and done, too, we have got to have those names. We have to know who to be looking for from the databases, which happen to be very well-integrated databases right now. It is true that in terms of FBI and CIA and that sort of thing that law enforcement information is not well-integrated. But the border information—the lookout information from Customs, State Department, INS, and if you can just get the FBI and the CIA to give you the doggone names—the integration and the software and all that sort of thing works well.

In short, all these things can be done if it is simply made a higher priority, which brings me to the question of how to organize the government to do all of this?

I think we should be looking at the NSC model. The czar model has all kinds of bad baggage with it because of the drug war (even though the drug czar has probably been more effective than he is given credit for). Look, when the NSC—and, Mort, you may disagree with this—but from an agency standpoint, when the NSC decides something and issues a decision (an NSTD), that's law. That is what sets the intelligence gathering priorities, that's what makes the list for what is going to be collected, and so forth. We at the INS had to work like crazy to get international alien smuggling onto the collection list, but it got on. And once it got on, the Coast Guard changed its mission in order to deal with alien smuggling, which is why the Chinese boats stopped coming to the West Coast. When an NSTD finally gets born, agencies change their behavior.

And the National Security Advisor is never questioned in terms of power where access is concerned; there is a statutory coordinating body at the right hand of the president that does not have line authority over Executive Branch departments, but that does set the direction for the government and for the intelligence community. My sense is that on homeland security we need to create a parallel internal oversight structure, possibly one that is statutory. (I think it would be very good for Congress to pronounce on this in

terms of making the Ridge position a cabinet position, but with some kind of machinery that allows for the coordination.) And that, it seems to me, is much more doable in the near term than some kind of a total Kennedy School of Government remake. It's better to get the existing cultures to work for you, rather than to simply throw them out.

[*Leiken*]: Back to borders: they do matter but we need to look at the right ones. Our foreign policy has been deeply involved with our immigration policy over Mexico during the past six to nine months. But we need to be looking first toward Canada. It's very easy for these radical fundamentalists to come in through Canada. There's a large Muslim community; they can get landed refugee status very easily, and then disappear into the underbrush. And, of course, our northern border is notoriously sparse in terms of supervision. That said, keeping in mind that bin Laden has been a step ahead of us most of the time, we need to look at Mexico, too. Although there are no Muslim communities in Mexico to speak of, there are four or five major terrorist organizations in Mexico. So far they have no known ties with Muslim radicals, nor do the Colombian terrorists have ties with Islamic radicals. But we ought to be looking at that.

Of course, terror organizations and drug organizations are alive in Colombia. So far they haven't been alive in Mexico. But should they use the existing smuggling facilities, there is one thing to keep in mind: Mexican drug gangs now control the methamphetamine industry in this country. They have set up methamphetamine factories inside the United States. One can only imagine the other kinds of factories that might be set up if they join with Islamist terrorists.

[*Mark Kirkorian**]: People have periodically discussed removing the visa issue function from the State Department. It might be worth following the asylum core model from the asylum reforms and create a visa core within the INS, and simply have the INS process visas. And then you have a seamless process overseas, at the border and in the country.

[*Garfinkle*]: I want to pose one question that goes back to the very beginning of the day. Some of you were here this morning when Charles Krauthammer opened up the discussion. One of the things that Charles predicted, but that we haven't talked about very much, is that the general attitudes that Americans take toward foreign policy will change. We will tend to shift away from the sort of ameliorist and idealist Wilsonian characteristics and become more narrowly realpolitik. Dick Betts wrote an article in *Foreign Affairs* a couple of years ago in which he said that the threat of mass-casualty terrorism ought to persuade the United States to define its interests in a narrower way than the sort of expansive "We are the indispensable nation" manner in which the Clinton Administration was inclined to speak.* Is this sort of retrenchment likely? Could we even become more isolationist in spirit if more attacks strike us over a protracted period?

[*Iklé*]: If more attacks happen here as well as abroad, that itself would drive us to selectively be more engaged, not isolationist. This fear about isolationism is greatly exaggerated. For one, the powerful business organizations constantly drive us in the opposite

*Mark Kirkorian is executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies.

*Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction", *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 1998).

direction, involvement with China and also the spirit of all these NGOs. So I don't know why people fear the United States becoming isolationist.

[Halperin]: I don't think the danger is isolationism. I do think that in a few months we're going to have a debate about which policies of the United States led to this attack. It is clear it's not our democracy. Nobody in Costa Rica worries about being subject to terrorist attack. It is policies of the United States, and I think we're going to have a debate about whether it's our policy on Israel, whether it's our policy on Iraq, whether it's our policy toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt. We're going to get a debate in this country about whether those policies continue to make sense. And I don't know which ones people are going to pick on, and I have no idea which ones are right, but I think we're going to have that debate.

[Garfinkle]: Well, I can guess which ones will come up, but the Wahhabi fundamentalists like bin Laden really hate the United States not because of what it does but because of what it is. There are no policy changes we could possibly undertake, or any gestures we could possibly make, or any words we could possibly say, that would get them to stop hating us. Now it is true that there are some things we do that create a kind of political stew in various countries that the core groups of terrorists feed off of. But I do think that this idea—that since somebody attacked us we must have done something to deserve it—should be rejected as a premise.

[Halperin]: I didn't say that it was because we did something wrong. I said that people are going to argue about which of the things that we did may have led to this kind of attack. And people are then going to debate whether there are things that we should continue to do or change.

[Lionel H. Olmer]:* I spent ten days in Asia from just before September 11 until September 20, and I can tell you that not a single foreigner I spoke with believes anything other than that the attack was a consequence of U.S. Middle East policy. And when I said, "Are you crypto-speaking about American policy toward Israel?", they said, "Oh, no, no, not exactly." When I came back I tried that on several businessmen at fairly senior levels in the United States, and the answer I got was much more direct: "Well, don't *you*?"

Now, the second thing I want to say is that I give the administration some time to reflect on precisely how to deploy these magnificent men and women around the world in ships and airplanes that are simply the marvel of technology—most of which are vulnerable to a cheap couple of hundred-dollar Stinger missile that we provided, by the way, and lost count of. I believe that the American people, too, as a whole, are willing to give the administration this time to reflect on how best to fix the problem. But if there is a repeat of any dimension, it doesn't need to be more than 5,000 lives and the destruction of the monument to capitalism, as the WTC has been described, but something much smaller—I think the pressure on the government will be and should be, "Do something." And do something isn't to appoint a very handsome governor of a state to a visible position and say, "Go to it. You're now the czar, but by the way, you don't have any

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budgetary authority and, by the way, you don't have any command authority over the agencies that really either control the situation or the agencies that provide information as to what should be done." Nobody wants to hear that. We don't want to see boxes on a piece of paper, organizational charts. They want something done and I happen to subscribe to that view—do something.

[Barone]: In response to Charles' remark, it seems that one of the changes afoot is that Americans are more willing to take casualties than almost anybody in our media thinks. They are more willing to inflict collateral damage, too. We've seen some collateral damage at home now, and we have some idea of what that is like. Many of the constraints that people not only in the Clinton Administration but in the first and second Bush Administrations felt that they were operating under in foreign policy or in military policy probably never applied as much as they thought. But clearly they don't now. Americans will have some considerable staying power on this. The red nation and the blue nation have become the red, white and blue nation. We just have a few putrid cesspools in certain universities, but otherwise we're a red, white and blue country. If we go back to the years of World War II we recall that Americans were willing to endure long periods of time without flashy victories. The month after Pearl Harbor was not a month of American triumphs, neither was the month after that, or the month after that or the month after that. People were willing to invest considerable time and take considerable risks to achieve victory, and I think that's not an entirely false analogy for where we are today.

[Iklé]: Yes, but we have to keep in mind that fighting terrorism, this civilian attack in the United States, is awfully complicated and difficult and it is something we haven't faced before. In World War II, we could partially align what we had learned in World War I and before: you go overseas and fight the enemy. Here we have a far more complex situation that has to do with new technology.

Let me make this concrete with one example, in my view, the scariest one—smuggled nuclear weapons. It is possible to detect such weapons if we have the equipment that laboratories are now working on, but we need masses of that equipment. We have to be well organized to use it, and so on. And even that might fail, because such weapons can be brought into the country in different ways that we are not prepared for. It would just take one or two of these beasts to totally upset our structure.

Biological weapons, we know, are very hard to detect before they do enormous damage. Maybe in twenty years the pharmaceutical industry will find a solution—maybe not. And so it goes on. And we must remember that the precise nature of the attack we actually suffered on September 11 was barely conceived by any of our experts and professionals in counter-terrorism. There are so many different ways of attacking, because the enemy is not trying to conquer territory like Hitler did, or like Saddam Hussein did in Kuwait. So you push an aggressor out of the conquered territory; it's a simple problem. This, however, is a very difficult problem unless we want to be like North Korea. Presumably, we don't.

[Garfinkle]: On behalf of The Nixon Center and *The National Interest*, and of our symposium chairman, Jim Schlesinger, I want to thank Dr. Iklé and everyone who participated in today's discussions. It has been a stimulating, if very sobering, day. □

An End to Nonsense

Owen Harries

SOMEONE—was it Nietzsche? Henry James? Lionel Trilling?—has observed that those who lack the imagination of disaster are doomed to be surprised by the world. Until September 11 such a lack was very prevalent in the Western world. While it was particularly characteristic of liberals, with their belief in progress and perfectibility, it was by no means confined to them. Indeed, in retrospect, the emergence of a species of optimistic conservatives—a term that until our time had been close to being an oxymoron—may come to be seen as a distinguishing feature of the last decades of the 20th century.

In any case, many people of many political and temperamental stripes were taken by surprise by the awful disaster of September 11. That they were was clearly evidenced by the widespread insistence that the acts of terror in Manhattan and Washington marked the beginning of a new era, that the world would never be the same again, that everything was changed and changed utterly.

With all due respect, this was and is nonsense. It reflects not the reality of the matter but the difficulty that intellectuals

habitually have in distinguishing between the state of their minds and the state of the world. It also reflects what the philosopher John Anderson termed the “parochialism of the present”, a condition resulting from a combination of ignorance of history and an egotistical insistence on exaggerating the importance of events that more or less directly involve oneself. Horrifying and atrocious as the acts of terror were, it should be remembered that they have happened at a time when people who experienced the Somme and Verdun, the Holocaust and Hiroshima, are still alive.

Far from marking a sharp break with the world in which we have been living for the last decade, this act of terror was an event with which that world had long been pregnant, and there had been many urgent and well-informed warnings of its imminent delivery. Nor were the reasons for such warnings hard to discern. Once the discipline imposed by the superpower rivalry of the Cold War ended; once the authority and control of many nation-states began to be seriously undermined by transnational and subnational forces; once the movement of people became easy and virtually unmonitored in an increasingly “borderless” world—and all these things happened in the last ten years—the opportunity for terror increased greatly. And as globalization—which is to say, the Westernization of the world—proceeded rapidly, producing

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both fear and powerful resentment as it undermined traditional cultures and authority, the motive for terrorism also strengthened greatly.

The point has often been made that terrorism is the weapon of the weak, of the losers. In this case, terrorism has been employed by members of some (not all) other civilizations who—on religious and cultural grounds, and because the bases of their authority and power are threatened—furiously reject and oppose the triumph of Western ideas, values, institutions and enterprise. Unable either to compete with the West or to hold it at bay, they vent their hatred and despair by terror. Again, the likelihood of this happening was clearly foreseen, notably, though by no means exclusively, by Samuel Huntington.

What happened in September was not that the world changed in some fundamental manner, but that, in the most dramatic way, a group of ideas and assumptions about the world that had come to prevail among large sections of Western elites was shown to be at best inadequate and at worst utterly false. First and foremost there was the assumption that the world was moving rapidly and surely toward a benign, market-driven interdependence; that a positive-sum game was in progress in which all would benefit and friction would be smoothed away. With the triumph of the West, too, there came the belief that liberal democracy was destined to triumph rapidly and more or less universally. (As his views first appeared in this magazine, I should emphasize that this was *not* what was argued by Francis Fukuyama in his justly famous “End of History?” essay. He allowed for long holdouts against democratization in substantial parts of the world. Still, the reception given to his views and their subsequent vulgarization no doubt reflected and contributed to the attraction of the more simplistic version.)

Speaking of simplistic, there was also the complementary belief that traditional power politics had become old hat. As that human weathervane, William Jefferson Clinton, proclaimed, “the cynical calculation of pure power politics simply does not compute. It is ill-suited to the new era.” It was asserted that “geo-economics” (a term that first saw the light of day in this magazine, incidentally¹) had allegedly displaced geopolitics, and that economic wealth and “soft” power were replacing violence and coercion as the ultimate currency of “the global village.”

There was, too, the long-standing liberal belief, given a new lease on life by the end of the Cold War, that enmity between peoples was the result of misunderstanding and ignorance rather than of genuine conflicts of interest. Once these were removed by education and increasing contact in a multicultural world, it was assumed, harmony would prevail.

In the United States the ideas outlined above usually go under the label “Wilsonianism”, after the President who so vigorously promoted them. They are not, then, exactly newly minted and, indeed, they were already pretty shop-soiled when Wilson took them up. The “universal interdependence of nations” was proclaimed by Marx and Engels in their *Communist Manifesto* of 1848. And long before that the belief that proximity and interaction would promote harmony was sufficiently prevalent for Rousseau to feel obliged to contradict it, observing of the states of Europe in the 18th century that their condition was such that they “touch each other at so many points that no one of them can move without jarring all the rest; their variances are all the more deadly, as their ties are more closely woven.” As

¹Edward N. Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics”, *The National Interest* (Summer 1990).

for the alleged obsolescence of power politics, that is a belief that was widely subscribed to a century ago, on the eve of the Great War.

Especially at a time when American faith in these ideas has received a body blow, it is worth bearing in mind the remarkable durability of such notions. Unfortunately, there is truth in the remark that a truly bad idea never really dies, and in Frank Johnson's observation that "Utopia is always an important country, always one of the Great Powers." One can predict with great confidence that these beliefs will survive the present setback and before long will again be advanced as exciting new truths.

But for the immediate future the Wilsonian set of assumptions is not going to be convincing or useful. The belief that conflict is due to ignorance and misunderstanding has been exposed yet again for the nonsense it is. (In today's world, no two groups understand each other more fully than the Israelis and the Palestinians, unless they be the Protestants and Catholics of Northern Ireland.) Far from being adequate for dealing with Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, "soft" power was partly instrumental in creating them; military power of the old-fashioned kind, as well as intelligence and technical knowledge, which have always been important sources of power, are needed to destroy them.

BUT IF Wilsonianism is at least temporarily discredited, what will replace it? Well, there is another foreign policy tradition that has figured prominently in American history, one that has been brilliantly delineated by Walter Russell Mead: the "Jacksonian tradition."² Some historians have taken issue with Mead for using the Jacksonian label, but what is important in this context is not the label, but the substance. The mindset that Mead describes is immedi-

ately recognizable and convincing as that possessed by a large segment of the American people. It is populist, not elitist; characteristic more of men who drive pickup trucks and Harley Davidson motorcycles than of college professors or journalists. (One of the most moving sights in Washington is that of the mile-long parade of motorcycles on Memorial Day, carrying leather-jacketed, tattooed men and their wives from all over the country to pay tribute at the Vietnam War Memorial. It is usually sparsely attended by the capital's residents and scarcely written about by journalists.) It is a mindset that is unabashedly patriotic and America-centered rather than cosmopolitan. It regards honor as important and is unforgiving toward those it considers to have behaved dishonorably. It suffers not at all from a sense of guilt or angst, and it does not subscribe to the view that truth and morality are relative concepts.

Jacksonianism is normally preoccupied with American domestic affairs and is reluctant to get involved abroad. But once circumstances force it to become involved, it is determined to prevail; and it is prepared to be ruthless in order to do so. It is prepared to bear pain, and to inflict it, for the sake of causes it believes in. As Mead puts it, "Jacksonians see war as a switch that is either 'on' or 'off.' They do not like the idea of violence on a dimmer switch." Jacksonians do not think much in terms of exit strategies or negotiated peace settlements.

People of this persuasion and temperament are not necessarily callous or cruel, but as between humanitarian obligations and the security of their country they have a clear sense of priorities. They would readily subscribe to the view of

²Mead, "The Jacksonian Tradition and American Foreign Policy", *The National Interest* (Winter 1999/2000).

things once enunciated by Dr. Johnson in, as it happens, the year the United States was born: "If a madman were to come into this room with a stick in his hand, no doubt we should pity the state of his mind; but our primary consideration would be to take care of ourselves. We should knock him down first and pity him afterwards."

This "Jacksonian" way of looking at things obviously has its limitations. It is not very suitable for dealing with genuine complexity and ambiguity, for it is a view of the world that has little patience for the color gray. On the other hand, it is invaluable for cutting through a lot of cant and prevarication, and it is indispensable when there is in fact a straightforward conflict to be won.

It is a way of looking at America's dealings with the rest of the world that has not been over-represented at the presidential level in the 20th century: Teddy Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan—until now that has been about it. But one senses that this tradition may be well represented in this Bush Administration. Indeed, given his Texan background and what we know about his thinking, the President himself may adhere to many of its precepts and assumptions. The Jacksonian tradition may be even better represented in the person of Rudy Giuliani. One certainly hopes that his rejection of a donation from a Saudi prince that came accompanied by an offensive sermon represents the authentic mood of the country.

Some would say that it does not. Writing in the *New York Times* in mid-October, for example, Maureen Dowd maintained that a people who until a few weeks ago had lived in "a paradise of trivia, wallowing in celebrity, consumerism

and cosmetic surgery" now inhabited "a paranoia of trivia", as the fear of envelopes containing white powder spread. Perhaps. But observing America from a great distance—which may not altogether be a bad thing at a time like this—it seems to me that such a judgment sells the American people short. The citizens of New York—a city that embodied the culture of celebrity and consumerism more than any other—responded to the events of September 11 in a way that did not suggest that they had been fatally enfeebled or rendered paranoid by having lived trivial lives. Having observed the *modus operandi* of the American media at close quarters for 18 years, I suspect that the anthrax "panic", being a good story, has been overplayed.

I believe that the American people have grasped the enormity of the insult that the United States has suffered. They have registered the unrelenting hatred of America that gave rise to it, which in turn has generated a visceral and implacable demand not only for justice but for revenge, and not only toward the particular terrorists responsible but for destroying the will and capacity of international terrorism generally and all who help sustain it. They recognize that negotiation and compromise are not options in dealing with fanaticism, that they amount to nothing but an appeasement that is bound to fail.

If this mood is sustained and this resolve holds, what will have happened will not be so much the entry of America into a new era but the end of a brief pause when euphoria and illusion flourished. It will mean a return to an older, more sober, and above all more realistic state of mind about the world. □

NEW FROM THE NIXON CENTER

SHIELD EMBATTLED:

MISSILE DEFENSE AS A FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM

BY

PETER W. RODMAN



The deployment of a limited missile defense system to protect America against attacks from so-called rogue states, attempts at nuclear blackmail, and the accidental or unauthorized launch of a nuclear missile has been a top priority of the Bush Administration both before and after the tragic events of September 11. The Nixon Center's former Director of National Security Programs, Peter W. Rodman, examines the foreign policy challenges—both real and imagined—that face the United States in developing and deploying such a system in this paper, his final work before assuming the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Of course, the views expressed are solely his own.

The full text of *Shield Embattled* is available for download at www.nixoncenter.org. Soft-cover copies are available for \$9.95 plus shipping and handling charges at 800-872-8865.



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“WHAT HAPPENED in September was not that the world changed in some fundamental manner, but that, in the most dramatic way, a group of ideas and assumptions about the world that had come to prevail among large sections of Western elites was shown to be at best inadequate and at worst utterly false.”

—Owen Harries

“THOSE STATES that support terrorism are expecting a U.S. response commensurate with the magnitude of the attack against us, and it would be a great mistake to disappoint them.”

—Richard Perle

“A NARROW definition of what we fight as an illegitimate, crackpot splintering from sane and healthy religious and national communities may soothe consciences, serve short-term political ends and provide reassuring boundaries to our fears. But it is incorrect.”

—Eliot A. Cohen

“THERE IS a larger sense in which U.S. success and the demonstration of its power is important: If the United States is shown to be weak and vulnerable, the entire post-World War II international system will be put at risk, for that system rests, in the end, on American power.”

—Charles Krauthammer

“WE SHOULD not pretend that there are no consequences to the determined pursuit of U.S. national interests. The notion that particular U.S. policies and actions could have painful consequences may contradict America’s post-Cold War triumphalism, but no law of history says that good deeds go unpunished.”

—Dimitri K. Simes

“THE CHARACTER of most people is ‘built upon conventional morality. It leans on the social order. Mine stands free from everything artificial. They are bound in all sorts of conventions. They depend on life . . . whereas I depend on death, which knows no restraints and cannot be attacked. My superiority is evident.’”

—Robert D. Kaplan, quoting “the professor”
in Joseph Conrad’s *The Secret Agent*